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ABSTRACT 
Operation of Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) has increased significantly over 
the past few years. However, routine operation in non-segregated airspace 
remains a challenge, primarily due to nature of the environment and restrictions 
and challenges that accompany this. Currently, tight human control is envisaged 
as a means to achieve the oft quoted requirements of transparency1, 
equivalence2 and safety. However, the problems of high cost of human 
operation, potential communication losses and operator remoteness remain as 
obstacles. One means of overcoming these obstacles is to devolve authority, 
from the ground controller to an on-board system able to understand its 
situation and make appropriate decisions when authorised. Such an on-board 
system is known as an Autonomous System. 
The nature of the autonomous system, how it should be designed, when and 
how authority should be transferred and in what context can they be allowed to 
control the vehicle are the general motivation for this study.  To do this, the 
system must overcome the negative aspects of differentiators that exist 
between UASs and manned aircraft and introduce methods to achieve required 
increases in the levels of versatility, cost, safety and performance. 
The general thesis of this work is that the role and responsibility of an airborne 
autonomous system are sufficiently different from those of other conventionally 
controlled manned and unmanned systems to require a different architectural 
approach. Such a different architecture will also have additional requirements 
placed upon it in order to demonstrate acceptable levels of Transparency, 
Equivalence and Safety. 
The architecture for the system is developed from an analysis of the basic 
requirements and adapted from a consideration of other, suitable candidates for 
                                            
1
 Transparency means vehicle operation such that an external observer, such as Air Traffic 
Control or other aircraft, would not be able to determine whether the vehicle was manned or 
otherwise.  
2
 Equivalence refers to the ability of the vehicle operation to adhere equivalently as a manned 
aircraft to the rules and regulations relevant to the airspace it is operating in. 
ii 
effective control of the vehicle under devolved authority. The best practices for 
airborne systems in general are identified and amalgamated with established 
principles and approaches of robotics and intelligent agents. From this, a 
decision architecture, capable of interacting with external human agencies such 
as the UAS Commander and Air Traffic Controllers, is proposed in detail. This 
architecture has been implemented and a number of further lessons can be 
drawn from this. 
In order to understand in detail the system safety requirements, an analysis of 
manned and unmanned aircraft accidents is made. Particular interest is given to 
the type of control moding of current unmanned aircraft in order to make a 
comparison, and prediction, with accidents likely to be caused by autonomously 
controlled vehicles. The effect of pilot remoteness on the accident rate is 
studied and a new classification of this remoteness is identified as a major 
contributor to accidents A preliminary Bayesian model for unmanned aircraft 
accidents is developed and results and predictions are made as an output of 
this model. 
From the accident analysis and modelling, strategies to improve UAS safety are 
identified. Detailed implementations within these strategies are analysed and a 
proposal for more advanced Human-Machine Interaction made. In particular, 
detailed analysis is given on exemplar scenarios that a UAS may encounter. 
These are: Sense and Avoid3, Mission Management Failure, Take Off/Landing, 
and Lost Link procedures and  Communications Failure. These analyses 
identify the nature of autonomous, as opposed to automatic, operation and 
clearly show the benefits to safety of autonomous air vehicle operation, with an 
identifiable decision architecture, and its relationship with the human controller. 
From the strategies and detailed analysis of the exemplar scenarios, proposals 
are made for the improvement of unmanned vehicle safety The incorporation of 
these proposals into the suggested decision architecture are accompanied by 
                                            
3
 A Sense and Avoid system is the equivalent of the manned aircraft requirement for a pilot to 
lookout for other aircraft to avoid mid-air collisions (the so-called “See and Avoid” 
requirement). 
iii 
analysis of the levels of benefit that may be expected. These suggest that a 
level approaching that of conventional manned aircraft is achievable using 
currently available technologies but with substantial architectural design 
methodologies than currently fielded. 
Keywords: UAS, Safety, Human Machine Interaction, Sense and Avoid. 
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PROLOGUE 
“Writing a Thesis is an adventure. To begin with, it is a toy and an amusement. 
Then it becomes a mistress, then a master and eventually a tyrant. Finally, just 
as you are reconciled to your servitude, you kill the monster and submit”. 
Paraphrased from Winston Churchill 
Winston was right - writing a thesis as a contribution to original knowledge is an 
awesome task. One has to take a subject, forensically research it, investigate 
flaws and develop new areas, propose further avenues of work, and finally, 
defend it against all argument as a statement of certainty of knowledge. 
However, in doing so, one becomes increasingly aware, and uncomfortable, 
that there can be no such certain statement. A Thesis is definitely not an 
statement of certainty – it is only an argument; perhaps a well thought out and 
researched one, but one that is always susceptible to the law of uncertainty – 
Heisenberg perhaps got it right after all; and the never proven, but incredibly 
successful theory of Quantum Mechanics, repeatedly provides evidence that 
there is nothing in nature that is certain, and more so, is unlikely (excuse the 
pun) to be proven to be so.  
Neither is the so called “Test of Time” a good test – there were 350 years 
between Newton and Einstein – what were all the physicists doing in between; 
perhaps they were satisfied they were certain in their knowledge. If they were 
truly masters of their craft, they would have known, in their heart of hearts, that 
this was untrue. 
If anything, all a thesis can ever say is that, at this moment in time, I believe this 
to be true and that is uncertainly right, and therefore likely to be, perhaps in the 
next moment of time, certainly wrong! 
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 ASTRAEA is charged with providing the technology and maturity of test applications which 
will eventually enable the routine use of UASs in UK un-segregated airspace. 
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1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 General Motivation 
Airborne military and civil vehicles, and the means to control them, are changing 
rapidly. Although Uninhabited Air Vehicles (UAVs) have operated in the military 
sector for many years, there has been a recent and significant acceleration of 
programmes to develop, manufacture and operate them not only in combat 
arenas but also in the civil sector. Whilst the manufacture of small UAVs is 
cheap and development is relatively quick, the routine operation of these 
vehicles in civil airspace, currently containing only manned aircraft, is neither. 
This is largely due to the nature of the operating environment and the 
restrictions and challenges it brings. Restrictions, due to fact that the 
environment is highly regulated and therefore controlled, and challenges, due to 
the fact that the environment is uncertain and hazardous. The means to 
overcome these restrictions and challenges can be satisfied, to a degree, by 
having tight human control over the vehicle. However, if we require these 
vehicles to be operated with minimal human involvement, due to the high cost 
of human labour, then new ways of overcoming the restrictions and meeting the 
challenges must be sought.  
Thus we see a current picture of thousands (literally) of different UAVs being 
built but only a few being able to operate in either diverse roles, conditions or 
airspace categories, and none whatsoever with respect to all three aspects. 
So, the challenge today is to reduce operating costs by gradually replacing the 
human involvement in the control process whilst retaining satisfactory operating 
performance and regulatory adherence. This can be achieved by transferring 
authority for some of the control functions normally made by the pilot or ground 
controller, to an on-board system able to make decisions and implement them. 
Such a system is conventionally known as an autonomous system. When 
such a system is incorporated into a UAV, the consequent vehicle and Ground 
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Control System is described collectively as an Uninhabited Autonomous Air 
System (UAAS)5.  
Which functions should be transferred, how should they be implemented and in 
what context can they be allowed to control the vehicle are the general 
motivation for this study, as these aspects are still largely unproven and, where 
they have been identified, are often at the early stages of development and 
design. 
1.1.1 The Operating Environment 
As discussed above, the operating characteristics, and therefore the 
requirements, for an airborne system are largely determined by the nature of 
the environment in which it operates. The nature of this environment, and the 
characteristics it imposes, are briefly touched upon here and described more 
fully in the next Chapter. 
 The operational environment for a UAS: 
 Has collision hazards, either with other airborne, and likely to be manned 
objects, or with the ground. These must be avoided with an extremely 
high degree of success as the consequences of collision are potentially 
life threatening. Typical probabilities of success are likely to be < 10-9 per 
flying hour6. 
 Contains uncertain, incomplete and inaccurate data – the environmental 
dimension for a typical aircraft is vast. Even a light aircraft can routinely 
operate within an area of 50,000 sq. nm. Large aircraft are global in their 
sphere of operation. The aircraft density in the air environment is vastly 
uneven. Airborne entities are present in dense clusters near airports yet 
                                            
5
 There are several descriptions and definitions of UAV, UAS and UAAS available from a 
variety of sources, some authoritive, some not. Nearly all are at variance with each other. 
Throughout the rest of this Thesis, the term Uninhabited Air System (UAS), taken to mean an 
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irrespective of whether or not it is autonomous, automatic or remotely piloted 
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hazard. Protection against such events for medium/large civilian aircraft is specified such that 
the probability of the event occurring is less than < 10-9 per flying hour. 
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widely separated over oceanic areas. Objects, and their associated data, 
within the operating area may or may not be sensed. Even if they are, it 
may not be to a level of accuracy that is required. 
 Is highly regulated – aircraft must conform to the rules of the air and 
operate to tight procedural control under certain circumstances. 
Operating under this control, i.e. Air Traffic Control (ATC), is mandatory 
when flying into and out of an airfield or airport. It is also mandatory for 
certain categories of airspace. This requires that the platform must 
communicate, understand and conform to ATC commands in a highly 
robust and reliable way. 
In order for UASs to operate in regulated airspace, there is a requirement 
for adherence to two main principles: Transparency and Equivalence [1]. 
Transparency means that UASs should not require special procedures or 
equipment fits and must operate in the same way as other aircraft. In 
short, it should be transparent to other air users or controllers that the 
aircraft is unmanned. Equivalence requires that the UAS operates to the 
same regulation set as other air users and performs to a standard 
equivalent to that of a manned aircraft. Thus some of the functions of a 
manned aircraft performed by the pilot, such as look out, must be 
replicated in some form, and to the same level of performance, as a 
human. 
 Dynamic - and therefore capable of leading to a variety of unforeseen 
events such as : 
o Emergencies of a diverse nature such as fires, engine failures, 
operation outside a planned envelope etc. 
o In flight changes of missions, plans, targets, roles and 
responsibilities. 
o Pop up threats to avoid, such as threatening hostile objects 
(military) or storm and turbulent air centres. 
o Pop up objects to co-operate or co-ordinate with. 
o Changes in environmental conditions such as precipitation, 
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turbulence, icing, wind and temperature. These changes can 
sometimes occur quite rapidly and often have consequences on 
the operation of the vehicle. 
 Has gravity as an opponent! The vast majority of air vehicles are heavier-
than-air and rely on systems (engines for powered aircraft; vertical wind 
for gliders) for generating lift. These systems generally have fixed 
resources and before they run out, the aircraft must land. After they have 
run out, the aircraft will certainly crash. The former requires an airfield, 
which in turn must be precisely navigated to, and the latter usually 
implies some form of damage, which in the worst case may be fatal, 
either to the occupants or to those on the ground. 
In short, the environment is inherently unsafe. This in turn requires that the 
systems which operate within it have certain characteristics, some of which are 
commented on here: 
 The vehicles need to operate in real time and continuously. To do this, 
most of their systems need to do the same. This requires that: 
o They are robust and reliable – they cannot stop or pause. If they 
are computers, they must be guaranteed not to crash and to 
complete their computing within a defined timescale. This usually 
also entails some form of high integrity software. 
o Must handle Mission Critical functions. This usually entails some 
form of redundancy. 
o Must handle Safety Critical functions, failure of which must not 
either occur or must be handled in a fail-safe way. This usually 
entails some forms of redundant safety modes and even higher 
levels of software integrity. 
Later, it will be seen that avionic systems, and the standards to which they have 
been built, have evolved to encompass these requirements and face up to the 
challenges of the operating environment. 
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1.1.2 Control of Unmanned Air System 
UASs can be flown in a variety of control modes all of which have in common 
the fact that the pilots, commander or operator(s) are remote from the vehicle, 
either within, or beyond, the line of sight.  
The most common mode of control, particularly for light UASs is remote control 
operation whereby the operator flies the aircraft manually at all times like a 
model aircraft. Such operation requires a high level of skill and many accidents 
of vehicles using this type of operation are skill based errors, the majority being 
prevalent in the take-off and landing phases of flight. Of course, if these 
vehicles are cheap, easy to repair, or even disposable, then such accidents, 
provided they do not endanger life, are acceptable. 
However, where such accidents are not acceptable, then in order to reduce the 
probability of their occurrence, some UASs have automated flight control (i.e. an 
autopilot) and only use manual control for take-off and landing. The USA’s 
Predator UAS is a good example. 
Again, in an attempt to reduce skill based errors causing accidents, automated 
control can be used in all phases of flight. This automation can also be 
extended to include areas other than flight control, such as path and mission 
planning. The USA’s Global Hawk UAS is an example.  
Finally, it is possible to confer a degree of autonomy to the UAS and allow it to 
make its own decisions according to the situation it is in and under specific 
conditions of authorisation. Such systems are considered Uninhabited 
Autonomous Air Systems (UASs). They potentially offer many advantages 
compared to conventionally controlled UASs but also bring fresh challenges. 
The nature of those challenges, the means to meet them, and the 
consequences are the main thrust of this thesis. Currently there are no known 
examples of autonomous UASs, as opposed to automated (no matter how 
highly), in the field. 
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1.1.3 Control of Autonomous Systems 
Systems for autonomous control have been progressing for the last twenty five 
years and that progress has been strongly associated with that of increasing 
computing power. Many theoretical arguments have been advanced and 
consequent system models have been built to do a variety of tasks. Recently 
these have branched into many areas: web crawlers, manufacturing and vehicle 
control are some examples. The most interesting, and probably diverse, are 
those for the control of robots; generally small and ground based. These have 
evolved over the last few years and their general design apparently seems to 
have stabilised with the general consensus of the robotic community. This 
general design, or architecture, is frequently referred to as the Three Layer 
Architecture (TLA), so called because it is made up of three primary functions: 
planning, sequencing, and control. This general architecture is investigated in 
some depth at  Para. 3.2.5. 
1.1.4 Autonomous Control of Air Systems 
So, it seems that there is consensus within the robotic community of the 
suitability of the TLA for control, and there is consensus within the avionic 
community for the general design principles of avionic systems (which can be 
used for control). However, there appears to be no confluence at present 
between avionic systems and robotic architectures for the control of 
autonomous air systems. This could be for several reasons: 
 Money – avionic systems are very expensive (compared to robotic 
systems). Research using complete systems would normally be outside 
the financial scope of a university student or team. In addition, the funds 
for a UAS are usually used up on the airframe, engine and vehicle 
control system with little for the mission system. This is due to the need 
to get the vehicle flying as early as possible.   
 Availability - high, or even medium, fidelity models of avionic systems 
are usually unavailable from system designers who are operating in a 
very competitive market. In addition, suitably detailed, high fidelity, 
models of the operating environment, known as a Synthetic Environment 
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(SE), are equally unavailable. 
 Need – in order to just get airborne, fly around and land in fully restricted 
airspace, perhaps doing something interesting in between, does not 
require a heavy weight avionic system conforming to international 
standards. Corners can, and should for many cases, easily be cut and in 
many ways, particularly for research purposes. However, in order to 
develop a system that will conform to these standards is a serious and 
expensive undertaking. 
 Performance - robotics research work is often limited in scope and 
achievement to focus upon a specialised topic of interest. Whilst valid, it 
has to be recognised that this approach would not test the limitations in 
a complex UAS control architecture where many compromises have to 
be made in order to do difficult and/or complex tasks. 
 Automatic systems – many systems, particularly avionic ones, whilst 
claiming to be autonomous, are frequently found to be, on inspection, 
merely automated7. Why, because autonomous control of an air vehicle 
is a difficult, and as discussed, a potentially dangerous thing either to do, 
or be allowed to do. 
1.1.5 Human Control Aspects 
In identifying that the control mechanisms of a UAS are distributed between the 
remote ground operator, who has overall command responsibility, and the on-
board autonomous system, it is likely that the architecture of future UASs will be 
driven by the need to reduce the involvement of humans, particularly in terms of 
direct control. The drivers for this can be summarised as follows: 
 Bandwidth As the number of UASs grow, so the requirement for higher 
levels of bandwidth increases. In recent years the number of UASs in 
the “field” has grown exponentially. Unfortunately the available spectrum 
is characterised by the laws of physics and other users and is, in 
practical terms, capped. One way of reducing the bandwidth requirement 
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is to increase on-board autonomy. 
 Operating Cost There is a need to drive down operating costs. 
Currently, the major part of this are the number of humans required to 
operate the vehicle8. If some of these tasks can be undertaken by the 
on-board systems, then operating costs can be reduced. 
 Operator Remoteness The fact the operator is remote from the 
vehicle can lead to loss of control and/or situational awareness and 
consequently, in extreme cases, loss of the UAS. In some cases, it may 
be possible that the UAS is better informed of its state than its operator. 
In such cases, if they can be identified, provision by way of design 
features can avoid such losses. This is a major point within this thesis 
and is discussed at length later. 
Clearly, the inherent nature of distributed and remote human control of the UAS 
brings its own problems and, when compared to the control aspects of a 
conventional aircraft, the opportunity for failure within a UAS leading to an 
accident is clearly likely to be different. 
Whilst it is true that humans cause accidents, they are also well placed to 
prevent accidents. Their special skills in reasoning and extensive experience, 
coupled with their ability to successfully react to unforeseen and complex 
situations, enable them prevent the propagation of errors could ultimately result 
in an accident. So, accident prevention in a UAS is likely to be different to a 
conventional aircraft. 
The industry standard for the analysis of human error in aircraft accidents is the 
Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) of Wiegmann and 
Shappell [2]. This in turn is based on a more abstract model of human error 
proposed by James Reason [3] and which is frequently referred to as the “Swiss 
Cheese” model. This is so named due to its likening of circumstances, failure 
and error being propagated through “holes” in barriers that would be normally 
expected to prevent accidents. This analysis taxonomy, based on the 
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classification of errors, can be applied to UAS accident modelling to discover 
accident causal factors and identify architectural safeguarding mechanisms that 
can be applied to reduce the accident rate of UASs to an acceptable level. 
1.1.6 UAS Safety 
The requirement for safety has already been mentioned. There are, however, 
several drivers associated with this. The primary ones are certification and, as 
usual, cost.  
For UASs, certainly in the UK (of above 25Kgs weight), before they can be 
flown on a routine basis, they must be demonstrated to be safe to operate. In 
other words, there is a requirement to prove that there is a minimum of risk to 
human life. Unfortunately, UAS have a poor safety record with an accident rate 
at least an order of magnitude greater than that of General Aviation9. The route 
to certification is discussed in detail later but suffice it to say there is, as yet, not 
one UAS, fully certificated for flying in routine airspace, anywhere in the world. 
This poor safety record is largely attributable to early design decisions to keep 
costs down. However, with the increased capability of UASs, this view is shifting 
as evidenced by the following remarks: General Jumper, the US Air Force Chief 
of Staff in 2005 [4]: “We've... got to have some respect for the fact that (just) 
because these are UASs, they are neither expendable or disposable. They cost 
a lot of money”. Similarly, General Hal Hornberg, Head of USAF Air Combat 
Command in 2008 [5]: “.. we can’t treat these things like disposable diapers and 
just throw them out. These things cost money, and it comes out of your 
Treasury, just like it comes out of ours”.  
On a more tangible basis, the largest and most sophisticated UAS in the market 
is the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk which has a published fly away cost of 
about $80m (and increasing). 
From the above remarks (and their tone), together with knowledge of costs 
comparable with manned aircraft, we can take it that there is a pressing need to 
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reduce the accident rate of medium to large UASs on a cost basis alone. (See 
also Table 4: Examples of Manned/Unmanned Aircraft Reliability  
1.1.7 UASs’ Control Architectures 
Current UASs have simple control architectures based heavily on manned 
aircraft and there has been little in the way of design progression to 
accommodate the lack of the on-board human or the fact that he is remote. The 
only condescension is the addition of a simple “lost link” facility. Study of current 
control mechanisms, which will be called architectures, invariably leads to the 
impression that there is a pretence that he (the pilot) is, “in effect on board” and 
that there is little that therefore needs to be done to accommodate the fact that 
this is patently untrue. Every UAS Ground Control Station, to date, looks like a 
cockpit10 – the flight crew (If we can call them that) even wear flying clothes 
(including “wings”), thus increasing the illusion of “in effect on board”.  
If we now extend the functionality of the on-board system to act autonomously 
under certain circumstances, this pretence becomes increasingly untenable. 
That the architecture must be (re)-designed to reflect the true reality must be 
acknowledged and this is the fundamental motivator for the study. 
1.2 Statement of Thesis 
The general thesis of this work is that the role, responsibilities and environment 
of an airborne autonomous system, specifically an Uninhabited Autonomous Air 
System (UAS), are sufficiently different from those of other conventionally 
controlled manned and unmanned systems to require a different architectural 
approach. Such a different architecture will also have additional requirements 
placed upon it in order to demonstrate: 
• Acceptable safety levels, preferably at least comparable to 
conventionally manned aircraft. 
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• Acceptable levels of performance despite reduced human presence on 
board. 
• Acceptable levels of integrity and robustness to unforeseen events, again 
despite reduced human intervention. 
1.3 Specific Aims of the Study 
The aim of the study was to address the following questions arising from the 
general thesis: 
• What do the issues of role, responsibility and environment force the 
architecture to achieve that is not found in other architectures? 
• Can existing autonomous system architectures address these issues?  If 
so, how, to what degree and why? If not, why not? 
• In order to satisfy regulatory authorities and to operate safely and 
effectively, the UAS “decision agent” will be required to perform 
competently in routine airspace, almost certainly to the level approaching 
that of a human pilot. Knowing that the operator is remote, what effect 
does this have on the underlying accident rate compared to manned 
aircraft? Are the accident mechanisms the same or different? 
• Given that operator involvement should be reduced to the lowest level 
possible, how does the need for operator interaction affect the design of 
the architecture, particularly with respect to the need to safeguard 
against novel accident mechanisms? 
1.4 Approach 
The approach taken to address these questions was to: 
 Understand the nature of autonomous air systems and their underlying 
architectures for decision making in an airborne environment by: 
o Undertaking a review of existing architectures, irrespective of the 
environment for which they were intended, and determine their 
key characteristics. 
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o Determining the fundamental requirements specific to airborne 
architectures. 
o Assessing the suitability of the existing architectures against these 
requirements. 
 Understand the relationship between the distributed control mechanisms 
of the human operator and the on-board autonomous air system 
 Propose a robust architecture suitable for increased devolved control 
whilst maintaining high levels of performance, integrity and safety.  
 Investigate models and levels of human failure 
 Extend the above models of accident causation with particular respect to 
additional and alternate modes of UASs and their operation when 
compared to conventional manned and unmanned aircraft.  
 Use the accident model and associated data to improve the proposed 
decision architecture design. 
 Assess the proposed architecture against conventional approaches and 
determine the likely impact of these improvements on UASs future safety 
records. 
1.5 Assumptions 
It is assumed that: 
 The UAS is sufficiently large, nominally greater than 150 kg and 
generally of the order of 2000kg, to require adherence to the UK Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA) recommendations covering the routine 
operation of UASs in UK airspace11 as well as those regulations specified 
in the CAA Air Navigation Order. In addition, the class of the UAS is 
assumed to be Class 5 (i.e. designed to operate in all classes of UK 
airspace). 
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 The UAS should have a variable level of human operator interaction and 
therefore be capable of operating with a high degree of autonomy 
consistent with achieving appropriate levels of performance, safety and 
regulatory adherence. 
 The sub-systems of a UAS, including the decision making system, will 
have the general characteristics of current avionic systems. 
 The decision making system is contained within the avionic system. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This Thesis is structured as follows: 
In Chapter 2, a statement of the problem to be studied is elaborated which 
encompasses a review of UAS and manned aircraft operations. This also 
identifies the key factors that motivate the trend from manual, through automatic 
and finally to autonomous operation of the air vehicle. 
In Chapter 3, the requirements for decision architecture for a UAS are 
developed and a detailed proposal advanced. 
In Chapter 4 the issue of safety is addressed and a preliminary probabilistic 
accident model advanced. This highlights accident modes specific to UASs and 
indicates a route to improved safety. 
In Chapter 5, strategies for improved safety are identified and target levels are 
specified. 
In Chapter 6, exemplar scenarios are proposed and the operation of the 
decision architecture in those scenarios is analysed in detail. In particular, a 
comparison with automatic modes of operation is discussed.  
In Chapter 7, a discussion of the overall results is given, including an estimate 
of safety levels of the architecture likely to be achieved. 
The final Chapter 8 draws appropriate conclusions and suggests avenues for 
further research. 
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1.7 A Summary of the Major Original Contributions of the Work 
1.7.1 The Proposed Decision Architecture 
Whilst development of the Three Layer Architecture (TLA) for robots and the 
need for effective world modelling was completed before this work began, the 
identification of a complex hierarchical Information Layer to complement that 
architecture was not and I believe that this work is the first to propose, 
implement, demonstrate and analyse, a complex, scalar and innovative decision 
architecture for an autonomous UAS. This is particularly so in the area of safety. 
Also, very few (if any) of the wide variety of robots using the TLA have been 
developed to incorporate complementary involvement of humans. The fusion of 
the TLA with avionic practises, the application of the Pilot Authorisation and 
Control of Tasks (PACT) levels to enable a complete range of human 
involvement from zero to full control, the demonstration that the architecture is 
fully capable of generating behaviours ranging from deliberative through to 
reactive as an inherent feature with no special provision or switching of modes, I 
believe to be not only original but also novel and exciting. 
1.7.2 A Bayesian Approach to Accident Modelling 
There has been at least one analysis of manned aircraft accidents using some 
aspects of Bayesian models [6] and there have been analyses of unmanned 
aircraft accidents using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS), but not, I believe, one to date that has combined both of these 
avenues and looked at unmanned aircraft accidents from the perspective of 
their control moding whether using a Bayesian approach or not and certainly not 
of autonomously controlled vehicles.  
1.7.3 Strategies for the Improved Safety of Autonomous Air 
Vehicles 
In outlining strategies for improving the safety of autonomous air vehicles, three 
aspects are presented all of which are novel. The checking of operator beliefs 
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by a process of abduction is original though based on work by McGuinness and 
Dawson when they developed Quantative Analysis of Situation Awareness 
(QUASA) (they stopped at generating an SA metric). The concept of plausibility 
checking has been around but again I know of no suggestion or implementation 
that it is comprehensively used for the checking of critical beliefs (to date no 
aircraft have beliefs, nor are any (sufficiently) self-aware as a route to safety. 
Since there has been little published research into the Human Factors of 
autonomous systems, the requirements, one could say design rules, presented 
here, together with a concept display demonstrating them, is entirely original. If 
nothing else, it identifies the need for a considerable investment in such 
research. 
1.7.4 Findings from the Analysis of the Exemplars 
Analysis of the Exemplars, particularly those regarding the Sense and Avoid 
and Flight Management scenarios, reveals new knowledge regarding the far 
more useful, and I believe safe, role an autonomous system with a decision 
architecture such as that proposed, can contribute especially in comparison to 
automated architectures. The analysis clearly shows that such an architecture 
keeps a human supervisor in the loop, and therefore informed, far longer and 
more appropriately that an automatic system.  This together with the inherent 
deliberative/reactive range of behaviours demonstrated is, I contend, not only 
original but also a major breakthrough for the future acceptance of autonomous 
air vehicles. 
1.7.5 The Identification of Accident Modes Relating to Pilot 
Remoteness 
Although some Human Factors engineers have noted that UAS operators are 
affected by remoteness, I know of little work that has investigated that aspect in 
detail or identified that such remoteness leads to new classes of accidents. 
These classes can , of course, be added to the HFACS taxonomy. 
16 
1.7.6 The Nature of Autonomy and a Comparison with Automation 
Several researchers, Weiner, Norman, Bainbridge etc. have identified the 
dangers of humans’ relationship with automation and the danger that can bring. 
However, I know of little that has been researched to date on the relationship 
between autonomous systems and humans; certainly none to the detail herein. 
Nor, ipso facto, has there been such a comparison, as presented here, of the 
differences between humans controlling automatic as opposed to autonomous 
systems . 
1.7.7 Validation of the SEBA Approach to Systems Design 
Although not an aim of the thesis, it is a fact that the Autonomous Integrated 
Mission System (AIMS) decision architecture was developed according to the 
Synthetic Environment Based Acquisition and in doing so, validated much of the 
theoretically derived advantages of such a process, particularly that regarding 
integration risk, operator involvement at an early stage and incremental 
acquisition. This, I believe, is a first for such a large development programme 
over 5 years. 
1.8 Publications and Presentations 
1.8.1 Papers Submitted 
The following papers have been published based on some of the findings in this 
Thesis: 
• C H Patchett, V.V.Sastry: “Decision Architectures for an Uninhabited 
Autonomous Air System”, 6th Eurosim Congress on Simulation and 
Modelling, Ljubljana, Slovenia, September 2007. 
• C H Patchett, V.V.Sastry: “A Preliminary Model of Accident Causality 
for Uninhabited Autonomous Air Systems and Its Implications for their 
Decision Architectures”, IEEE Tenth International Conference on 
Computer Modelling and Simulation, Cambridge, UK, April 2008 
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• C.H. Patchett, D. Ansell: ”The Development of an Advanced 
Autonomous Integrated Mission System for Uninhabited Air Systems 
to Meet UK Airspace Requirements”, CEAS 2009, Manchester, 
October 2009. 
• C.H. Patchett, D. Ansell: ”An Advanced Autonomous Mission System 
for an Uninhabited Air Vehicle to Meet UK Airspace Requirements”, 
ISMS, Liverpool, 2010. 
• C H Patchett, V.V.Sastry: “The Pilot as an Intelligent Sensor: What 
UASs and Pilots are Missing”, currently available in draft and awaiting 
publication, May 2011 
1.8.2 Formal Presentations 
A number of informal presentations of parts of this work has been presented, 
certainly too many to outline here. However, in addition to the papers presented 
at the conferences specified above, the following major formal presentations 
have been made: 
• “Control, Autonomy and Safety of UAASs”, Autonomy Workshop, 
Shrivenham, Cranfield University, March 2009. 
• “Sense and Avoid Control Architectures for Uninhabited Air Systems”, 
Student Symposium, Shrivenham, Cranfield University, June 2010. 
• “The Advanced Autonomous Integrated Mission System”, to an 
audience of Members of the IET, BAE Systems Warton, November 
2010. 
• “Certification of Civil Autonomous UASs: Research Questions and 
Issues”, to members of the Civil Aviation Authority, November 2010. 
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2 Statement of the Problem 
“When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that 
something is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he 
states that something is impossible, he is very probably wrong.” 
Clarke's First Law, Arthur C. Clarke 
2.1 The Advent of UASs 
In this Chapter, the evolution of unmanned flight is discussed. In particular, the 
nature and reasons for the compression of that evolution are presented. For 
some, the history of unmanned flight is merely a continued part of the history of 
manned flight and it is constructive to have a short but relevant review of this. 
2.1.1 Manned flight 
It is useful to momentarily reflect on the evolutionary scale and impact of the 
aeroplane on society in general. The aeroplane has made the world a far 
smaller place, has had an enormous effect on economics and warfare and has 
expanded man’s horizons, not only physically but also mentally. It has given 
man that stepping stone to the “final frontier”. And in such a short time – literally 
the span of a single lifetime.  Between Louis Bleriot, the first man to fly across 
the channel (1909) and John Young, the first Space Shuttle pilot (1981), there 
are only 72 years. Between, the first manned flight of the Wright brothers and 
Chuck Yeager flying at Mach12 2.5 there are only 50 years. 
The history of flight is really the history of manned flight. Without man’s 
ingenuity, endeavour, and endurance in the face of failure, there would be no 
aeroplane. Above all, however, it is the skill, aura and sheer bravura of the pilot 
that has been always ascendant in the history of flight. He is seen as the 
necessary ingredient to make the plane perform, sometimes at the limits of its 
design and at the edges of the environment.  
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That bravery is a necessary ingredient for a pilot is beyond question, especially 
when considering the early days of flight. The technology and limited 
understanding of materials and aerodynamics, coupled with the desire to 
expand the flight envelope, mainly for war, made the cockpit a dangerous place. 
In those early days, the aircraft was more likely to kill the pilot through 
mechanical failure than he was to kill himself through his own error. In the 
evolution of manned flight, that situation has been reversed. 
2.1.1.1 The Changing Role of the Pilot 
“There are old pilots and there are bold pilots – there are very few old and bold 
pilots”. Traditional, Anon 
In the early days of flight, pilots were true explorers, not to say adventurers – 
and they often did not last long! This exploration was multi-faceted. Not only 
were they exploring the environment and its physics, they were also exploring 
the theories of power, aerodynamics, structures and materials. However, it 
could be argued that the greatest exploration of all was that of flight control - the 
skills of the pilot, the response of the vehicle and the relationship between the 
two. The deeper the explorative venture, the higher the demands on pilot skill 
levels became.   
This exploration, rapidly accelerated by the First World War, led to new 
demands on pilot skills. He was not only expected to be able to control his 
aircraft under all circumstances, he often had to be a tactician, a marksman or a 
crew leader, a navigator, an engineer and a radio operator. In particular, the 
concept of making good judgements of situations in order to complete the flight 
successfully, emerged - what we now call “Situational Awareness”. A long 
standing Royal Air Force pilot adage, somewhat trite and school-boyish, but 
nevertheless, absolutely true, is: 
“A superior pilot is one who uses his superior 
judgement to avoid situations that require the use 
of his superior skills”. Anon. 
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In terms of flight control, automatic pilots or autopilots, have been around since 
the early days, aided by Charles Sperry’s invention of the gyroscope in 1909, 
and have since progressed via “George13”, through to the highly sophisticated 
Flight Control Systems (FCS) we have today, where an airliner is under 
automatic control shortly after take-off rotation until completion of braking on the 
destination runway, perhaps many thousand miles apart. 
Similarly, it did not take long for machine guns in fighter aircraft to be fixed 
mounted and aimed by pointing the aircraft. Gun sight technology advanced 
from the reflector gun sight (to avoid parallax error) to radar ranged gunfights 
(reduction of fall of shot errors) and lead computing gunfights (reduction of 
aiming errors in turns). A similar story for bombing has also unfolded. In fact, the 
early post war bombers of the RAF (the V-Force) had a Navigation and Bombing 
System (NBS) where the radar operator could control the aircraft and the 
bombing computer14 released the bombs automatically when the distance to the 
target equalled the forward throw of the bombs. This release, of course, had to 
be pre-authorised by the crew. 
Similar stories can be told for the roles of the flight engineer, wireless operator 
and navigator, although these duties are sometimes retained for specialist 
areas. Commercial pilots maintain currency in their traditional skills for particular 
situations where the machines cannot help, but for routine flight, they are rarely 
exercised in practice. 
However, the one thing that has not yet changed dramatically is the requirement 
for the pilot to exercise good situational judgement – and that requires the ability 
to project the current situation into the future and to plan accordingly. Machines 
can help but humans are still the best at situational awareness and planning, 
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 The nickname of the autopilot given by the crews of RAF heavy bombers in World War 2 
14
 One of the finest and last true examples of analogue computing. For example, the solution 
to the perennial navigational problem of solving the “triangle of velocities” (knowing 
heading/true airspeed and wind velocity, then calculate track and groundspeed) was achieved 
by literally having a metal triangle with variable length sides, adjusting two sides manually and 
measuring the third. It was extremely accurate; much more than required for the delivery of a 
nuclear weapon.   
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particularly creatively, when a situation has not been foreseen. However, there 
are signs that even this last bastion of pilot skill is on the cusp of change. 
2.1.1.2 Regulations and Procedures 
When Bleriot crossed the Channel in 1909, he did not need approval; he was 
the only one up there. However, as flight became more common, means of 
directing traffic became necessary. In addition, Rules of the Air were introduced 
whereby air users could operate together in safety. These Rules were based on 
rules for the only other similar form of transport – the sea. They still are, despite 
plenty of evidence that the environments are fundamentally different! 
As mentioned, the early aircraft were quite capable of killing the pilot and crew 
without their help, and so forms of regulations began to evolve which set 
standards for construction and licensing in order to improve safety. These have 
since evolved to a morass of regulations which have to be conformed to. These 
regulations, with an evolution of over a hundred odd years, have a single 
common factor. They all presume there is a pilot on board. 
Hence we have a requirement for air users to “See and Avoid” other aircraft. 
Another is to remain “clear of cloud” or “within sight of the ground”. Others 
include statements such as “Not to descend below decision height in cloud 
unless “in sight of the runway”, “If there is smoke in the cockpit”; “if there are 
signs of fire” etc. In fact, there are countless similar ones. 
In order to operate UASs, these requirements must be complied with - they are 
not going to go away (at least quickly). They have evolved over a hundred 
years, and thousands of air users comply with them every day. UASs will be 
expected to be no different. 
2.1.1.3 Operating Environment 
“What goes up, must come down – how it comes down is the important bit”.  
The air environment is unforgiving, primarily because we have had millions of 
years to adapt to the ground environment and only 100 years or so for the air. 
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For humans, it is unnatural. The truth is our brains can cope, hopefully more 
often than not, but our bodies frequently let us down. There is a vast world of 
aero-medical physiology which deals with the effects of the air environment on 
our bodies. We have no birdlike sense of direction – we need a reliable 
compass, map and judgement of the wind. We have no sense of altitude in 
cloud, nor speed through the air. Even the dynamics of turning flight can give us 
a wrong sense of balance, even to the point of not knowing which way is up. In 
clear sky, we can use our eyes, but in cloud we rely, literally for our lives, on 
instruments.  
As we go up, it gets colder, the air becomes thin and the partial pressure of 
oxygen in our lungs can get so dangerously low that we die. And there is 
weather to deal with. Not just cloud but thunderstorms, lightning, ice accretion, 
high winds, zero visibility, turbulence15 – the list is very long. 
Finally though, once flying, the only major concern is the landing. You can’t pull 
over as in a car or head back out to sea in a ship. You can’t halt things 
temporarily or press pause. Once things stop working, you’ve either landed or 
you’re going down. 
2.1.1.4 The Nature of Air Accidents – Human Error and Reliability 
“To err is human; to forgive is often too late” 
Because of the nature of the operating environment, human characteristics and 
the fact that machines have finite limits of reliability, there are always going to 
be accidents. The causes of these accidents are dealt with in detail later but 
suffice it to say that the breakdown of accident causality has changed 
considerably over the years. As mentioned, in the early years, when the 
sciences and machines were immature, aircraft were positively dangerous. 
Since then reliability has improved enormously, mainly due to improvements in 
design, materials, fuels, engines etc. and a recognition that the safest part of 
the flight envelope is in the middle – not at the extremes! 
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 And rather topically for the first time in UK aviation, volcanic ash! 
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That increase in maturity and reliability is not however matched by 
improvements in human abilities for evolutionary reasons. Nowadays, human 
error is responsible for about 75-80% of all air accidents. That is overall human 
error, not just pilot error. Human errors can occur due to poor organisational 
processes and culture, supervisory errors, including maintenance procedures 
and poor physiological states [3]. However, the pilot is the final barrier. He is the 
one who through poor judgement, lack of skill, bad decision making, risk-taking 
or just plain honest failing, causes the accident. Or, conversely, by using those 
extraordinary human skills to advantage, the pilot averts the accident and saves 
the passengers. 
2.1.2 The Rise of UASs [7] 
Most lay people will imagine that unmanned aircraft, let’s call them UASs for 
now, are a modern invention – certainly in the last 40 years. In fact, the 
Englishmen, John Stringfellow and William Henson built a steam powered 
propeller driven model aircraft with a 10 foot wingspan called the Aerial Steam 
Carriage. This odd looking aircraft successfully flew for a distance of 
approximately 60 yards in 1848, 55 odd years before the Wright Brothers. 
During the American Civil War, attempts were made with balloons fitted with 
incendiaries and timers to try to set fire to Republican lines - the first flying 
bombs! However, they were largely unsuccessful. The American experimenter 
Samuel Langley successfully flew a steam 
powered model he called “Aerodrome Number 
5” down the Potomac River for 3/4 of a mile 6 
months before the Wright Brothers first manned 
flight. However most would agree that the most 
recognisable forerunners of today’s UASs  were 
the American Navy Curtiss/Sperry “flying bomb“ 
which first flew in1918, together with the Charles 
Kettering Aerial Torpedo, also known as the Kettering Bug (see right). The 
“Bug” was a petrol fuelled propeller driven biplane which flew on a pre-set 
course for approximately 50 miles and was developed late in 1918. Many 
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thousands were due for manufacture (but only 36 were actually made) though it 
was rather unsuccessful, ironically, until the war ended when it then 
demonstrated a true capability 
The key technologies enabling the use of UASs were the Sperry designed 
barometer/altimeter and gyrocompass (for automatic flight control) and radio 
transmissions (for real time and remote, rather than pre-set, operation). The use 
of radio control was originally envisaged by Nikola Tesla in 1898. He conceived, 
and developed, radio controlled operation of a pair of six feet long boats, 
capable of carrying an explosive charge16. These were demonstrated to a crowd 
at Madison Square Garden, New York who were amazed at the operation of 
remote control and thought miniature trained monkeys or Black Magic were 
responsible. Tesla referred to these boats as “Teleautomatons17” and envisaged 
scores of them attacking naval ships controlled by specially trained operators. 
He offered the concept to the US Navy and British Admiralty without success. 
With the advent of aircraft some 6 years later, this concept was quickly 
translated, by others, to the air environment. 
With the onset of (relative) peace in 1918, the development of UASs slowed 
considerably but a new role emerged, that of aerial target tracking, which 
enabled weapon operators to hone their skills on live targets, with live weapons 
– the simulator age was still a way off!  Many hundreds of UASs were 
manufactured for this role in the mid-1930s, the best known of which was the 
Fairey “Queen Bee”18, and within which they were colloquially known as 
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 A perfect example that topicality is as powerful as technology. Science should be grateful 
that his invention never gained the interest of the US Navy or British Admiralty! This failure 
resulted in his teaming with Elmer Westinghouse for the development of modern alternating 
current electricity transmission – clearly far more useful to mankind. 
17
 “Telautomats will be ultimately produced, capable of acting as if possessed of their own 
intelligence, and their advent will create a revolution”. -Tesla, Nicola, in his book My 
Inventions, published in 1921. He also referred to them as tele-automatons. How true this all 
rings nowadays and what prescience. 
18
 This was a derivative of the DeHavilland Tiger Moth (many DeHavilland aircraft were 
named after insects) and some 420 were build. A senior RAF officer remarked that “ .. nearly 
all of them rendered valuable service over many years which says more about the state of 
contemporary UK anti-air defences than the resilience of the aircraft. Such UASs proved the 
vulnerability of ships prior to World War 2 (though most Naval people ignored the fact) and 
heralded the ascent of the aircraft carrier over the battleship. 
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“drones”19. The first really successful flying bombs though were German and 
developed in World War 2. These were the Henschel 293 rocket powered bomb 
and the Fritz-X glider bomb. They both had mid-course and terminal guidance 
using radio control directed by an operator on board the launch aircraft and both 
were highly successful. However, the most well-known, and it can be argued, 
the most successful20, was the Fieseler Fi103 better known as the V-1 Flying 
Bomb, though this was unguided in the sense that it was aimed at its target and 
then launched. 
A third role, in addition to aerial targets and flying bombs, was introduced in the 
mid-1950s – that of reconnaissance. The motivation for this is similar as for the 
other roles; simply that wartime reconnaissance missions are very dangerous 
[7]. The key enabling technologies were automatic camera operation and in-
flight film processing and, as long as the targets were not too far away, 
reasonably large and static, good results were obtained. However, the key 
limitation was effective navigational accuracy. A side show concerning this 
aspect came about as a race between cruise and ballistic missiles. Cruise 
missiles could carry the weight of early nuclear warheads but suffered from 
navigational inaccuracy as the duration of the longer flight accumulated 
unacceptable errors. Ballistic missiles however, with their relatively short flight 
time were accurate but could not carry the weight. The race was decided by a 
massive reduction in warhead weight and size thus favouring the ballistic 
missile but, crucially for UASs, the race speeded the development of the inertial 
platform which enables autonomous navigation21. This factor, together with 
modern updates and by closely coupling the inertial platform with a Global 
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 The origin of the “Drone” descriptor for UASs, doggedly and annoyingly used by modern 
journalists (and no others!), is sometimes ascribed to the widely used Queen Bee target UAS 
developed in 1933 (although why a UAS with a female bee’s name should be given a male 
bee’s title is beyond me). However, the first recorded reference was by a US Navy Lieutenant, 
Delmer Fahrney in 1936. 
20
 A British assessment in 1944 compared the cost of the V-1 campaign to the cost of its 
impact on the Allies concluded that the V-1 offered a 4:1 return on investment. 
21
 Generally credited to Dr Charles Stark Draper who evolved the theory, invented the 
technology , develop, manufacture and field the first inertial referenced platform in 1949. 
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Positioning System (GPS), has enabled the advent of the UAS to where it  
stands today. 
2.1.3 Bombs, Missiles and UASs - Differences and Similarities 
There is clearly a grey area in differentiating between flying bombs, missiles 
aircraft and UASs, particularly visually. Obvious discriminators are that bombs 
and missiles are fundamentally disposable, non-returnable and lethal whereas 
the vast majority (if not all) of UASs have some sort of recovery system. 
However, those aspects aside, would one describe the Kettering bug (see photo 
above) as a bomb – it clearly is an aircraft without a pilot in it. Similarly, the 
Kamikaze pilots of World War 2 Japan used the Baka, obviously at first sight a 
manned missile, but they also used converted aircraft loaded with high 
explosive. The specialist target UASs were clearly a cross between a missile 
and an aircraft, as was the V1 flying bomb, known colloquially as a 
Doodlebug22. Its successor, the V2, is obviously (to us) a missile and yet it had 
the same objective (and target – London) Perhaps because it had a ballistic 
trajectory and no wings, it qualifies as a missile. However, nearly all non-ballistic 
missiles have wings. It’s not clear cut and it is confusing – even to the so called 
experts!  
.More importantly however, because of the above mentioned key aspects of 
UASs, bombs and missiles, we can start to determine differentiators from 
manned aircraft in the areas of versatility, cost, reliability and safety – 
fundamental aspects that require addressing  for modern UAS operation and,  
as far as autonomous operation is concerned, the underlying basis for much of 
this work. 
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 This could properly be referred to as a drone, as its pulse jet engine made a characteristic 
drone like sound. 
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2.2 Differentiators between UASs and Manned Aircraft  
2.2.1 UAS Employments and Versatility 
As related, UASs, certainly for their first 50 odd years were extensively and 
almost exclusively used as aerial targets or flying weapons. These roles were 
augmented with that of reconnaissance in the mid-1950s. Since unmanned 
aircraft inherently operate without life support equipment, their range/duration 
can be extended, theoretically almost indefinitely. These considerations have 
led to the oft quoted preferred, or even essential, UAS roles as: 
 Dangerous – e.g. battlefield reconnaissance, either photographic or 
electronic. Politically, UASs are excellent for this role. If discovered, 
blame can be apportioned to the computers “malfunctioning”23. If shot 
down, there is no pilot to stand trial or be used as a hostage. To this 
must be added the obvious reduction in the loss of human life that 
typically arise from these missions being undertaken by UASs and all 
that accompanies it. 
 Dirty – e.g. nuclear reconnaissance24, volcanic ash sampling25. UASs 
can clearly undertake roles for which there is no (current) manned 
equivalent. 
 Dull – long (i.e. > 24hour) endurance missions.  These tend to be the 
most interesting from engineering and human factors viewpoints. Current 
experience in operating aircraft in long endurance missions is lacking 
and certain factors assume a lot higher importance than previously. One 
factor is reliability. Most aircraft consume their fatigue life during take-off 
and landings. If the proportion of such events relative to flight hours is 
drastically reduced, then either the airframe can be made lighter, or the 
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 A Snark missile fired eastwards from Florida in 1956 disappeared and was discovered by a 
Brazilian farmer in 1982 [7] 
24
“Sniffing” for radioactive fallout after nuclear weapon tests was a routine mission during the 
Cold War and resulted in many crews suffering from radiation sickness despite wearing lead-
lined flying suits (and drowning after ejection because of the weight of them). 
25
 When Mount Usu erupted in Japan in 2000, the country’s UAS fleet, normally occupied on 
agricultural duties, were deployed onto this task. 
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life time of the vehicle is extended. Equipments, particularly engines, 
mission or safety critical avionics, may have to be redesigned to have a 
much higher Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) than considered 
previously in order to realise the extra endurance. In the area of Human 
Factors, long endurance missions require operators to perform 
handovers, often many times during a mission and there is quite a body 
of evidence, which will be referred to later, that such handovers can be a 
fertile ground for causing accidents. 
As previously mentioned, reconnaissance remains the predominant role of the 
UAS – both in military and civilian usage - and this role is constantly being 
extended. For military reconnaissance, there is a sensing gap in the 
atmosphere. Manned aircraft can routinely fly up to about 50,000ft, whilst more 
specialist, and it has to be acknowledged, more expensive, aircraft can fly up to 
about 85,000ft. Far above this, the satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO)26 operate; 
the lowest generally about 200km (656,000ft) altitude. The role that UASs are 
now seen to fill is reconnaissance in the region above conventional aircraft and 
below that of the satellites. Whilst the specialist aircraft can operate for several 
hours, a UAS, such as Boeing’s Phantom Eye Demonstrator is designed to 
endure for 4 days. The operational version should extend this to 7-10 days. At 
65,000ft, such an aircraft can cover a radius of 965km with a single sweep of an 
rotating antenna (covering an area about the size of Afghanistan). This 
extension in capability is in response to the military requirement for continuous 
surveillance (so called “unblinking” coverage) of large areas. 
However, the single factor that stands out when considering UAS employment 
is that the missions that are currently flown are generally simple and require 
little versatility27. For example, the vast majority of Predator missions can be 
described as: take off from A and fly to area B; search area B and transmit 
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 Defined by NASA as “Low Earth orbit (LEO) - The region of space below the altitude of 
2000 km” cited in “NASA Safety Standard: Guidelines and Assessment Procedures for 
Limiting Orbital Debris, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance , Washington. August 1995.  
27
 Versatility here is meant to imply operation in environments that are complex or operations 
that are complex in themselves. It does not suggest here the ability to do several (simple) 
things at once. (Some authors prefer the term “flexibility”). 
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photographs; return to A and land. There are few alternative goals, such as: 
process imagery, avoid other objects and the ground, manage fuel efficiently, 
re-role in flight etc. Similarly, the vast majority of civil UASs are used for 
agricultural purposes (in Japan), primarily crop spraying and photography.  
Again, a simple and uncomplicated mission with few conflicting goals or tasks 
and requiring fairly low levels of performance and versatility to achieve the 
objective. 
It may be considered that the mission of the airliner pilot is similar in terms of 
versatility, but even a cursory contemplation indicates that it most certainly is 
not. Although he has a sophisticated flight management system which will assist 
in fuel management, flight control, navigation, landing, and sometimes take off, 
the airline pilot has to consider a variety of factors such as weather, both en-
route and in the terminal areas, other air users, integration with the Air Traffic 
Management system and most importantly, conform to a plethora of regulations 
under a wide variety of conditions. All these, and much more, must be done to a 
very high standard, to high levels of safety and sometimes under extreme 
pressure. The pilot is there because he can provide the level of versatility 
required to maintain overall man/machine performance in achieving the mission. 
UASs, in general, do not fly in unrestricted airspace and therefore many of the 
demands that this places on the man/machine interface are absent, particularly 
in the aforementioned areas. Combat UASs28 do not currently attack other 
(manned or unmanned) aircraft and it is interesting to ponder why. Clearly they 
may shoot down an airliner (instantly categorised as “Catastrophic”) or the 
wrong target, at the wrong time or the wrong place - and this is obviously 
unacceptable. However, the nature of aerial combat, which requires high levels 
of tactical skill and instantaneous Situational Awareness, means that the 
mission may be just too demanding, in terms of versatility, for current UASs. 
This is despite the fact that a UAS can potentially turn at G levels well beyond 
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 There is an uncorroborated report of an exchange of missiles between a Predator A and an 
Iraqi MiG 25. The Predator lost! 
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human capacity. In fact, combat UASs rarely, if at all, have been assigned 
missions to attack humans who can fight back with any chance of success.  
By comparison, manned aircraft are much more versatile and undertake more 
roles than UASs at present, particularly in the application of lethal force and the 
reduction of collateral damage. The conclusion one is forced to draw is that 
building the versatility of manned aircraft into UASs, even with the operator in 
the loop (but always remote), is currently just too difficult. 
2.2.2 UASs and Cost 
Cost, or more properly put, cost effectiveness is frequently cited [8] as one of 
the two main reasons for replacing manned aircraft with unmanned ones. Cost, 
when applied to an aeroplane, is not a simple variable and has many 
ingredients and attributes. A fairly simple example is the relationship between 
non-recurring (e.g. manufacture) and recurring (e.g. operation) costs.  Manned 
military aircraft are increasingly more expensive but at the same time 
increasingly more capable and operate in a variety of roles (but not of course 
simultaneously). Where flexibility, survivability and rapid response are key 
requirements, manned aircraft are more cost-effective. Where speciality, 
expendability, cost and endurance are uppermost then UASs are the preferred 
choice [9]. Reference [9] also cites that “it is cheaper and faster to produce an 
entire squadron of medium range UASs for the price and effort required to 
replace a single F-14 .. and .. though the UASs are not strictly comparable to 
the F-14 due to the large differences in capabilities of the platforms, the figures 
do tend to highlight the fact that UASs can be produced cheaper” (taken from 
[10]).  
So, it appears that the consensus of opinion is that UASs are currently cheaper 
to procure, and possibly operate, than manned aircraft for equivalent size, 
weight and performance and for a singular role. However, that is not to say they 
are cheap. As previously stated, Global Hawk is currently priced at about $80m 
(and rising); Predator A is about $6m and Predator B about $25m. 
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Airframe empty weight is frequently used in the aircraft industry as a rough 
metric of aircraft costs. The table below gives an indication of the costs/weights 
of a variety of UASs: 
 
Figure 1: UAS Cost Vs. Weight ($/Lb.) [11] 
Similarly, the analysis below gives an indication of the costs/weights of a variety 
of manned aircraft.  
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Figure 2: Cost Vs. Weight ($/Kg) for a Variety of Manned Aircraft29 
A comparison table drawing the salient features of these graphs is provided 
below: 
Aircraft Type Cost/Weight ($/Kg)30 
Fighter/Multi Role Aircraft 6700 
Military Transport Aircraft 2100 
Commercial Transport Aircraft 1700 
UAS (Including Payload) 20768 
UAS (Weight Empty) 3894 
Table 1: Comparison of Aircraft Costs Vs. Weight ($/Kg) 
These graphs and the above table tend to not support the generally held view 
that UASs are cheaper than manned platforms if we characterise them by 
cost/weight.  However, the caveat must be applied that at least one reason for 
the high costs of advanced fighters and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft is 
the cost of the sensor suite, which can sometimes double the airframe cost. 
This is of course generally a non-recurring cost. It could also be that better 
                                            
29
 An anonymous but apparently well researched and referenced article: “An Aircraft Worth its 
Weight in Gold”, available at http://theblogbyJavier.wordpress.com/2010/03/13/an-aircraft-
worth-its-weight-in-gold/ 
30
 These costs are estimated at Financial Year (FY) 2008. The FY 2002 costs previously 
shown are assumed to increase by 3%p.a. for inflation (US Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
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metrics, capturing some of the realities of capabilities should now be used when 
making comparisons, such as: pixels per hour or cost/kg/hour (endurance).  If 
we take into account endurance31 on the above figures: 
Aircraft Type Cost/Weight/Endurance ($/Kg/Hr.) 
Fighter/Multi Role Aircraft 3350 
Military Transport Aircraft 300 
Commercial Transport Aircraft 212 
UAS (Including Payload) 865 
UAS (Weight Empty) 162 
Table 2: Comparison of Aircraft Costs Vs. Weight vs. Endurance ($/Kg/Hr.) 
These figures now reflect a general equity between manned and unmanned 
aircraft. Unfortunately, they also show that different metrics lead to different 
conclusions – the reader is invited to pick! 
When it comes to service support and training, other differentiators can come 
into play. The range of metrics to consider is vast but one example is the cost of 
training a ground based commander or sensor operator which is lower than for 
a combat pilot as depicted in the tables below [12]: 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Training Costs for a UAS and B52 Pilot 
For a Squadron of 15 pilots, that generates savings of $10m. Furthermore, crew 
currency can be maintained far more cheaply, particularly if the UAS is 
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 Endurances used are: Fighters – 2, Military Transport – 7, Commercial Transport – 8, UAS  
- 24 
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equipped with automatic take-off and landing systems, thus not requiring direct 
flying skills to be maintained. Hitherto, the USAF required its UAS pilots to be 
qualified officer pilots whereas other services have enlisted men as pilots. Again 
this can translate to cost savings. Equally, by not deploying crews in the field, 
cost savings can be easily identified such as transport, maintenance, support 
and infrastructure, pay and conditions etc. Finally, the real cost benefit, that of 
the saving of human loss of life, especially when considering the exemplar dull, 
dirty and dangerous missions, cannot be readily quantified but must certainly be 
taken into account. 
The research to date has failed to pin down high quality literature of the nature 
of UAS costs. Much of what is available identifies some of the areas of savings 
(but frequently not all) but often is lacking in quantative data and referenced 
material and thus remains somewhat conjectural. In fairness, aircraft 
manufacturers and operators have been arguing over the best method of 
characterising aircraft costs for many years and the fact remains that the rising 
and rapid advent of UASs, together with their unusual and hitherto unique 
features, makes this a difficult subject. 
The general consensus in the literature and the conclusion reached here, is that 
UASs have considerable potential for cost benefits compared to manned aircraft 
operation but much of that potential has yet to be reached. 
2.2.3 UASs and Safety 
The design and build quality of UASs has changed remarkably over the past 
eight years (the majority of the time taken for this study). Consequently so has 
the safety of UASs. In 2002. Global Hawk has an accident rate of 157 per 
100,000 flight hours. Today it is less than 30 with only one published accident 
occurring in the last eight years. Predator and its variants show a similar record. 
These statistics, excusing the pun, are no accident. It is a fact, for all aircraft, 
that the accident rate drops as the system enters service and starts to 
accumulate flight hours32.  This is due to a variety of reasons. These may be 
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 Evidence for this is given later and in more detail. 
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maintenance and operating experience, replacement of weak components or 
design flaws that come to light, implementation of accident investigation 
recommendations, improvements in materials.  However, it remains true that 
general safety records of UASs, although improving and approaching that of 
General Aviation, show that they are still demonstrably more unsafe.  
There is a clear trade-off between cost and safety and the fact that the vehicle 
is unmanned allows an extension of that aspect. This is easily seen when one 
considers the expendability of the vehicle – no manned aircraft is ever 
considered expendable. However, there are many small military UASs that are 
designed to be expendable and there may be occasions when even the large 
ones are sacrificed to achieve a desirable outcome33. However, the link 
between cost and safety, although subtly different for UASs compared to 
manned aircraft, cannot be ignored.   
So what causes UASs to crash? The USA DoD conducted a UAS Reliability 
Study in 2003 [13] and presented the following graph based on data collected 
from 1986-2002 covering the Predator, Pioneer and Hunter UAS fleets: 
 
Figure 3: Average Sources of System Failures for U.S. Military UAS Fleet 
(Based On 100,000 Hours) 
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 A perfect example is an emergency manoeuvre to avoid a mid-air collision. One can 
countenance ordering a manoeuvre so violent that it results in losing vehicle control and 
consequently causes a crash into the ground in order to achieve safe separation and avoid 
the collision 
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It should be borne in mind that this is a general statement of what was true 7/8 
years ago and things have improved since then for a huge variety of reasons, 
all of which are covered in the Reference. 
In contrast, statistics for General Aviation in the USA shows the following 
breakdown of accident causes (taken from the 2006 Nall Report [38])  
73.80%
16.90%
9.30% Pilot
Mechanical
Other
 
Figure 4: Major Causes of USA GA Accidents 2006 
The breakdown of the “Mechanical” sector into components is shown below: 
 
Figure 5: USE GA Accident Causes 2006 – Mechanical/Maintenance 
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However, caution should be observed before making an analysis of these 
differences due to the facts that are from slightly different years (although GA 
data tends to remain roughly constant over this decade), they both cover a 
variety of different aircraft and the systems on-board are often very different34. 
Having said that, it is quite clear that pilot error is the overwhelming cause of 
manned aircraft accidents whilst mechanical failure is predominant for UASs. In 
fact, a casual glance at these statistics (wrongly) implies that UASs are easier 
to fly. This is not quite so. It’s just that mechanical failure is the overwhelming 
influence for accidents. For sub categories of maintenance /mechanical failure, 
the predominance of propulsion failures is remarkably similar. For flight control, 
the statistics cannot be compared since both types have completely different 
control system designs. This aspect will be covered later. 
In the UAS Reliability Study of 2003, a comparison was given of 
manned/unmanned reliability and this is below: 
 
Table 4: Examples of Manned/Unmanned Aircraft Reliability 
This clearly highlights the differences which are particularly apparent for 
airliners and Predator.  
So the first question to answer is “Why are UASs so unreliable”? Firstly, 
manned aircraft obviously are designed from the outset with safety in mind (they 
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 For example, the majority of GA aircraft do not have autopilots or software embedded 
systems. 
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cannot be introduced into service without stringent analysis and verification – a 
process known as certification). Military UASs are not subject to the same 
process and they are not perceived to require the same levels of safety as 
manned aircraft. Additionally, it must be said that UASs (nearly all of them) have 
been put into production based on experimental prototypes. Cost, weight, 
performance and time into service, not reliability or safety, were, and still are, 
seen as the most important aspects. Due to this, cost savings and short cuts 
have often been made in design and materials. In addition, military UASs have 
frequently been deployed into an operational theatre early in their lives and are 
frequently placed at risk through hostile action – remember the 3D35s tag for 
UASs. Military commanders were quick to realise the capability of these 
vehicles and demanded more at whatever price. As more vehicles went into 
service, around 2003 onwards, it was realised that the cost/benefit trade off 
needed re-assessing (hence the motivation for the reliability study). At this 
point, improvements were steadily introduced but at additional cost. A perfect 
example is Global Hawk. This was rushed into service, had four accidents in 3 
years each costing about $30m. Subsequently the design was improved and, 
consequently, it now costs about $80m but has had only one accident since. 
Despite accumulating an exponential increase in flight hours, Predator, a far 
cheaper aircraft has not had a complete re-design (it was more mature anyway) 
but is now more reliable and in turn costs more to replace. Having said that 
there are still many Predator accidents caused by single point failure of critical 
systems (i.e. no redundancy). It is therefore reasonably clear that the 
cost/reliability trade-off is complex in nature and likely to be different for different 
UAS classes. The USAF Reliability Study recommended improvements to the 
propulsion (although nearly all are single engine) and flight control systems 
together with improvements for operator training. This was implemented (to a 
degree) and, together with the fact that the systems have become more mature, 
the accident rate has subsequently reduced. This is discussed in detail later. 
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Nearly all that has been said applies to military UASs since they are the most 
prevalent and have the most flight hours from which facts can be ascertained. 
However, in this period, the capability they have given commanders36 is several 
orders of magnitude greater than previously. This growth in capability has not 
gone unnoticed in the civilian community37 and there is now an increasing 
awareness of the potential uses of UASs for civilian purposes. However, the 
requirements for safety in this arena are much more demanding and will have to 
be met before UASs can routinely operate with other air users. The CAA is on 
record in saying that UASs will not be allowed to operate in UK civilian airspace 
until they are “at least as safe as General Aviation”. Current experience with 
military UASs shows that there is still some way to go before this can be 
demonstrated. 
In summary, over the last ten to fifteen years there has been a growing 
realisation that UASs are not throw away objects. They can confer a lot of 
capability but can cost a lot of money. It makes good financial sense to design, 
manufacture and operate them to standards approaching that mandated for 
manned aircraft. For civilian operation, it is likely that this will be obligatory. 
2.2.4 UASs and Communications 
Communications is a huge differentiator between manned aircraft and UAS 
operations. So large is the difference, that any sort of full discussion is outside 
the scope of this thesis thus necessitating only a brief outline of the subject 
here. 
Situating the pilot remotely inherently sets the requirement for an external 
communication link between the controller and the vehicle – the co-called 
Command or C2 (Command and Control) link. Such a link is, of course, entirely 
absent in manned aircraft where the pilot maintains the connection between 
aircraft’s current status (the displays) and his demands (the controls). More 
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agricultural duties in large numbers. 
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importantly, in manned aircraft, this link is virtually instantaneous, and is 
designed to be (and is fairly easy to make) highly reliable. The fact that this is 
not the case in UASs is the cause of many an accident – several of which will 
be discussed in detail later. In addition, in manned aircraft, the pilot’s awareness 
of aircraft state and status from his displays is augmented by that from his own 
senses. Not so in UASs. The nature of the link is conventionally by radio in 
either Line of Sight (LOS) or Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) modes. To operate 
anywhere away from the local area requires the latter and for this, the medium 
of choice is invariably Satellite Communications (which we will abbreviate to 
SatComms forthwith). Unfortunately, SatComms has a few undesirable 
characteristics. Firstly is the bandwidth limitation. UASs can consume a large 
amount of bandwidth, especially when several are in the air at once [14]. This 
bandwidth comes at a cost and, if civilian satellite constellations are used, the 
UAS competes with other users such as TV channels and of course other 
UASs. This means that bandwidth may become unavailable at short notice. 
SatComms antennas can often be blanked from satellite view by the airframe 
when in a turn which leads to short term outages. Latency is an issue for 
SatComms and it is commonplace for transmissions to be received several 
seconds late. Finally, satellite constellations are vulnerable to physical 
phenomena (such as sunspots38 and other radiations) and again performance 
can become degraded or unavailable.  All this means that the traditional high 
bandwidth, availability and reliability of the pilot vehicle interface in conventional 
manned aircraft cannot be taken for granted in a UAS. 
The C2 link is not the only communications required for UAS operation.  For 
military reconnaissance UASs, the mission payload39 frequently has to 
download sensor data and imagery (usually the higher resolution the better), 
often in real-time, to its Mission Exploitation Ground Station. Again, this carries 
penalties in bandwidth. 
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 Military reconnaissance UASs typically carry a suite of Electro-optic, Radar and TV systems 
as a mission payload. 
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Finally, UASs required to operate in non-segregated or busy airspace have to 
comply with the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system which controls and co-
ordinates air movements. For civilian traffic, this is routinely done using Very 
High Frequency (VHF) LOS voice communications. A UAS operating under 
such conditions must be able to comply in accordance with the principles of 
Equivalence and Transparency. Designing a UAS communications architecture 
to meet these requirements is not a simple exercise since they usually require 
that: 
• VHF transmissions emanate from the UAS40. This requires that uplink 
SatComms transmissions are relayed over VHF and UAS VHF 
receptions are transmitted on the SatComms downlink, in real time, to 
the GCS (thus using more bandwidth). 
• The GCS must have some alternative means of contacting the Air 
Traffic Controller (and vice versa), usually by landline, to cater for 
emergencies. This contradicts the principle of Transparency. 
• The cognitive communications medium is speech. If a reversionary 
mode is invoked, there seems to no recourse other than to text-to-
speech (fairly easy) and speech recognition41 (fairly hard) 
technologies. 
A solution to some of these problems is currently being operated in the 
Maastricht Sector of Eurocontrol for flights above Flight Level42 (FL) 245. It is 
known as Cockpit Pilot Data Link Control (CPDLC) and provides an alternative 
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is the altitude in hundreds of feet when the Standard Atmosphere pressure datum 
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Figure 6: Cockpit Pilot Data Link Control Display (Airbus A330) 
to VHF communications. It also offers far higher data integrity because of 
encryption, virtually guarantees reception at the targeted receiver and prevents 
garbled or misunderstood voice messages. It is, however, not widespread 
(Maastricht is the only sector of more than a hundred currently using it). 
Although, increased use of CPDLC is expected over the coming years, it is only 
a partial solution to the problem. For the thousands of light aircraft in General 
Aviation, VHF speech will be the primary communications medium for many 
years to come. 
In summary, controllers of UASs (Air Traffic, Mission Payload, and Pilots) 
require a communications architecture that is required to be safe, reliable and 
capable of integrating within the present and future communications 
architectures and with existing air users. It should also operate at an equivalent 
level of performance to manned aircraft in terms of connectivity, availability and 
bandwidth. Such an architecture is likely to be complex and difficult to design in 
order to satisfy these requirements. Consequently, it is imperative that the UAS 
should be able to operate independently of its controller, at least for short 
intervals. 
                                                                                                                                
(1013.25mb) is set.  Thus at FL245, the altimeter will read 24,500ft. 
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2.2.5 UASs and Control 
Of all the differences between manned and unmanned flight, how the vehicle is 
controlled represents the biggest aspect. UASs can be flown in a variety of 
control modes all of which have in common the fact the pilots, commander or 
operator(s) are remote from the vehicle, either within sight or beyond line of 
sight.  
There are many concepts of control moding. Some of these are: 
2.2.5.1 Remotely Piloted 
In this mode, the aircraft is flown manually from the ground control station at all 
times in a manner somewhat similar to a Radio Controlled model. This is the 
most common mode of control, particularly for light UASs. Such operation 
requires a high level of skill and many accidents of vehicles using this type of 
operation are skill based errors, the majority being prevalent in the take-off and 
landing phases of flight. In addition to the skilled operator, a communication link 
of high integrity and negligible latency is required. This can often only be 
achieved with Line of Sight (LOS) communication links thus restricting the range 
of operation to the limit of the Radar Horizon43. However, generally they are 
frequently operated within visual range since that is the usual means of control 
feedback to the operator. Such operation can be augmented with automatic 
take-off, landing and cruise modes. In summary, the pilot is in direct (and 
constant) control of the vehicle. 
2.2.5.2 Supervised Automation 
Here the aircraft is flown under full autopilot control in accordance with a 
specified route plan. This may, or may not, include provision for alternative 
routes. Such operation allows use of Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) datalinks 
since real time feedback control is not now necessary. Versatility of operation 
can only be incorporated by uploading new routes or waypoints to fly. In 
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summary, the pilot is now a supervisor of the automation which is directly 
controlling the vehicle. 
2.2.5.3 Autonomous Operation 
The aircraft is flown according to an agenda of objectives which can be 
specified by the pilot, the on-board autonomous control system or jointly by both 
in co-operation. In summary, the pilot is now a manager of the autonomous 
system which is controlling the vehicle. 
Of the above control philosophies, the trend is that we are rapidly moving 
toward collaborative human-machine decision making or fully autonomous 
decision-making rather than relying on human supervisors of autonomous 
systems, particularly if operators are not on-board [15]. 
There are a few features of such control modes that are common to each other 
but different to manned aircraft. A major one is pilot remoteness. It has already 
been noted that the immediacy and reliability of the conventional pilot - vehicle 
link in manned aircraft is absent in UASs. This inherent remoteness of the pilot 
or operator of a UAS introduces problems, some subtle, others not so. Some of 
these problems are now discussed. 
2.2.6 Operator Remoteness 
The pilot can be viewed as a multi sensor, information processing system. The 
most important of those sensors, the eyes, is replaced by a “Sense and Avoid” 
sub-system which replaces the “See and Avoid” responsibility we would 
normally assign to the pilot of a vehicle. Humans have far more senses that the 
traditional five normally assigned by the layman – sight hearing, touch, taste 
and smell. It is also true to say that some of these have a much higher 
importance when removed to the air domain than would be normally expected. 
Some but not all, of the less well known are: pain, joint movement (position and 
acceleration), balance and acceleration (vestibular), sense of time, temperature 
difference, and other minor ones not including those of internal body sensing. 
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In addition, humans are naturally pre-disposed to associate data from different 
sensors, occasionally incorrectly44, thus reinforcing perceptions to promote a 
single cause from the combined effects – vibration and noise mean more 
concurrently than separately, as does heat and smoke, fire and light, aircraft 
movement and vestibular responses, thunder and lightning etc.  
Some examples of how humans respond, and the procedures they follow in the 
event of emergency are given below. It should become plain that these are fully 
based on past experience with the pilot in the loop: 
• An aircraft fire is often first noticed by aircrew by the smell of smoke. This 
may be later followed by visual signs of smoke. Aircrew associate the two 
and diagnose the possibility of a fire. This in itself triggers a procedural 
response using emergency checklists where “Actions in the event of a Fire” 
are proscribed. One of these responses is to seek for and confirm or 
otherwise, other indications of a fire. A fire light may come on and then go 
out45; fire may be seen; the aircraft is trailing smoke; an accompanying 
aircraft or the aerodrome personnel may report the smoke/fire. Now consider 
translating that situation to one where the pilot is remote. The pilot would 
certainly not see, smell or confirm (if they knew) the presence of fire. They 
have neither the on-board sensors to do so, nor could they otherwise 
deduce it. The only response a UAS designer can do is to put more fire 
sensors, and perhaps smoke detectors, in the vehicle. Thus the manned 
aircraft the “standard” procedure for identifying and confirming a fire as 
contained in the checklists is now inappropriate when applied to a UAS. 
• In descending in cloud, with the outside air temperature less than 5C, rain is 
noticed on the windscreen. The pilot would immediately identify the 
likelihood of icing of the airframe, engines and the pitot static system which 
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the fire sensor or wiring! 
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provides vital air data. In this event, he would respond by getting clear of 
cloud or precipitation thus avoiding the dangerous situation. Again we could 
put rain/ice sensors on the airframe but do we in practice? The answer is no 
because we (the designers) “never thought of that”. We assume the aircrew 
are there when they are not. 
• Similarly, the pilot feels severe turbulence and manoeuvres to avoid the 
situation. He may notice lightning in the vicinity. He takes appropriate action. 
What does the ground based pilot either know or do and, as we shall later 
explore, it is possible that he may not even care. 
So, in removing the pilot, the vehicle is being denied important sensor 
information that he normally provides (for free) together with his sophisticated 
sensor fusion and associated processing. As mentioned above, the UAS 
designers could add these extra sensors as a replacement for the pilot’s 
sensors. In doing so, however, another problem will emerge and that is the 
increased possibility of false alarms (the more sensors, the higher the number 
of false alarms). This is a standard problem for designers – how to achieve a 
high level of true alarms with a low probability of false alarms. If those false 
alarms trigger safety critical responses, that probability may be required to be 
as low as 1x10-6 – a requirement that may be extremely difficult, and costly, to 
achieve. Thus, the implementation of the remedy may be more damaging than 
ignoring the problem. Certainly costs would go up. 
Similarly, in removing the pilot, he is being denied important vehicle information 
such as peripheral vision, tactile feedback etc. Consider a conversation with a 
person in front of you. Aurally,  you may (or may not) be concentrating on what 
they are saying or the emphasis on how they are saying it, but research has 
shown that communication also takes into account facial expressions, the body 
posture (language), movement of the hands, shaking or a nodding of the head 
etc. This extra information can be vital in fully understanding their views. If we 
now translate that to a pilot trying to understand what may be a complicated 
situation, then the denial of that extra, subtle and background information may 
be the difference between a correct decision/response and an unsafe one. He is 
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also being denied the opportunity to proactively investigate the situation 
because he is blissfully unaware of it. 
Another aspect of removing the pilot, is that he is being denied his natural 
instincts of self-protection even if perhaps sub-consciously. This can have the 
following effects: 
• He is less immersed (or more detached) in his attention to the state and 
status of the vehicle which could lead to cognitive disengagement. 
• He is less aware of the danger to the vehicle but quite aware of the lack of 
danger to himself. This could make him prone to take greater risks or 
contemplate action which he would otherwise never ordinarily do were he 
aboard.  
Latency has already been discussed in terms of communication aspects. Direct 
control feedback is hampered by latency, and UAS control signals can be quite 
latent. Anyone who had a computer mouse that did not respond in real-time, or 
a computer function that did not respond to the mouse, will know the sensation 
of such loss of control. Imagine a pilot who moved the control column of an 
aircraft and then waited for a response up to 4 seconds later. Or even worse, 
waited for a few minutes and, in the air, a lot can happen in that time. It is also 
not just direct control. Demanding the autopilot to turn onto a new heading is 
simple, direct and trustworthy in a manned aircraft, but not necessarily so in an 
unmanned one. Humans in control usually insist on direct and immediate 
feedback of demand inputs. Unfortunately, such tight human control cannot 
always be guaranteed for UASs. 
To summarise, in a UAS: 
• The operator is remote   
• The operator’s Situational Awareness (SA) may be different from the on 
board Autonomous System (AS) 
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• Control is shared between the AS and the operator 
In a manned aircraft: 
• The pilot is in the vehicle 
• The pilot’s SA is immediate and direct 
• The pilot is in sole control of the vehicle 
2.3 The Motivation Towards Higher Levels of Autonomy 
It will come as no surprise that the primary motivation for introducing autonomy 
into UASs is to overcome the negative aspects of those differentiators between 
UASs and manned aircraft and introduce corresponding increases in the levels 
of versatility, cost, safety and performance. How this may be achieved, and at 
what cost, is discussed below. 
2.3.1 Versatility 
As previously discussed, UASs currently undertake roles that require little 
versatility despite a human being in overall control. Versatile operation requires 
the ability to: 
• rapidly assess current states and predict likely future states 
• identify alternate courses of action and assess their chances of 
success 
• to choose appropriate action and to monitor progress 
Such abilities have a root requirement to observe and comprehend the 
operating environment and its enclosed objects in real time – a process known 
as generating situational awareness. A remote controller is, by nature, less able 
to achieve this than a pilot of a manned aircraft for reasons discussed earlier. 
As for the UAS itself, none is currently fielded that can generate self-situational 
awareness.  
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It was argued earlier that the pilot of an airliner operates in a complex 
environment where identification of changes of internal and external states is 
vital to the achievement of the mission objective. For UASs to operate in the 
same environment will require it to augment the deficiencies caused by remote 
operation and transmit this augmented data to the pilot in real time. This is not a 
trivial problem. Communication links, particularly those involving satellites 
(SatComms), are by no means fail-safe46. In addition, processing of that data, 
which may be somewhat stale by the time it arrives, by the human controller 
may prove difficult. Many a manned airliner has had the recorded comment 
from the crew “What is going on” shortly before crashing – this could only be 
much worse for a remote operator. The ability for the crew to get rapidly vital 
data, which may be directly indicating some failure or provide appropriate 
context, is fundamental to safe and efficient operation, particularly for 
unforeseen events. However, if we provide the UAS with abilities to be versatile 
in operation as defined above and provide the means to effectively interact with 
the human controller, then we can start to expand the roles and operations of 
such vehicles into more complex missions and environments, even if 
communications have been lost. Such versatility is inherent to autonomous 
systems as will become clear when this area is explored more fully in Chapter 
3. 
2.3.2 Cost 
Increasingly over the last 50 years, machines have replaced humans. First in 
manufacturing and subsequently into the service area (automated telling 
machines, washing machines etc.). In general, the net effect has been reduced 
cost (with often more performance). The main problem with automation as such, 
is that it is inflexible. Similarly to current UASs, provided the operation or the 
environment is simple, then automation can be introduced with subsequent cost 
benefit. If, as it is proposed, systems can be introduced that can handle 
complexity, it is highly likely that cost benefits will also be found. The primary 
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mechanism for this is reduced (note, not replaced) human involvement. The 
cost benefits are found via several sources: 
• Direct human employment costs such as income/pension, training, 
deployment, welfare, accommodation, infra-structure etc. 
• Indirect human costs such as those caused by strikes, lateness, 
fitness, inefficiency, rostering, capacity, supervision, performance etc. 
Current medium/large UASs are manpower intensive with a typical crew of 3, 
although there is usually only 1 pilot per vehicle. Experiments have shown that it 
is possible (under certain constraints) to have I controller operating up to 4 
vehicles simultaneously and the effects on costs are estimated in the Figure 
below:  
 
Figure 7: Operator Capacity as a Function of Mission Constraints [16] 
The solid line is theoretical performance and dotted line the measured 
performance. The graph indicates that costs can be reduced by an estimated 
factor of 2 when operators control several vehicles. The sophistication of the 
vehicles used in these experiments was very low (comparable to current UASs) 
and therefore this estimate perhaps should be regarded as the upper-bound for 
reduced costs with the expectancy of further gains with increased autonomy.  
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2.3.3 Performance 
One metric for human performance as a decision maker is speed. 
Unfortunately, humans operate at different cognitive levels according to the 
problem at hand. Where automatic (or reactive) responses are required (driving 
the car, manually flying the aircraft etc.), typical  responses are about 2Hz. For 
deliberative responses (a higher cognitive level, sometimes known as the Rule 
Level), the decision – act cycle can be anything from 2 to 10 seconds47. For the 
highest, and hardest, cognitive level, the planning level (also known as the 
Knowledge Level), decisions may be made in tens of seconds, minutes or even 
hours; some planning functions are actually beyond human computation (e.g. 
The Travelling Salesman problem). Cycles of decision making are captured in 
Boyd’s Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action (OODA) loop theory (see 
Appendix B). He proposed that the ability to progress the OODA “loop” in as 
short a timescale as possible is essential to success. This theory was 
extensively explored (and empirical evidence was gained in support)  in Ref. 
[17]. This view is also supported in the following quotations: 
“One of the most important elements to consider with this 
battlefield is the potential for UAS to rapidly compress the 
observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop. Future UAS, able 
to perceive the situation and act independently with limited or 
little human input, will greatly shorten decision times. This 
Perceive - Act line is critical to countering growing adversary 
UAS threats”  - USAF UAS Roadmap [81] 
and also: 
 
“Autonomy means different things to different people. To 
[USAF] Information Directorate chief scientist Rich Linderman, it 
is a matter of speed -- autonomous systems can sense, self-
adapt, dynamically plan and make decisions at speeds that 
preclude having people in the loop. But while the cyber domain 
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requires decision speeds far beyond human capability, 
timescales in the aviation domain still allow human interaction, 
says Dan Thompson, [USAF] Air Vehicles Directorate scientist.” 
Aviation Week [18]. 
Such abilities, to make effective decisions at high speed, are also inherent to 
autonomous systems and this performance benefit can be gained in stressful 
situations such as:  
• When emission control requirements are in effect or when 
communications are down though failure or jamming 
• When operator workload is high, if the operator is required to 
command/supervise multiple UASs, or if the operator has other tasks 
to perform such as flying another aircraft. 
• Where safety of life during an emergency  is an issue. 
2.3.4 Safety 
Good performance can also be regarded as a lack of failure or a high degree of 
safety. Unfortunately, again humans are prone to failure as discussed earlier 
(and will be in detail later).  It is a fact that 80% of air accidents are caused by 
human error48. Some of these error modes can be entirely eradicated by careful 
design of an autonomous system. In general terms, an autonomous system 
possesses inherent attributes that can contribute to flight safety: 
• They do not suffer from memory loss, lack of concentration, or 
boredom. 
• They can react extremely fast to recover situations – very important in 
time critical situations such as the take-off and landing phases of 
flight where most manned accidents occur. 
• They do not take chances nor do they wilfully violate regulations or 
dodge safety procedures 
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• They can be forced to objectively re-evaluate situations49 – no human 
type “confirmation bias” 50. 
• They can be forced to attend to a variety of situations virtually 
simultaneously – no human type “framing bias” or fixation. 
• Since humans are not carried, accidents caused by failed life support 
systems will not occur. 
• Loss of control due to human sensory failure, such as disorientation, 
is absent. 
• Automatic take-off and landing modes can reduce accidents due to 
manual loss of control 
• They are under no pressure to return to base or family instead of 
landing at the most suitable airfield. 
2.3.5 General Limitations of Autonomous Systems 
Whilst arguments have been provided for increased autonomy for the control of 
future UASs, it would be unbalanced not to consider some general limitations of 
autonomy. Again these are expanded in Chapter 4. 
Certification  All airborne systems have to be certified for use. This in 
turn requires the appropriate standards51 to be developed and tested. These 
standards are not currently in place for airborne autonomous systems and 
agreements for their development will require consensus across a large 
community of developers, user-groups and regulators.  Even if such standards 
were in place, then it is currently essential to demonstrate that the system 
response can be guaranteed in response to specific system inputs. This is 
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highly likely to remain true for autonomous air systems. Such a system is said 
to be deterministic. It has not been fully researched, but this fundamental 
requirement for determinism is likely to preclude the use of machine learning 
techniques where the response of the machine is different according to recent 
(i.e. since testing) experience. It may be that the requirement for stringent 
testing places a practical limit on the degree of complexity that can be 
introduced.   
Inappropriate System Responses This inability to learn may provide 
limitations in the systems’ response to issues not foreseen by its designers thus 
providing a cap to the versatility that potentially is wanted. Note that pilots are 
allowed to learn and are not constrained to be deterministic, but then we don’t 
certify them because we palpably cannot. However, there is still a lot that can 
be done with straight-forward rule based systems under the 80/20 rule52.  
Whilst it was proposed that autonomous systems could preclude some accident 
modes, it is also probably true that some new accident modes may be 
introduced by the advent of autonomous air systems. A particular example 
could be what Reason [3] classes as rule based errors53. Two modes can be 
identified. Firstly, an incorrect antecedent belief, which may be generated in a 
variety of ways, will positively cause an inappropriate action to be performed. 
Secondly, a need for action may be identified (with hindsight), but no rule was 
available to generate the appropriate action, either because the designers had 
not anticipated it, or because no antecedent belief had been formed to fire it. 
Later Chapters discuss how accidents due to these modes may be reduced. 
Human Machine Interaction (HMI) There have been several hundred 
(nay, thousands) of books, reports and studies into the way humans interact 
with machines, particularly within aircraft cockpits. These have produced a 
variety of guidelines into appropriate design methodologies and yet accidents in 
                                            
52
 A commonly held unwritten rule of systems engineering that states” You can spend 20% of 
the cost to achieve 80% of the requirements but you will then spend 80% of the cost to 
achieve the remaining 20%. In other words, if possible, see if 80% of the task will satisfy the 
overall requirement. 
53
 A generalised Rule being: IF (antecedent) BELIEF is TRUE then DO (consequent) ACTION 
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which the primary cause was faulty HMI, especially with respect to automation, 
continue to arise.  
The best, and kindest, thing we can say about automation is that it is still an 
incomplete science. If we now start to shift away from automatic machine 
modes, which can shut the operator “out-of the loop”, and progress towards 
human interaction with decision making machines, we are likely to run into 
several new and difficult areas when it comes to safety. These are likely to be 
not just of an engineering nature, but also from social54, legal and ethical 
aspects. 
For the future, it is likely that new models of HMI and appropriate design 
guidelines will be required to be developed for autonomous air systems. These 
problems will be exacerbated by the human’s remoteness and consequent lack 
of immediate SA. Until such systems have been developed, operated and 
understood in order to provide requisite levels of human trust, they are just not 
going to be accepted, despite their potential. 
2.4 Summary 
This Chapter has looked in detail at the concept of UASs, their characteristics 
and their uses. In particular, the concept of remote operation, and more 
importantly, all that this implies, was discussed. This has enabled a review of 
those features of manned and unmanned flight to be made. This concluded that 
the following differentiators should be considered: 
• Employments and Versatility 
• Costs 
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 Whilst observing a recent (May 2011) Human Factors synthetic environment experiment 
with a Sense and Avoid autonomous system, a pilot received a plan proposal from the system 
to turn right through 30 degrees as a response to an imminent collision. This proposal was 
promptly rejected by the pilot who then immediately instructed the vehicle to turn right by 30 
degrees. When queried, his response was “I am not having a machine tell me what to do!” It 
was pointed out that his actions had delayed appropriate action by several seconds which in a 
head on collision scenario could prove fatal. This is an interesting observation from a huge 
variety of viewpoints and is returned to later. 
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• Safety 
• Communications 
• Control topologies, including those aspects required to cater for 
operator remoteness. 
It was argued that, in order to realise the potential of UASs by increasing their 
versatility, safety and performance whilst at the same time reducing costs, a 
move away from remote operation, a trend already in progress, has to be made. 
It was also argued that this trend towards automated operation, in itself, places 
limitations on the achievable levels. The argument was proposed that a move to 
autonomous operation would potentially remove this limit on achievable 
potential. Such an autonomous vehicle would be capable of operating in 
conjunction with a human controller at whatever level of authority was invested 
by him or, if he was unavailable, at whatever level was appropriate to the 
situation. This latter requirement, ipso facto, places a requirement for the 
system to be self-aware and aware of its situation. This in turn requires that the 
system is capable of: 
• identifying courses of action (plans) in order to meet the objectives 
set for it and, from these alternatives, choosing the most suitable. 
• proposing the preferred plan for authorisation, if required, and 
actioning the plan on receipt or by default 
• monitoring the progress of this plan and identifying when it has either 
succeeded or failed 
All of the above must be achieved with due regard to the fundamental 
requirements, previously identified, of Transparency, Equivalence and Safety. 
It should now become readily apparent that today’s UAS architectures, based 
heavily on current practice in manned aircraft avionics and cockpits, are not 
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suitable to achieve all of the above requirements and to the degree necessary. 
The study now proceeds to propose and analyse such a system architecture. 
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3 Development of an Advanced Decision Architecture 
for a UAS 
3.1 Autonomous Systems 
3.1.1 Definitions 
Several definitions of autonomy and autonomous systems are discussed in 
Appendix A and the following definition is offered from this: 
“An autonomous system is one that operates within an 
environment and is capable of independent decision and 
action in pursuit of its objectives”. 
The concepts of decision and action are intertwined. It is difficult to understand 
the nature of a decision, or the point in making it, if the decision is not followed 
by action and in particular, action to change or influence the environment. 
Therefore we can always think of decisions and actions as a tuple (D, A).  
Support for this notion, which is not universally accepted, particularly in the 
intelligent agent community, is given below. 
In Multi-Attribute Decision Theory, a decision is defined as: 
“A decision is the commitment to irrevocably allocate 
resources. A decision is a commitment to act. Action is the 
irrevocable allocation of resources55”. 
Similarly, in the Lexicon of Decision Theory published by The Decision Analysis 
Society56:  
“A decision is an allocation of resources. It can be likened 
to writing a cheque and delivering it to the payee. It is 
irrevocable, except that a new decision may reverse it”. 
                                            
55
  Available at http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/decision 
56
  Decision Analysis Society: “Lexicon of Decision Making”, at 
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/daweb/lexicon.htm#decision 
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As far as the rest of this document is concerned, the above definitions, which 
are believed to be equivalent to each other, will be used. 
3.1.2 Automation and Autonomy 
In defining autonomy as above, it should be possible to make a clear distinction 
between automation and autonomy. At a high level this proves to be the case, 
however when considering both concepts in detail, especially in relation to a 
deterministic machine, the distinction becomes somewhat blurred. 
A discussion of the definition of automation is also given at Appendix A together 
with a view on the differences between autonomy and automation. This 
discussion concludes that an automatic machine is something that does not 
think, does not decide, nor acts according to an agenda, whereas an 
autonomous system should be capable of at least one of these, and preferably, 
all three. It also re-forces the view that autonomous machines should be 
authorised to make decisions. This may mean real time, operator-in-the-loop 
control authority, or pre-authorised control, perhaps even hard-coded at the 
design and implementation stage. 
The problem starts when we consider the need for a deterministic system – i.e. 
one that will produce a consistent single output for a given input. Later, it is 
argued that in order to produce a certifiable system, then at least the safety 
related elements must be deterministic. If this case is accepted and the output 
must be pre-determined given the input, then the resultant system is hardly the 
nature of what has been defined as autonomous. That is, an independent 
controller, a deliberative thinker or one that is capable of responding to external 
situations according to its objectives. In fact, it can be argued that for the latter 
case, the (so called autonomous and deterministic) machine can, and will, only 
respond to situations pre-considered by the designer.  
This aspect needs more thought and impacts on the question as to whether a 
machine that learns its behaviour can ever be considered to be certifiable for 
airborne use.  
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3.1.3 Intelligence and Autonomy 
Is there a relationship between autonomy and intelligence? The answer is yes 
but they are not the same as each other as is frequently implied, if not stated. A 
competent autonomous system operating in a complex, threatening and 
uncertain environment would certainly start to approach what the majority of us 
would call intelligent behaviour. However, an intelligent being may not be very 
autonomous at all – a very obedient dog for instance, or my wife’s husband! 
Bacteria, viruses and genes have all the characteristics that we would naturally 
suggest autonomous systems have – however, they are clearly not intelligent in 
the accepted sense. For less demanding environments, the need for 
intelligence or to act intelligently to achieve a stated level of performance 
reduces, but the system can still be considered highly autonomous if it, rather 
than someone else, decides what it is to do (and perhaps more importantly, 
why).  Given that there is a difference between intelligence and autonomy, the 
question remains do we want our autonomous system to be intelligent or at 
least behave intelligently. For the types of environment that is under 
consideration, it seems fair to say, at this stage, that some sort of intelligent 
response is definitely required. It also seems fair to say that the attributes of that 
intelligence is likely to be different from that of humans, but whilst a human is in 
the loop, and generally in charge, those attributes of machine intelligence must 
be able to be aligned with those of humans. 
3.1.4 Decision and Action 
Although it has been defined that a decision should always be followed by 
action, it is not necessarily true that action is always preceded by a (conscious) 
decision. If you stick a pin in some-ones arm, they will try to withdraw it 
instinctively as a consequence of reaction and not of considered decision. Pain 
is a sufficient trigger to force an immediate change irrespective of the cause. 
There is no world model which tries to represent the pin in the arm or 
assessment of alternative action possibilities. The action is directly “hard-wired” 
from the perception of pain to the withdrawing of the arm. The action is a 
stimulus – action pairing, or a tuple (S, A), and can be termed reactive. 
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Conversely, we can say that action preceded by a decision, tuple (D, A), is 
deliberative behaviour. This notion of reactive and deliberative behaviours, and 
their attributes, is discussed further in Para.3.2.3. 
3.1.5 Information 
If we accept that a decision is followed by action, and some do not, it is 
reasonable to ask what comes before the decision. Fortunately there are three, 
generally accepted, theories which explore this area: 
 Classical Decision Theory (CDT),  
 Recognition Primed Decision Making (RPDM) Theory 
 Boyd’s Observation-Orientation–Decision-Action (OODA) cycle.  
These are described in more detail at Appendix B. 
CDT requires the formulation of alternative Courses Of Action (COAs) which are 
assessed according to the Decision Maker’s (DM) values. The COA that gives 
the greatest expected utility is chosen (the decision) and then embarked upon 
(the action). Unfortunately, CDT assumes that the derivation of acceptable 
alternatives is the starting point in the process but it certainly recognises the key 
elements of values and objectives. Objectives come in two major forms, 
fundamental objectives and means objectives. The differentiator between the 
two is in the asking of the question “Why is that an objective”. If the answer 
cannot be cast as another objective, perhaps at a higher level, it is a 
fundamental objective. If it can, it is a means objective.  So we can now infer, 
from CDT, that the choice of (D, A) is one that ultimately gives the greatest 
chance of (ultimately) achieving a fundamental objective. This may be 
represented as tuple (O, D, A). 
RPDM is very different from this in that it assumes, and requires, full or 
sufficient Situational Awareness (SA) of the problem at hand. SA is discussed at 
Appendix B which proposes the process of achieving SA as a continuing 
sequence of perception, comprehension and projection (or prediction) i.e. tuple 
62 
(Pr, C, Po). So the full recognition primed decision action cycle is tuple ((Pr, C, 
Po), D, A). 
The OODA cycle is very similar. The process is Observation-Orientation–
Decision-Action. Observation and Orientation, or “what is going on in the world 
and how is it relevant to me”, can be seen to be equivalent to the SA process 
described above. Indeed, the whole OODA cycle has been shown to be 
equivalent to a more general Information – Decision – Action (IDA) cycle [19] 
thus implying a tuple (I, D, A). 
3.1.6 Nature of A-Systems 
In the definition of an autonomous system at Appendix A, the words “operate, 
action, decide, control” were regarded as generally equivalent. It has already 
been discussed that, under certain circumstances, decide and action are 
inseparable. Within the context of the operation of a vehicle, the concepts of 
control, action and operate have identical meanings. For the context of an 
autonomous vehicle system, it is proposed that the term control is used 
throughout. This is useful in that several architectures have been designed for 
the autonomous control of vehicles such as cars, robots, submarines and even 
aircraft.  
Thus we finally end up with a process, which we can call Information – Decision 
– Control (IDC), operating over the contexts of objectives, consequences and 
constraints. 
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A summary view of the above is given below: 
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Figure 8: Information – Decision - Control Model 
It is believed the above mechanisms for control are a full and complete set with 
the exception of those directly ordered by an external operator. Therefore, 
ideally, an architecture for control of a UAS should encompass all the above 
mechanisms including the latter i.e.: 
• Direct Sensor to Effector Reactive Control 
• Direct Operator to Effector Control – in effect, a control override 
• Deliberative Effector Control using: 
 Recognition Primed Decision Making – this mechanism 
constitutes a direct decision consequent to the recognition of a 
particular situation. This mechanism could be effected by a 
rule based system e.g. IF Under Attack, THEN Turn by 180 
degrees, or by a more sophisticated and complex method such 
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as Case Based Reasoning (CBR) by retrieving a suggested 
Course of Action from the best fit of input conditions to a case 
database. 
 Operator Decision Making – this can be effected by presenting 
the Operator with inferenced situational data in order that value 
judgments can be reached, and accepting his decision as the 
pre-cursor to a control override. 
 Recognition Primed Plan Assessment and Selection – The 
result of the Situational Assessment is used to draw up a list of 
applicable plans to that situation and select the most 
appropriate, either by on the basis of maximum expected utility 
or by some other mechanism. 
 Maximum Expected Utility (Value) Plan Assessment and 
Selection – the generation  of alternative plans to achieve a 
perceived objective and scoring these plans from value metrics 
and probability of outcome 
 Operator Plan Assessment and Selection – as above but 
allowing the operator to select the plan 
 Recognition Primed Plan Generation – the generation of a plan 
to achieve an objective within a perceived situation. 
 Objective Based Plan Generation – using plans based on 
applicable objectives; initiating a take-off sequence for 
instance. 
 Operator Commanded Plan Generation – the acceptance of a 
plan override commanded by the operator. 
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3.1.7 The Nature of Distributed Control 
3.1.7.1 Man Machine Interface 
In a manned aircraft, controls for the aircraft are vested in the cockpit primarily, 
and are under the direct control of the pilot. These controls are the starting point 
in the generation of a chain of functions that ultimately lead to that control 
having the desired effect. The last of these functions in the chain is known as an 
end event function57. To generate the required evidence to approve the system 
as safe, these end-event functions are analysed for their criticality58. If this end 
event function is considered to affect safety adversely, it can be described as a 
safety-critical, end-event function. The complete chain from control function 
to safety-critical end-event function, routing by whatever path in software or 
hardware is then termed a safety critical chain59. By a similar process, it is 
possible to identify mission critical chains60. Since the identification and 
analysis of these safety critical chains is fundamental to the subsequent 
certification of the system, consideration of how these would be generated in a 
UAS is essential. 
Controls that would lead to a safety-critical end event function being generated 
are routinely protected for inadvertent operation. Such protection may include 
guarding, shielding or covering of switches, or switches that are inoperative 
without other switches being made. These measures cover hardware originated 
controls. For areas where the control signal originates in, or passes through, 
software, the signal is protected by writing the software to a Software Integrity 
Level (SIL) of 4 or more and often duplicating the hardware in it resides or by 
providing reversionary paths, which are invoked upon failure detection. 
Whatever the case, it can be shown that, for manned aircraft, all end-event 
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 An end event function is one that is delivered externally from the system under 
consideration.  
58
 A typical taxonomy of criticality is: non-critical, safety involved and safety critical. The latter 
implies that a failure of such a function would lead to the loss of the aircraft and/or life. 
59
 A chain which, if its integrity is compromised, would lead to an endangerment or loss of life. 
60
 A chain which, if its integrity is compromised, would lead to a failure of the mission. 
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functions are generated by the pilot, even if perhaps remotely.  As in the 
discussion of decision-action model above, it is interesting to speculate on what 
precedes the control function generation. 
The answer lies in the displays and aural warnings61 that are presented to the 
pilot by the avionic system and, to a much lesser extent, those perceived by the 
external audio, tactile and visual scene. A schematic of this, representing the 
pilot as a Black Box with Unknown Processes (BBUP), is shown below: 
Controls
(manual, voice etc.)
Weapon System
(Avionics, Vehicle, Utilities)
Pilot
External Environment
Sensor Data 
incl. comms.Effectors
Displays 
and Audio
Audio-Visual
Scene
 
Figure 9: Pilot Vehicle Interface 
Although apparently innocuous, the above schematic will give a valuable insight 
into two major problem areas for the control of a UAS - positive control 
feedback and determinism, both of which lead to the predictability of UAS 
behaviour. 
Representing the pilot as a BBUP is interesting in itself. However, from a point 
of view of certification, airworthiness bodies and aircraft manufacturers do not 
certificate the pilot. It is assumed that he is competent enough not only never to 
inappropriately invoke a safety critical mode by choice, but also to provide a 
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 I concede that the stall warning “stick-shaker” is a tactile message, but it is probably  the 
only one. 
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cross check on system integrity. Indeed, many of the FFA reports pass the 
overall system safety analysis by citing the pilot as being required to monitor 
certain events. In addition, we do not require, and we cannot specify or test, that 
the pilot must be deterministic. In fact the reason why we make no attempt to 
certify the pilot, in formal terms at least, is because of the knowledge that we 
know he cannot be deterministic in all circumstances.  All we can do is specify 
that the pilot must have adequate training, knowledge and skills to operate the 
aircraft in question – but that is not the job of the systems design engineer or 
part of the design process.  
So here we have a system, the BBUP, that is not certified, but is required to be 
operative for the system to pass the certification process. The BBUP therefore 
represents somewhat of a discontinuity between the receipt of data and the 
invocation of a control signal, at least in systems engineering terms.  
If we now replace the BBUP with an autonomous decision and control system, 
such as below, we have an entirely different result, although it apparently looks 
the same: 
Controls
Avionic & Flight Systems
Autonomous System
External Environment
Sensor Data Effectors
Data
 
Figure 10: Autonomous System Control – Vehicle Interface 
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The provision of an autonomous system cannot be regarded as equivalent to a 
pilot and the insertion of it as a replacement changes things as follows: 
 It can be, and indeed must be, certifiable This requires it to be: 
o Deterministic. For every possible state of data input, there must a 
reliable and repeatable output. The system will be, by design 
requirement, predictable. 
o Competent or “Fit for Purpose”. Therefore it must have a range of 
behaviours and control functions that will allow it to carry out its 
assigned tasks. Furthermore these functions must have been 
proven to be able to do so. 
o Capable of handling safety critical functions. 
 Given the nature of machines and humans and their differences – 
humans are inherently good at Situational Awareness, whilst machines 
are not - the requirement for an intelligent and knowledgeable cross-
monitor to achieve a safe system output, as normally performed by the 
pilot, now becomes a real problem to satisfy. It is possible for another, 
independent, system to perform this cross monitoring role but it likely to 
suffer from the same problems that would lead to an unsafe output in the 
first place. Namely, a lack of knowledge, understanding and, dare I say, 
intelligence. 
 There is now no element of discontinuity. There is a seamless transition, 
and indeed translation, from data to control. This aspect allows for the 
possibility of unwanted positive control feedback. As we have discussed, 
the system is deterministic and a given data input set will produce a 
guaranteed output. Consider an external unit that just happens to know 
the process, and data, by which that output is produced, and of course 
such an output may be safety critical. All that the external unit needs to 
do is to provide that data, perhaps by deliberate disinformation or 
deception, in the correct form and context, and an inappropriate control 
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signal is generated and the end event function is passed to the 
environment. This signal or effector may be detected by the malpractor, 
the originating data reinforced and subsequently returned to the system. 
A process known to control system engineers as positive feedback.  
Some of these problems may be overcome by returning the operator to the loop 
to fulfil some of the control functions. The problem then swaps to a 
consideration of how control passes between the two control systems, human 
and autonomous, and the integrity and availability of their communication. This 
is discussed further. 
3.1.7.2 Distributed UAS Control 
If we consider a distribution of control between the autonomous system and the 
external human controller, and assume that the human has executive, or 
overall, control, then a system of appropriate and dynamic authorisation of 
control can be envisaged. One such system is described in the schematic 
below: 
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Figure 11: Human - Autonomous System Interface 
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This concept of distribution of control between the autonomous system and the 
remote human controller is fundamental to the architectural design. The concept 
calls for a taxonomy of control hierarchies whereby control of a specific 
functions is allocated a control protocol and an associated authorisation to 
proceed.  
3.1.8 Level of Automation and Autonomy 
There has been much work done on developing such a taxonomy. The ground 
breaking work in this area is generally acknowledged to be by Sheridan & 
Verplank in 1978 [20].  Their work, together with that of Parasuraman, Sheridan, 
and Wickens in 2000 [21] is described in the table below, reproduced from [22].  
Table 5: Levels of Automation of Decision and Action 
3.1.8.1 PACT Levels 
The levels shown above have been further modified by Taylor [23] and are 
called the Pilot Authorisation and Control of Tasks (PACT). These original 
PACT levels originated from consideration of work conducted separately by the 
(US) Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and Sheridan and Verplank. The 
PACT levels so discussed have been further modified by BAE Systems Human 
Factor engineers and their results are given at [24]. These modified levels, 
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together with the original levels they were derived from and other influences are 
described below: 
AFRL 
Original 
PACT Locus 
of Authority 
Computer 
Autonomy 
PACT 
Level 
Sheridan & Verplank 
Levels of HMI 
Fully 
Autonomous 
Computer 
Monitored by 
pilot 
Full 
5b 
Computer does everything 
autonomously 
5a 
Computer chooses action, 
performs it & informs 
human 
Remotely 
Supervised 
Computer 
backed up by 
pilot 
Action 
unless 
revoked 
4b 
Computer chooses action 
& performs it unless 
human disapproves 
Action if 
authorised 
4a 
Computer chooses action 
& performs it if human 
approves 
Remotely 
Operated 
Pilot backed 
up by 
computer 
Advice,  and 
if 
authorised, 
action 
3 
Computer suggests 
options and proposes one 
of them 
Pilot assisted 
by computer 
Advice 2 
Computer suggests 
options to human 
Pilot assisted 
by computer 
only when 
requested 
Advice only 
if requested 
1 
Human asks computer to 
suggest options and 
human selects 
Remotely 
Piloted 
Pilot None 0 
Whole task done by 
human except for actual 
operation 
Table 6: Modified PACT Levels 
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It can be seen that, for the type of distributed control problem we envisage, the 
human will delegate authority to the autonomous decision making system in the 
UAS using PACT Levels (PLs) 4-5. This implies that, for each function, at either 
the control or plan level, the UAS needs to have an understanding of what level 
of authorisation it is operating at. A way of doing this is to maintain an 
authorisation status list for each control function. When a control function is 
selected to be invoked, by whatever process, reactive or deliberative, the 
authorisation status list is checked and the appropriate response generated. 
This functionality is discussed further in Para.3.3.3. 
This concept can be taken further and the PLs could be used for delegating 
authority to the management functions of sub-systems lower in the command 
hierarchy to the decision making system. 
3.2 Decision Architectures for Air Systems 
3.2.1 Architecture Definition 
As with “autonomy” and “agents”, there is no unanimous agreement on the 
definition of “architecture” as it relates to a software/hardware system. The 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) cites [25]: 
“The structure of components, their relationships, and the 
principles and guidelines governing their design and 
evolution over time” 
An excellent reference covering virtually all known definitions, both classical and 
modern, is given by Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering 
Institute62. These authors appear to prefer a modern definition emanating from 
[26] which states: 
“The software architecture of a program or computing system 
is the structure or structures of the system, which comprise 
                                            
62
 Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering Institute: “Published Software 
Architecture Definitions”, available at 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/architecture/published_definitions.html 
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software elements, the externally visible properties of those 
elements, and the relationships among them”. 
At [26], the implications of the above definition are discussed in detail. 
These are summarised below: 
• An architecture is an abstraction of the system that suppresses internal 
details 
• Systems can, and do, comprise more than one structure 
• Every system has an architecture because every system can be shown 
to be composed of elements. However, this does not mean that the 
architecture is necessarily known. 
• The behaviour of each element is part of the architecture 
• The definition is indifferent as to whether an architecture is a good or bad 
one. This raises the question of architecture evaluation. In other words, 
what constitutes a “good” architecture? 
3.2.2 Architectural Viewpoints 
From the generalised definition of a software architecture given above, it is clear 
that differing viewpoints of the same architecture can be stated, not only from 
different levels of abstraction (i.e. detail), but also from different properties of the 
composing elements and their relationships. 
3.2.2.1 Reference Architecture 
A Reference Architecture describes the highest level of abstraction, free from 
implementation details, but encompassing definitions of relationships, not only 
between top level elements within the system of interest, but also those 
interacting elements external to it. 
3.2.2.2 Functional architecture 
In contrast to a Reference Architecture, a Functional Architecture is solely 
concerned with what the system of interest actually does. It describes the 
functionality of the system and specifies the interfaces between the interacting 
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elements, at increasing levels of detail for each aspect. A top level or system 
level viewpoint expresses general functionality and indicates the lower levels of 
system partitioning. These sub-systems’ functionality are further detailed as 
required. At the highest level of detail, each algorithm fulfilling the functionality, 
together with the necessary input/output, is explicitly described and allocated to 
the computing hardware that will undertake them. This latter process is 
sometimes called the Functional Allocation. 
3.2.3 Robotic Architectures  
Since there has been a vast amount of research in the field of robotic 
architectures, which by nature are architectures designed for control, and 
usually for control of a vehicle, it is worth a review of the general nature of 
these. 
Earlier it was conjectured that that a process termed IDC would be useful for 
portraying the required control loop for an autonomous system. This is 
uncomfortably similar to the now out-dated (at least since 1985) notion of 
Sense-Plan-Act (SPA) architectures. These had three primitive functional 
elements: a sensing system, a planning system and an execution system. It is 
valuable to reflect on the history of robotic architectures and the demise of SPA 
in order that old lessons may be reviewed and/or re-learned. 
3.2.4 BACKGROUND 
The nature of SPA architectures is that they are characterised by a one way 
flow of control from sensors to effectors via a plan which was similar to a 
computer program – a series of elements executed using traditional 
programming control flows such a conditionals, loops and orderings. The 
execution of such a plan is conventional and therefore simple. The interesting, 
and therefore difficult, part of producing an effective SPA was seen to be the 
quality and sophistication of its world modelling and planning. This proved to be 
a non-trivial problem. 
The first departure from SPA was Rodney Brookes’ Subsumption architecture. 
This renounced the need for a world model (the information processing 
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element) and the planning system and replaced them with a series of direct 
reactive responses which connect the sensed input and provide a ”hard-wired” 
output. These could be hierarchical with one response link subsumed by a 
higher level one. Thus the nature of Subsumption is hierarchical reactive control 
which is, by nature, very fast. This fact enabled robots using Subsumption to 
outperform those using SPA enormously. Unfortunately, and this is a key fact 
which will be returned to, the degree of sophistication is governed by the 
number of links and the quality of the Subsumption design. In short, the 
architecture is not directly scalable. Gat [27] states that one possible cause of 
Subsumption’s apparent “capability ceiling” is that the architecture lacks 
mechanisms for managing complexity. He quotes Hartley [28] who reflects that 
Subsumption is not sufficiently modular and that higher layers interfere with 
lower layers and cannot be designed independently of each other. Gat himself 
designed a modification to the Subsumption architecture whereby instead of 
suppressing lower layers, higher layers provided input or advice to the lower 
layers. There were manifested in the Tooth and Rocky III robots.  However, the 
robots were single task only and could not achieve different tasks without 
rewriting the control program. This is probably true of all such reactive 
architectures. 
So, reactive architectures replaced the SPA architecture based robots by 
essentially replacing all (subsumption type), or mostly all, of the world modelling 
and planning aspects. In doing so, robots could be built which were satisfyingly 
fast and performed, in the main, pretty well - at least for unsophisticated and 
singular tasks. However, as computers and programming languages improved, 
it became more attractive to introduce a modicum of planning and world 
modelling, especially where speed of operation was not demanding. This bred a 
new architectural approach commonly called the Hybrid Architecture where a 
reactive layer was combined with a deliberative layer. An example of this was 
the Guardian architecture of Barbara Hayes-Roth which was one of the first to 
attempt to control complex tasks. 
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Eventually, a number of researchers63, working independently, but with a 
common background of research material, arrived at solutions surprisingly 
similar. An abstraction of these solutions is now commonly known as the Three 
Layer Architecture (TLA). Such architectures have the following components 
[27] which may operate asynchronously: 
• A fast reactive feedback control mechanism, sometimes called the skill 
layer or controller 
• A slower deliberative planning layer, sometimes called the planner or 
deliberator 
• A mechanism that connects the first two, sometimes called the 
sequencer, executive or manager. 
Since the three layer architecture has almost become an industry standard (for 
robots at least) it is important to see where they are different from the SPA 
architecture and perhaps incorporate their positive aspects into any proposed 
new architecture for a UAS. 
3.2.5 The Three Layer Architecture 
3.2.5.1 The Controller 
The control flow in an SPA architecture is uni-directional. By contrast, in a TLA 
there is reactive feedback. This is required for several reasons: 
• The controller should know the current state of its actuator and operate it 
to achieve the desired state over the period of time allocated to it.  This 
may be a continuous function (for something akin to a control surface) or 
a time-bound state transition function for a finite state machine. 
• The controller should know when it has failed (to achieve the required 
state of its actuator) 
                                            
63
 Gat, Bonasso and Connell. The difference was in the type of sequencer used. Gat used 
Firby’s Reactive Action Package (RAPs), Bonasso used Kailbeiling’s REX/GAPPS system 
initially and RAPs later, and Connell’s was based on Subsumption. 
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• The controller should be able to report that failed state to a higher level 
for contingency, alternative or remedial action.  
The above implies that the controller need know nothing of anything else save 
the state of its actuator and the control requirement (or order) from the higher 
level.  
Restricting access to information within a system in general is desirable for 
many reasons: 
• It makes interfaces between modules simpler and therefore less likely to 
be specified or implemented in error. 
• It conforms to the general principles of Occam’s Razor [29] 
• It allows for an easier analysis and assessment of mission and safety 
critical functions for certification. 
• It simplifies any hardware or software connections. 
• It may reduce the data required at some connections which in turn allows 
for higher speed data transmissions. 
Controller Requirements 
If we implement a generic mechanism for a controller such as that shown 
below, we shall achieve the above requirements and bring the design into line 
with the general required characteristics of a TLA: 
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Control Handshake 
Definition
Manager
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Timescale
for completion
Manager - Register 
Command sent/time
Controller
Actuator
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Acknowledge
Command 
if in comms
Demand
Actuator
to Change
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Controller – Register 
Command sent/time
Action Initiated
Actuator
Status
Changed
If Actuator
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success
Controller - Monitor Actuator Status
Action Completed Action Timed out
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Failure upon 
timeout
Time to complete action
Initiation
Generate Command if 
actuator state /= goal 
state
&&
Command not sent
Manager – reset Command Sent message
 
Figure 12: Generic Sequencer/Controller Handshake Protocol 
3.2.5.2 The Sequencer 
The role of the sequencer is to connect the deliberation layer to the control 
layer. Specifically, the sequencer is to: 
• Assess and if necessary select plans generated by the deliberator 
• Request plans, or modifications to plans, from the deliberator. 
• To implement selected plans and sequence them to the controller. 
• To react to external and internal, events and situations 
• Monitor progress of plans 
• Decide when a plan is no longer relevant or is inadequate to achieve the 
objectives 
TLA requires that the sequencer be a reactive plan execution mechanism [27]. 
This is taken to mean that a plan sequence of primitive actions does not 
proceed to the next element of the plan until the controller has reported success 
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with the current element. The above generic sequencer/controller handshake 
protocol embraces this requirement. It is worth considering that non-linear plan 
sequences are now being developed. These can still fit with the original 
requirement for plan sequencing 
Sequencer Requirements 
If we accept the handshake protocol in Figure 12, then the proposed sequencer 
will be in accord with the general principles of TLAs. 
3.2.5.3 The Deliberator 
The deliberator or planner has the task of generating plans for the sequencer to 
assess, choose and implement, and to respond to the sequencer for specific 
queries or requests. For a UAS, both tasks are likely to be required. An example 
may be a route generation to avoid certain no-go areas. The route plan will be 
generated using constraints such as fuel restrictions, avoidance margins, etc., 
perhaps using default ones initially. Once the route plan is passed to the 
sequencer and assessed for suitability, it may be either accepted or returned for 
modification/optimisation by changes to the constraints.  
Deliberator Requirements 
There appear to be no extra requirements or characteristics required for the 
deliberator suggested by TLAs.  
3.2.5.4 Sensing and the World Model 
TLAs do not appear to consider the generation and maintenance of the world, 
or world model, as a separate layer but clearly they act upon its present and 
predicted future states. Gat [27] states that stateless sensor based algorithms 
inhabit the control layer, algorithms based on past states are in the sequencer 
layer, whilst those that make predictions about the future inhabit the deliberator. 
The type of internal state for the controller has already been remarked upon. It 
should only consist of present knowledge of the effector that it is controlling. 
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This knowledge should include, not only the state of the effector, but also its 
status and this may be generated either from: 
• the effector itself as part of the feedback process, or 
• perceived by the controller from a consideration of the performance of 
the effector, or 
• be independently generated from a separate monitor of the effector. 
In general, for most robotic architectures, the TLA serves well. However, in 
practical terms, the world modelling required for robot applications is usually 
simple. Given the background of subsumption, where a direct sensor to actuator 
link replaced the world model, this is not surprising. For many TLA robots, with 
tasks not very much more demanding than those using subsumption, a simple 
representation is all that is required. This is highly unlikely to be true for a UAS 
given the nature of its environment and the degree of competency required. If 
this proves to be the case, the architecture for a UAS must make specific 
provision for an information processing layer. 
3.2.5.5 Suitability 
Many robotic architectures have been designed and implemented. The most 
successful have been highly specialised applications either in academia or in 
manufacturing. Such systems tend to have low levels of functionality and world 
modelling. However, robotic architectures are well developed, have a strong 
theoretical underpinning and can clearly point the way to an architecture 
suitable for an autonomous airborne application. 
3.2.6 Architecture Proposal 
 An architecture is proposed based on the following bases: 
 By accepting those modifications above as suggested by consideration 
of TLAs, and 
 Including an information collection and processing layer, and 
 Make clear provision for mission and safety critical control functions, and 
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 By making provision for the human control of the system by 
authorisation in accordance with a defined protocol (such as the PACT 
levels) 
3.2.7 Avionic System Architectures 
3.2.7.1 The Evolution of Avionic Systems 
The term “Avionics” originated from an amalgam of “Aviation Electronics” 
sometime around the mid 1940’s. In those days, avionics were standalone 
items complete with their own power supplies and controls, and sometimes 
displays and antennas. The equipment was heavy but sparse and for more 
functionality, large aircraft were required. The weight problem eased somewhat 
with the advent of transistors and, eventually, digital computers but still most 
avionics provided a bespoke functionality within Line Replaceable Units (LRUs). 
Such systems are known as federated systems and their overall design is 
referred to as a federated architecture. Given that some redundancy was 
required, such avionic systems were heavy, inefficient and expensive.  
By the late 1970’s, It was clear that by providing communication links between 
LRUs would in itself  enable utilisation of common resources such as 
computing, power supplies and displays thus saving weight, increasing 
efficiency and reliability. Such systems were known as integrated systems. 
However, the systems were still bespoke and the communications between 
them were un-standardised at the application layer. This meant that upgrades 
were expensive and the effect of changing one LRU would almost certainly 
impact on other LRUs. These systems are often referred to as closed systems.  
The major change came with the advent of standardised interfaces and 
protocols, a notable one being the US MIL-STD-1553B standard. Adoption of 
this standard throughout an avionic system enabled sharing, fusing and 
broadcasting of data at high rates (in those days up to 1Mbit/sec, nowadays at 
nearly 2GBit/sec). Avionic systems which utilise open standards exclusively are 
often known as open systems with open architectures.  
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A good example of an integrated and (predominantly but not completely) open 
avionic system using such interfaces is the Eurofighter Typhoon where the 
communications are distributed using “twisted pair”64 wiring and which form the 
1553B databuses. In Typhoon, the system architecture is functionally 
partitioned into three major sub-systems; avionics, utilities and flight control. 
The avionics sub-system is further functionally partitioned into seven sub-sub-
systems each with its own computing centre. Such a system is referred to as a 
distributed architecture.  
3.2.7.2 Current State 
However, the Typhoon avionic architecture design dates from the early 1990s 
when computing had severe limitations compared to today. Many issues [30] 
needed to be addressed such as: 
• Affordability of systems throughout the life cycle,  i.e. reduction of both 
support costs and acquisition costs 
• System complexity, resulting from increasing functionality, performance 
and integration 
• Obsolescence management, exacerbated by the increase of system 
lifetimes and the decrease of component lifetimes 
• System upgrades: 
 difficulty in providing enhanced capability 
 evolution of the initial system into multiple variants and for multiple 
customers 
 extent of system re-qualification following upgrades 
• Improved system availability, typically by means of an extended 
Maintenance-Free Operating Period (MFOP) 
• System flexibility, i.e. the ability to easily change the functionality of the 
system to adapt to different operational scenarios, roles or mission 
                                            
64
 Twisted pair cabling is a common form of wiring in which two conductors are wound around 
each other for the purposes of cancelling out electromagnetic interference which can cause 
crosstalk. [Wikipedia].  Also it should be noted that Typhoon also uses fibre-optic links. 
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modes. 
These issues are addressed to a greater or lesser extent by the development of 
Integrated Modular Avionics (IMAs); a trend which commenced in the early 
1990s and continues to date. Such architectures frequently have centralised or 
core computing hardware to further drive down weight and space restrictions 
and reduce the cooling and power needs. The development of the VersaModule 
Eurocard (VME) rack is a good example of this. Together with the hardware 
development, a major driver to reduce life cycle costs and obsolescence is the 
development of a modular software architecture in which the application 
software is made independent of the hardware by layering of software 
functionality. The BAE Systems proprietary 3-layer stack and Smith Industries 
Common Operating Environment are good examples of this. 
In summary, avionic systems and their architectures have evolved to become 
powerful integrated systems delivering increasing functionality but at constantly 
reducing life cycle cost. There is every reason to believe that this trend will 
continue. 
3.2.7.3 General Requirements for Avionic Systems 
The very nature of their environment forces avionic systems to have certain 
general characteristics compared to other electronic systems.  Pre-eminent of 
these is that avionic must be provably safe.  
3.2.7.4 Safety   
3.2.7.4.1 Design and Assessment 
Avionic systems, in fact all airborne systems excluding, perhaps, missiles, must 
have a high tolerance to failure and when they do fail, they generally must fail 
safe. The proof of a safe system resides in its certification by airworthiness 
bodies, which are usually independent of, but work in concert with, the system 
design authority. To achieve certification, systems must be designed and 
assessed for safety and the system tested to ensure safe system responses. In 
general, there are three phases to developing safe or high integrity systems31: 
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• Development and Integration  
• Verification and Validation  
• Integral Activities  
During Development and Integration a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is 
produced which will analyse the system functional design. For a functional 
assessment, the initial step is to assess each end-event function65 for its 
criticality66. These are then assessed by Functional Failure Analysis (FFA) 
which considers three failure modes: 
• Failure to provide a function when it is required 
• The provision of a function when it is not required 
• The provision of a function incorrectly. 
The effect of the failure is qualitatively assessed and the severity of the failure 
can be categorised as, say, Catastrophic, Critical, Marginal or Negligible. The 
assessment is then extended to include failures in conjunction with other 
failures or situations. Fault trees are then composed to determine how the 
failure can be generated. Finally, safety critical chains are established. Once 
these are understood, the design can be modified, procedures put in place, or 
redundancy built in to reduce the probability of a system failure occurring to an 
acceptable level. 
Appropriate flight worthy code is produced to requisite software standards using 
approved procedures, languages and validated compliers. Use of the latter may 
in itself force certain procedures to be followed. 
During Validation and Verification, the system response is tested to ensure that 
the requirements, including those that are safety related, are correctly 
implemented. 
                                            
65
 An end event function is one that is delivered externally from the system under 
consideration.  
66
 A typical taxonomy of criticality is: non-critical, safety involved and safety critical. The latter 
implies that a failure of such a function would lead to the loss of the aircraft and/or life. 
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Integral Activities covers the use of appropriate processes such as configuration 
management, version control, documentation and traceability[30] 
3.2.7.4.2 Standards 
Certain safety standards will be imposed on the system designers. An example 
is the set of standards developed by ASAAC for Integrated Modular Systems. 
Another set is the standards and procedures required for the development of 
software compliant to the European Standard EN50128. This Standard defines 
Software Integrity using a six-level scale (zero to five). Airborne software is 
usually produced to Software Integrity Level (SIL) 3, whilst that deemed to be 
safety critical will be produced to SIL4. 
3.2.7.4.3 Robustness 
An avionic system must be robust. Unlike a PC it cannot crash, stop and 
reassess, require operator input etc. These requirements are at the heart of 
hardware /software integration and high integrity operating systems, running in 
real time, are vital. 
3.2.7.4.4 Mission Orientated 
Airborne equipments are in general expensive to operate and the functionality 
which gives it its ability to perform its mission is expensive to produce. Thus, 
like the concept of Safety Criticality, the concept of Mission Criticality has 
developed. The approach to achieving mission success has closely followed the 
safety approach and the system is analysed to identify those components 
whose failure will cause a mission failure. The system can then be modified to 
introduce redundancy and high integrity to those areas. 
3.2.7.5 UAS Specific Requirements 
Development of avionic systems for UAS has, not surprisingly, generally 
followed the evolution described above with a few additions and modifications 
described below. 
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Volume and Weight The requirements for low volume, cost and power 
together with high reliability and robustness are probably more in demand for 
UAS than for manned aircraft.  
Transparency  Transparency is generally understood to be the ability to 
operate such that, to an external viewer (such as ATC), the vehicle’s  appears 
to be identical (transparent) with other air users. In order to operate in non-
segregated airspace, a UAS must: 
•  be fitted with the equipment specification applicable to the class of 
airspace it intends to operate in  
•  comply with ATC instructions using the same infrastructure as manned 
aircraft 
•  operate with no adverse effect on other air users 
•  not require special or extra services  
Equivalence Equivalence is generally regarded as the adherence to 
operational regulations in exactly the same way as other air users. In order to 
operate in non-segregated airspace, a UAS must: 
•  be capable of complying with all existing operational procedures, rules 
and regulations 
•  be certified to operate which includes: 
•  The vehicle, including the systems on board the vehicle 
•  The operator, pilot or commander (licensing) 
•  The off board systems used by the operators 
•  The communications infrastructure linking them and other users 
•  have functionality that the human pilot inherently provides e.g. lookout 
Safety   The vehicle’s operation must be no less safe than manned 
aviation. 
In order to be demonstrably safe as a manned aircraft, a UAS must: 
•  have a reliability level as good as manned aircraft 
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•  be able to respond effectively to unforeseen events: 
•  emergencies, equipment or systems failures 
•  safe diversionary routing/landing/crashing 
•  avoid ground/air collisions 
•  communications loss 
•  not present hazards to other air users or personnel on the ground 
•  have high integrity and security of its systems 
Current accident rates (accidents per 100,000 hours) are*: 
•  Large Airliners  ~ 0.01 
•  Regional Commuter Airliners  ~ 0.1 
•  General Aviation ~ 6.5 
•  UASs e.g.: 
•  Predator ~ 18 
•  Global Hawk ~ 80 
•  RPVs ~ 150 
In addition, if the system has autonomous functionality incorporated to any 
degree, then the system is likely to have higher than normal safety critical 
functions. This view is supported in the recent Defence Industrial Strategy 
document issued by the UK MoD [32]. 
3.2.7.6 Summary of Requirements 
In general, the general requirements for an avionic system are: 
• To be capable of certification for airworthiness by design. This turn 
requires: 
• It to be capable of being assessed and tested for safety. 
• It to have repeatable, deterministic and safe responses to external 
and internal input. 
• The use of robust and rugged hardware running high integrity 
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software in real time. 
• Adequate redundancy for safety and mission critical components 
and processes. 
• Handling of safety-critical functions which must fail safe and be 
incapable of operating when not required. 
• To have low volume, cost and power needs. 
• To conform to appropriate standards 
• To be highly integrated, modular and efficient 
• To be secure 
3.3 Proposed Decision and Support Architecture 
3.3.1 Cardinal System Requirements and Characteristics 
The example systems reviewed in the previous section are a mixture of 
components for making decisions through to complete integrated vehicle, 
avionic and decision sub-systems.  In deriving a cardinal requirement 
specification, it is difficult at this stage to separate out those components 
responsible for making decisions, those for providing the information with which 
to do so and those that will generate and implement appropriate sub-plans. The 
requirements below do not specify the implementation or the partitioning of the 
system into appropriate sub-systems. This aspect will be addressed when 
considering the system design. 
Based on the previous discussions, the following cardinal system characteristics 
and requirements are proposed: 
1. Decision Making - The system should be capable of making decisions, 
preferably using all of the methods described in Para. 3.1.6.  This in turn 
requires: 
– Direct Sensor to Effector Reactive Control –  a sensor invoked 
reactive control function 
– Direct Operator to Effector Control – operator control override 
function 
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– Deliberative Effector Control: 
• Recognition Primed Decision Making – a situational state 
recognition function 
• Operator Decision Making -  
• Recognition Primed Plan Assessment and Selection – a 
plan/situation association table 
• Maximum Expected Utility (Value) Plan Assessment and 
Selection – a plan value generation algorithm 
• Operator Plan Assessment and Selection – operator plan 
override function 
• Recognition Primed Plan Generation. 
• Objective  Based Plan Generation -  
• Operator Commanded Plan Generation – operator  
commands the system to generate a suitable plan. 
2. Certification – The system must be capable of handling safety related 
functions and must be robust for the air environment. If it is accepted that 
the system must follow the general requirements of an avionic system, these 
in turn require the following as discussed in Para. 3.2.7.6: 
• To be capable of being assessed and tested for safety. 
• To have repeatable, deterministic and safe responses to external 
and internal input. 
• To have robust and rugged hardware running high integrity 
software in real time. 
• To have adequate redundancy for safety and mission critical 
components and processes. 
• To handle safety-critical functions which must fail safe and be 
incapable of operating when not required. 
3. Competency – The system must be able to conduct missions, handle 
failures and other unforeseen events and respond appropriately to produce 
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successful outcomes where possible67.  
In order to conduct missions effectively, it must: 
 Effectively communicate with, respond to, and comply with, Air Traffic 
Control and System Operator authorities. 
 For operation within UK Airspace, comply with the CAA Air Navigation 
Order (which includes the Rules of the Air), CAP 72268 and other air 
regulations and mandatory procedures. A key requirement of CAP 
722 is the requirement for a “Sense and Avoid” capability which is the 
equivalent to the requirement for a human pilot to “See and Avoid” 
other air vehicles. 
 Implement standing procedures for each phase of flight. 
 Constantly monitor, assess and update, where necessary, its mission 
(including route) and fuel plans to ensure safe arrival at its 
destination. This must be achieved whilst avoiding no go areas and 
threats such as thunderstorms, etc. 
In order to handle failures successfully, it must: 
 Detect and diagnose system vehicle failures, and 
 Generate, assess, select and undertake the most appropriate 
remedial action and monitor progress. 
 Determine the best course of action following system failures and 
initiate action, showing a high standard of airmanship (if possible). 
In order to respond to unforeseen events and situations and achieve 
successful outcomes, it must: 
 Identify events and situations 
                                            
67
 It would be unfair to ask it to cope with some major failures such as loss of directional 
control, operation outside of the air envelope or airframe failure.  However, it would be fair to 
ask it to cope with an engine failure and carry out remedial action, even if that ultimately 
entailed a controlled crash landing. 
68
 CAA Publication detailing the regulations and requirements to be observed for the 
operation of UASs in UK Airspace 
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 Predict and the estimate the consequences 
 Asses and predict the probability of success of alternative courses of 
action (COA) in response and select the most appropriate. In doing 
so, it: 
– Must act in accordance with its objectives 
– Must not rapidly or inappropriately “flip-flop” between 
alternatives but only commit to a particular COA when it is 
clearly superior or if circumstances dictate the need for urgent 
short term action. 
The more complex situations the system can deal with, the more it will be 
judged to be competent and the less need it will have for operator override of 
control. Ideally, it should be able to recognise situations for which it can offer 
no solution and to report that to the human operator. In the absence of 
communications with the human operator, it should have reversionary modes 
of control which should in general fail-safely.  
4. Authorised Control – The system must be capable of determining whether 
it has the authority for committing a decision into action. This authority can 
be likened to a meta-control under the jurisdiction of the human operator. 
The above implies the following authorisation functionality: 
• For each control function, there must be an assigned PACT Level 
(PL) 
• Before invoking a control function, the requirements of the 
associated PL must be checked and if below PL5, satisfied by 
requesting authorisation (PL4a) or waiting for authorisation 
timeout (PL4b). If the associated PL is PL5a, the operator must be 
informed after the control function has completed . 
•  Assigned PACT levels can only be changed by the operator, 
either directly (on command) or indirectly (according to an 
operator defined rule-set). 
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3.3.2 Proposed Architecture 
3.3.2.1 System Partitions 
In Para. 3.2.6, a 4-layer architecture was envisaged: a conventional TLA, 
together with an additional information processing layer. Since the system is 
also likely to be more complex than that of robotic architectures and is likely to 
therefore consist of separate computing centres, a functional breakdown into 
related areas, or system functional partitioning, is likely to be beneficial. Since it 
is reasonable to consider the decision making sub-system as part of the overall 
avionic system, and taking into account the requirements in the previous section 
along, the following partitions are proposed: 
• A Mission Master Executive – responsible for all cross partition plans, 
decisions and actions. To act, in conjunction with the human control 
element, as the surrogate pilot controller. 
• An Information System – responsible for: 
o The management, processing and dispersement of external data 
to provide the necessary information for Situational Awareness. 
o The collection of internal data from contributing sub-systems. 
o The retrieval and storage of data from/to databases 
o Flight data recording 
• A Vehicle System – responsible for all non-avionic sub-systems such as 
hydraulics, electrical power and airframe systems (undercarriage, flaps, 
brakes etc.). 
• A Flight Management System – responsible for the directional control of 
the aircraft and operation of the engines. 
• A Navigation System – responsible for all navigational aspects including 
the flight (including route) plan and fuel plan. 
• A Communications System – responsible for all communications plans 
and actions 
• An Air Safety System – responsible for the recognition and avoidance of 
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threats such as weather cells and other air traffic 
• System Health System – responsible for monitoring and reporting system 
health by diagnosing failures, assessing the impact of those failures on 
the mission and proposing plans for remedial action. 
• Sensor Suite – responsible for operation of all sensors. 
3.3.2.2 General Structure 
The general outline of the architecture follows that of an SPA architecture with 
those modifications suggested by a consideration of the TLA described in Para. 
3.2.3. I.e. it should have: 
• A planning layer 
• A sequencing, or management layer 
• A re-active feedback control layer 
In addition, provision of a separate information layer is implemented, partly due 
to the complexity of the world modelling that is necessary, and partly as an aid 
to simplifying the hazard analysis that will be required as part of the certification 
process. 
3.3.2.3 Design Aims 
In Para. 3.2.5.1, it was also considered that restriction of data throughout the 
architecture was an aid to analysis of the system design. This is also likely to be 
true for plans and controls. The following design aims, comparable to general 
principles of Command and Control, are proposed: 
• Information should be encapsulated where possible and restricted to 
those elements which have a direct need for it. 
• Plans that have no impact on other functional elements should also be 
encapsulated within their own sphere, or partition.  On the other hand, 
plans which do not, should be referred upwards to a higher authority. 
This implies a hierarchy of authority within the overall system. 
• Controls should be managed at the lowest level possible and controllers 
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should only have access to the state of the actuator they are responsible 
for controlling. 
• Separation between the information layer and management layer (which 
is the sole means of generating behaviour) will enable easier 
identification of safety critical chains. 
From these principles, a generic view of the relationship between the four layers 
and their higher authority, which is called the Master Executive, can be 
envisioned as follows: 
Managers
Mission Controller
Generate alternative plans
Generate plan attributes/metrics
Respond to bespoke requests from Manager
Access to model data via manager
Can be asynchronous in operation
Evaluate alternative plans
Predict alternative plan performance
Evaluate current plan performance
Propose actions/plans to Master Executive for authorisation
When authorised, tell the Controller what to do and when by
Generate a plan request + required attributes & send to 
Planner
Receive plan weights (policies) from Master Exec
Generate revised plan weights (contextual)
Receive plan authorisations from Master Exec
Full access to model data
Synchronous in operation
Complete control function within time specified.
Detect failure to carry out control function & report to the 
Manager 
No access to model data
Event driven operation
External
(World)
Model
Determine/update/predict 
external (world) states & 
object attributes
Internal
Model
Determine/update/predict 
internal status & states
Information
Processing Layer
Planners
 
Figure 13: Generic 4-Layer Architecture 
This schematic encompasses the above principles. Data is restricted to the 
planner and controller by the associated manager which provides the minimum 
required for each of the processes. However, the manager has access to a wide 
range of data via the information databus and to other managers, principally the 
Master Executive. 
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3.3.2.4 Reference View 
The above constitutes the basic elements of the proposed architecture and their 
top level relationship. If we now structure the generic 4-layer model with the 
sub-system functional partitioning referred to earlier, we can now form an 
overall view of the architecture and see how the decision making system, 
described to here as the Mission Master Executive, sits alongside the other sub-
systems and the aircraft vehicle system. 
 This can therefore be considered the reference viewpoint of the proposed 
design, a schematic of which is shown below: 
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3.3.3 Functional View  
From the reference view, we can start to add more detailed functionality and 
show the interfaces and message passing between sub-systems and functional 
modules. This design has been implemented69 and a functional view of the 
latest implementation (June 2011), designated the Autonomous Integrated 
Mission System (AIMS) Capability  (CAP) 2, is shown below: 
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 By a team of BAE Systems researchers, including the author. 
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The above functional implementation is described further: 
Mission Master Executive 
This sub-system is the prime area for decision and control, and is thus the 
centre for the autonomous behaviour. It comprises six elements: 
 The Authorisation Manager – this element: 
o maintains the Authorisation Status List which is used by the 
system managers to check whether they have sufficient 
authorisation to command a particular control signal under their 
remit 
o Request authorisation changes from the GCS, on behalf of the 
system managers when they identify a command need for which 
they have insufficient authority. 
o Receives authorisation changes from the GCS in response to the 
requests and updates the Authorisation Status list. 
o Receives authorisation overrides from the GCS and updates the 
Authorisation Status list. 
 The Mission Planner – this element 
o Takes input from the Mission Assessor, which is a Bayesian Belief 
Net (BBN) which outputs an assessment of Mission Success, 
based on time on task and sensor availability 
o Takes input from the Survival Assessor, which is a Bayesian 
Belief Net (BBN) which outputs an assessment of Mission 
Survival, based on the level of threat and the mission time 
remaining. 
o From the above inputs and fuel remaining, it calculates the 
optimum balance between fuel allocated to: countering present 
and future threats, maximising time on task, allocating safe 
margins for the landing fuel. 
o When the above balance falls to sub-optimum levels, it generates 
99 
alternative plans for the landing airfield and diversion alternative, 
together with their associated expected values, to the Master 
Executive for assessment and selection (or rejection).  
 Flight Path Manager – this element provides the reactive (emergency) 
aspects of vehicle control: 
o Takes inputs of status from the: 
 Master Executive override (Priority 1) 
 Collision Avoidance Steering sub-system (Priority 2) 
 Threat Assessment and Counter sub-system (Priority 3) 
 System Health sub-system (for emergency diversion 
steering) (Priority 4) 
o Directs the Air System Control to respond appropriately if any or 
more of the above status signals are positive. 
 Flight Phase Manager – this element: 
o Determines the current Phase of Flight 
o Determines the current Phase of Mission 
o Selects the appropriate plan for each of the above and directs the 
Air System Control to implement it.  
 Air Systems Control – this element: 
o Generates the control signals for the operation of the air vehicle in 
response to the Flight Phase Managers commands 
o Receives feedback responses  from the actuators 
o Reports success or failure back to the Flight Phase Manager 
 Master Executive (ME) – this element: 
o Responds to ATC (not yet implemented) and GCS commands 
appropriately 
o Evaluates and selects (or otherwise): 
 route plans generated by the adaptive router – these will 
provide optimum routes around threats and no-go areas 
and plan the on task phase of flight. 
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 mission plans generated by the mission planner 
System Health Manager 
This sub-system provides prognostic and diagnostic data to the ME and 
proposes plans for emergency actions in response to failures. 
Adaptive Router/Planner 
This sub-system constantly calculates an optimum mission route and 
associated value metrics (fuel, time, threat level). If there is a difference 
between the current (authorised route) and the latest optimum route, it will 
propose the acceptance of the new route. 
Air Safety System 
This sub-system comprises two elements: 
 Sense and Avoid – this element generates appropriate70 emergency 
avoidance steering if it detects that a nearby external entity will pass 
within a pre-determined radius of the UAS. 
 Threat Avoidance – this element will provide emergency steering to avoid 
threats such as storm cells. 
Information Management System 
This sub-system is responsible for generating all requisite data for the 
managers to act upon. It handles external (world) entity information generated 
by the sensors and communication suite and internal (state and status) 
information. It also retrieves and stores information to and from on-board 
databases.  
                                            
70
 In accordance with the Rules of the Air as defined in the CAA Air Navigation Order, and if 
the object is within 10k and sufficient to provide a pre-determined miss distance (currently set 
to 500m laterally and 500ft vertically). 
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Vehicle and Flight System Interface 
This sub-system is the main interface to the vehicle71 and flight control72 
systems 
3.3.4 Implementation of the AIMS Functional Architecture 
The AIMS functional architecture described above was implemented by a team 
of avionic specialists during the ASTRAEA programme. This implementation 
was a based on the MoD’s Synthetic Environment Based Acquisition(SEBA) 
process, which is described in Appendix D, and in doing so underwent several 
spiral updates. The nature and results of that testing is not relevant to this thesis 
as they was not designed to determine the qualities of the architecture. 
However, in operating the architecture, some valuable lessons were learned 
from the final development standard that fundamentally affects the architecture 
as defined above. These are discussed below: 
3.3.4.1 HMI and the Authorisation Protocols 
When the basic generic 4-layer architecture was first envisaged, the Human 
Machine Interaction was using the PACT Levels identified in Table 6. Initially, it 
was envisaged that only the pilot could change the PACT levels for specific 
functions. When operating the system in response to generated inputs, such as 
a Sense and Avoid encounter, it became quickly obvious that this was an 
unsound practice, primarily because it limited appropriate behaviour, especially 
when the pilot was not in contact with the vehicle. As an example, consider the 
Sense and Avoid scenario. If the pilot refuses to authorise the avoiding 
manoeuvre plan, assuming that this plan is correctly specified, then a collision 
will occur (which is unacceptable). If the pilot is unable to authorise the 
manoeuvre due to loss of communication a similar situation arises. However, if 
the system requests authority to manoeuvre (i.e. a PACT 4A level) upon 
cognisance of the collision risk and then, at say 30 seconds to impact, self 
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 Such as the undercarriage, flaps, brakes etc. 
72
 This is primarily the autopilot, which is the only means of flight control. 
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escalates the level to PACT 4B (with a 10 second timeout) and then finally self-
authorises the manoeuvre at PACT 5A in time for the collision to be averted, 
then the appropriate behaviour is now generated. This would be an example of  
PACT escalation due to time pressure. A similar case can be made for routing 
to avoid threats (such as bad weather). If the route change is minor (and of 
course that has to be defined), then the system could self-authorise at the 
PACT 5A level. If the change is medium, then 4B, and finally for major route 
changes, only PACT 4A could be allowed. This is an example of PACT 
escalation based on the degree  of change of plan. A review of all such 
transitions was made and these are outlined in detail in Para. 5.2.  
3.3.4.2 Authorisation of Controls 
Although the architecture is designed to generate, maintain and implement 
plans, initially, the authorisation protocol was envisaged at the control or action 
level. For each switch in the UASs virtual cockpit73, a separate authorisation 
was considered necessary. As the architecture was implemented, it became 
clear that this was unwieldy and uncoordinated. In implementing the Flight 
Phase Manager, which uses checklists to transition from one phase to another, 
it became clear that a generic approach was to consider plans as the basic 
construct for authorisation. In fact, eventually it became obvious that the entire 
architecture should be  predicated on the selection, authorisation and actioning 
of plans alone, even if those plans contain only a single “atomic” action such as 
a Sense and Avoid manoeuvre. This is in alignment with the original generic 4-
layer architecture construct. 
However, in sequencing these plans using a “heavyweight” but conventional 
programming language such as ADA, it was obvious that quite complicated 
code could be generated from applying even simple plans. That complexity 
increases the level of debugging and testing, and therefore, cost. Even a simple 
assessment (and there were several detailed Hazard Analyses done) indicates 
that the vast majority of the architecture will be Safety Critical. Safety Critical 
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 Originally, the controls were seen to be identical to those in a manned cockpit i.e. switches. 
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code can be 10 to 30 times the cost of conventional code. Although not part of 
this Thesis, a review of the theoretical background of agent programming 
languages indicates that the architecture is fully aligned with their approaches 
and indicates a way ahead for the implementation of a future system.  
Moving to a plan based system of control also points the way to alternative 
means of specifying behaviours by the human operator. It was mentioned 
earlier that for an autonomous system, the operator is a manager of the 
autonomous system which is controlling the vehicle. Managers of human teams 
(well, good ones do) tend to specify objectives that need to be achieved or 
maintained rather than issue micro managing orders. Plans provide the ideal 
mechanism to do so since they are primarily concerned with the sequence of 
events that can lead from a current state to a desired or goal state. If that goal 
state can be identified by an objective, then the HMI dialogue can be reduced to 
setting objectives for the machine. On receiving an objective, the machine will 
back chain to link together a sequence of plans to get from the current state to 
the goal state and achieve the set objective. Again this concept is in line with 
current Agent Programming languages such as JACK, and Agent Factory. 
The current way of delivering behaviours is by a (crisp) rule based system. It 
was noted that improved human understanding and more appropriate response 
could be generated by moving to a fuzzy rule based system with linguistic 
hedges providing a “soft” transition from one belief (and therefore behaviour) to 
another and reducing the occurrence of flip-flopping of behaviours as beliefs 
swap. None of the above (agent programming or fuzzy rules) has been 
implemented or tested at this stage and the benefits remain unproven.  
3.3.4.3 SEBA Validation 
As part of a separate strand of research into system development processes, 
the development of the architecture provided an opportunity to test the 
theoretical advantages of the SEBA process (see Appendix D). SEBA is 
predominantly concerned with the construction and management of an evolving 
set of Synthetic Environments (SEs), Models and Simulations (SEMS), of 
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increasing complexity. The aim is to mitigate integration risk by simulating, 
modelling and emulating the necessary variables to ensure the equipment 
target remains within the specified boundaries (ordinarily of time, cost and 
performance).  
Consequently, it was decided to develop the AIMS architecture by following this 
approach. Initially, a small program, written in Java, and contained within a 
simple environment was written. This only had simple navigational and flight 
phase functionality74 but had a separate Master Executive to control the vehicle. 
This program effectively proved the concept and basic architecture. This 
program was then expanded in scope, re-designed into the partitions previously 
outlined and re-written in ADA. This prototype, at Spiral 1, along with a detailed 
and representative vehicle model, was then embedded into a far more 
sophisticated SE. This SE could represent other vehicles, and for the Spirals 
2/3 system, a high fidelity simulation of the UK Air Traffic Control system. The 
functionality at Spiral 3 included a Sense and Avoid System and an adaptive 
Navigation and Mission Planning System (called the Mission System) all 
controlled by the Master Executive suite. The Mission System created and 
constantly maintained a suite of flight and mission plans for use in normal flight 
and for contingencies such as: Return to Base, Divert to Nearest Suitable 
Airfield, Divert to Nearest Available Airfield and Emergency Ditch. These plans 
comprised: Routes, Fuel, Times of Arrival and Navigation data. In addition, the 
router could generate alternative plans to re-route around bad weather. 
Although a Ground Control Station was yet to be developed, the Master 
Executive was designed to respond to the Air Traffic Controllers commands 
generated by the ATC workstation. A screenshot of this ATC workstation and  
SE is given below. 
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 It would command the (very simple) vehicle model to take off, waypoint steer along airways 
and land. 
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Figure 16: UK Air Traffic Control Simulation Environment 
At Spiral 4, the functionality embedded in AIMS was further developed and 
included a Health Management System for identifying failures which informed 
the Emergency Manager (EM) in the Master Executive suite. The EM could then 
follow appropriate checklists to handle the emergency and if necessary invoke 
the appropriate contingency route. Spiral 5 (re-designated Capability 1 or CAP 
1) was designed but never implemented. However the current system, CAP 2, 
now incorporates a research Ground Control Station (GCS)75. The GCS/AIMS 
interface has been implemented as an extension of the NATO Stanag 4586 
protocol and is capable of providing the full range of authorisations, using the 
PACT levels, to the Master Executive. 
This system development process using the SEBA template has proven highly 
successful and, in general, has validated the theoretical advantages outlined in 
Appendix D. In particular, it has demonstrated the reduction of integration risk 
by the adoption of evolutionary acquisition and spiral development.  
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 This has been designed by Human Factors researchers. 
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4 The Analysis of UAS Accidents – Causation and 
Prevention 
4.1 Aircraft Safety and Regulations 
What is deemed to be safe, or more accurately, tolerably unsafe, for flight 
operations is defined by the appropriate regulatory authority. In the USA, for 
civil aviation, this is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and they publish 
regulations, known as the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) that cover the 
whole arena of flight operations. In the UK, the equivalent body is the Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA), however, they are part of the Joint Aviation Authorities 
(JAA) of European states and they publish, broadly equivalent, Joint Aviation 
Requirements (JARs). A new system of European aviation regulation (EASA – 
the European Aviation Safety Agency) was introduced in September 2003, and 
will gradually supersede the JARs. In this document, FAR and JAR are 
regarded as the same and the term JAR is used consequently. 
Military aircraft in the UK are certificated by the MoD and the approach used is 
largely based on the analysis of safety cases. In recent years, the CAA has 
concluded that UASs, in the UK at least, will be required to comply with defined 
codes of requirements, rather than a Safety Target approach [33]. 
General airworthiness regulations for aircraft are covered in Sections 23 
(Light/Commuter) and 25 (Transport) of the JARs. For UASs, briefly, each 
aircraft is covered by Section 23 or 25 according to a variety of criteria, e.g. 
size, weight, kinetic energy, use etc. As this thesis is aimed at medium to large 
UASs, we will assume that medium UASs are covered by JAR 23 and large 
ones, JAR25. 
A particularly relevant paragraph in the JARs is Para. 130976 . Put simply, “this 
requires justification that all probable failures, or combinations of failures, will 
not result in unacceptable consequences” [33]. This requires the identification of 
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 This is so important that it is frequently referred to as “1309” as if it  were a separate 
document. 
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failure probabilities, including multiple failures, by detailed analysis of essential 
systems and evaluation of the consequences of those failures. In particular, it 
requires that the frequency of occurrence (probability) of system failures must 
be inversely proportional to the severity of the effects. This is set out in the 
Table below77: 
Severity of 
Effect Prob. Definition or Example 
Catastrophic < 1 x 10-9 Multiple fatalities
78
 – usually with the loss of the 
aircraft 
Hazardous 
1 x 10-7  
to 
1 x 10-9 
Reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of 
the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions. 
Specifically: 
A large reduction in safety margins or functional 
capabilities 
Physical distress or excessive workload such that the 
flight crew cannot be relied up on to perform their 
tasks accurately or completely 
Serious or fatal injury to a relatively small number of 
the occupants other than the flight crew 
Major 
1 x 10-5  
to 
1 x 10-7 
Reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of 
the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions. 
Specifically: 
A significant reduction in safety margins or functional 
capabilities 
A significant increase in crew workload  
Discomfort to the flight crew  
Physical distress to passengers or cabin crew, 
possibly including injuries. 
Minor >1 x 10-5 
No significant reduction in aircraft safety. It may 
involve crew actions that are well within their 
capabilities 
Specifically, a slight reduction in safety margins or 
functional capabilities 
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 The table has been provided by the Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority. The 
equivalent FAA table includes the category  “No Safety Effect”. 
78
 The CAA refuse to formally define “multiple” fatalities. Informally, they have commented 
that greater than four would be likely to be categorised as “multiple”. 
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A slight increase in crew workload (e.g. flight plan 
changes) 
Some physical discomfort to passengers or cabin 
crew 
Table 7: Acceptable Probability of Failure, their Effects and their Definition 
There are a few problems with the above when UASs are under consideration. 
1309 is specifically concerned with maintaining safety by keeping the aircraft 
airborne or landing safely. It is also clearly aimed at passenger aircraft 
(according to the above definitions). A UAS is unlikely at this present time to 
carry passengers, nor, by definition, does it carry a crew. In addition, there is a 
distinct possibility that UASs can be designed to crash safely (some are 
already), and they can certainly be designed to land automatically and safely. 
By these definitions and considerations, a UAS failure cannot in theory have a 
Catastrophic outcome.  This point has been discussed with a Senior Surveyor 
of the Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). The official view 
is in accordance with the above, however, she agreed that, notwithstanding this, 
a UAS accident that resulted in the UAS impacting the ground (or a ship) killing 
several people would be surely construed as Catastrophic, even if only on 
societal grounds. In fact, there are probably many outcomes that would involve 
multiple fatalities, which should therefore be classified as Catastrophic.  
4.2 Aircraft Accident Analysis 
The major, some would say the only, difference between manned and 
unmanned aircraft accidents and their causes is the fact that, for unmanned 
aircraft, the pilot is remotely situated. Although this statement could be 
considered obvious to some, this view is not held by all, particularly some pilots. 
During an interview with three BAE SYSTEMS UAS pilots34, it was quite clear 
that they did not accept that they were in any way less in control of the UAS by 
being remotely situated, than would be the case for a normal manned aircraft. 
Their (unanimous) view was that, although not actually flying the aircraft 
directly, their situational awareness (SA) was undiminished due to the quality of 
the information available to them at the Ground Control Station. During 
discussions, where it was pointed out that many ways of achieving SA were 
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denied to them, notably peripheral vision, tactility (“seat of the pants flying”) and 
force feedback, it was clear that they felt these aspects to be of minimal 
importance. When they were shown that the accident rates between manned 
(GA) and UAS accident rates is of an order difference, roughly 6:80 (as will be 
shown), they were at a loss to explain this in terms of their skills or SA and 
genuinely thought that this was due to reliability problems in UASs. Whilst the 
latter is true to a degree, but the detail of this is outside the scope of this work, 
the analysis below gives strong indications that there is plenty of evidence that 
this remoteness is a major cause of UAS accidents. 
However, to understand the effects of this remoteness in detail, the following 
analysis is broken down into several components, which when brought together 
at the end, will hopefully justify the above statement. In doing so, the primary 
concentration will be on the Human Factors of UAS control and its impact on 
the prevalence of UAS accidents 
To do this initially, an understanding of Human Error is presented. This naturally 
lends itself to a discussion on the taxonomies for classifying Human Error types. 
Following this, an analysis of manned aircraft accidents is first given, with a 
particular emphasis on the Human aspects. This is then followed by an analysis 
of unmanned aircraft accidents. From a comparison of these, conclusions can 
then be drawn highlighting the differences. 
4.2.1 Reason’s  “Swiss Cheese” Model of Human Error  
There are many models describing Human Error in various forms such as a 
breakdown in Situational Awareness, proposed by Endsley [35] or as a wrong 
formulation of, and persistence in retaining79, “mental models, Besnard et al 
[36], and Burns [37]. However, a widely accepted model, primarily because of 
its abstract nature, and therefore broad applicability, is that proposed by James 
Reason. In his book “Human Error” [3], Reason argued that accidents occur 
because of a breakdown in the interactions and operation of the elements within 
a “productive system”.  He identified these elements as follows: 
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 Often described as The Confirmation Bias. 
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 Decision Makers – plant and corporate management. 
 Line Management – operations, maintenance and training etc. 
 Preconditions – reliable equipment, motivated workforce etc. 
 Productive activities – integration of human and mechanical elements. 
He particularly differentiates between errors that precede a fault, failure or 
problem and which he refers to as monitoring failures and those that follow it, 
referred to as problem solving failures. The former is seen as a latent failure or 
“an accident waiting to happen” whilst the latter is regarded as an active failure. 
When the integrity of each or any of the above is degraded, the system as a 
whole is more susceptible to catastrophe. Thus, these elements can be seen as 
barriers to failure and lapses of integrity are depicted as breaches or holes in 
these barriers, the whole system can be viewed in the following manner:  
 
Figure 17: The “Swiss Cheese” Model of Human Error 
Reason’s approach is attractive because it identifies and acknowledges the 
latent factors, which may be around for weeks or years that lead up to the final 
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unsafe act of the operator. The approach thus forces investigators to consider 
the accident sequence in its entirety. However, as it is by nature an abstract 
model, it does have some drawback in that it does not identify what the “holes” 
are. For this a taxonomy for the particular work environment is required. 
4.2.2 Taxonomies of Human Error in Aircraft Accidents 
Just as for models of Human Error, there are a wide variety of taxonomies or 
classification systems that have been used for the analysis of Human Error. A 
system used throughout the US Army is DA PAM 385-40, “Army Accident 
Investigation and Reporting”. In this approach, accidents are classified 
according to either materiel failure, environment or human error. The latter is 
further classified into individual failure, leader failure, training failure, support 
failure or standards failure. Another, which has gained prevalence in the civil 
aviation community and the USAF is the Human Factor Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) of Shappell and Weigmann [2]. As will noted 
later aligning these different taxonomies for the continued analysis of UAV 
accidents presents considerable difficulties.  The attractiveness of HFACS is 
that it supplies what was acknowledged to be the missing link in Reasons 
theory – identification of the “holes”. 
Since HFACS is more widely used and because it is heavily based on the 
accepted human error model of Reason, it will now be discussed in detail. 
4.2.3 The Human Factor Analysis and Classification System  
The Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) builds directly 
upon Reason’s work has been developed to assist in the classification and 
analysis of human error. The work so far has been primarily aimed at aircraft 
accidents but has been extended for other areas, such as Air Traffic Control. 
The system has also been used to analyse human error in Unmanned Air 
Vehicle accidents, but has not yet, as far is known, been used to investigate the 
interactions and acts of the air based command component (the autonomous 
part of the UAS).    
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HFACS builds on Reason’s model by formally identifying and classifying the 
natures of the “holes”, whilst keeping the organisational elements previously 
identified. In doing so, it provide the means to analyse the causal nature of 
human error in accidents. The formal structure of HFACS is shown below.  
 
Figure 18: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
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HFACS was developed empirically and has been refined over many years by 
analysing a vast amount of military and civil aviation accident reports each of 
which contained several human causal factors. As noted, although HFACS is 
one of several taxonomies of human error, it has become established as the 
leader in its field.  In fact, it is now used by the US Navy, Marine Corps, Army, 
Air Force and Coast Guard [2]. 
4.2.4 Manned Aircraft Accident Analysis 
4.2.4.1 USA General Aviation Accidents 
Each year, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) Air Safety 
Foundation publish facts and figures for General Aviation (GA) operations in the 
USA – a report known as The Nall Report80. General Aviation covers all flights 
for civil aircraft below the empty weight of 12,500lbs. This report therefore 
excludes the larger airliners but does include light commercial aviation and 
multi-engine aircraft. Since this report covers 1385 accidents for a total of 21.4 
million flight hours, the results can be considered statistically significant. 
Additionally the results are broadly comparable with the UK.  
Since, the body of statistics for GA is sufficiently large, and the accident rate of 
airliners is at least 2 orders of magnitude lower which makes their body of 
statistics commensurately lower, together with the fact that the target level of 
safety for UAVs is likely to be (initially at least) comparable with GA, only GA 
accidents will be considered in this analysis. 
In 2008, the authors reported that the accident rate for GA had fallen over the 
previous 10 years from 6.81 to 6.47 per 100,000 flying hours. 
Of these accidents81, 71.9% were attributed to being caused by the pilot. The 
following is the distribution of these pilot related accidents in 2006 according to 
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 So called in memory of Joseph Nall, a National Transport Safety Board official who died in an airline accident. 
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AOPA defines an accident as: “An occurrence incidental to flight in which, “as a result of the operation of an aircraft, any person (occupant or 
non-occupant) receives fatal or serious injury or any aircraft receives substantial damage.”
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their flight phase and/or main factor. It should be added that these are broadly 
comparable with earlier, though recent, years. 
 
Figure 19: 2006 USA Pilot Related GA Accidents in Flight Phase38 
It can be seen that, Landing (the most dominant, 40%), Take off/Climb and 
Manoeuvring are the major factors contributing to the overall accident rate. 
However, the number of accidents involving Fuel Management82 is fairly 
significant and, which the report notes, should be “easily preventable.” This 
subject is dealt with in detail later. 
In discussing these factors, the report highlights that “Take-off and climb 
accident statistics continue to show gradual improvement in both total and fatal 
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 Fuel Management (or more accurately the lack of)  covers loss of fuel (i.e. running out of through bad planning 
and operation),  fuel starvation (the inability to use on board fuel due to failure of some part of the fuel system) and 
fuel contamination. 
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crashes. Loss of directional control is a frequent causal factor in these 
accidents”. In fact, the report highlights that 61% of all take-off and climb 
accidents are due to loss of control which will be highlighted later as skill based 
errors. For Manoeuvring flight, 64.8% of all accidents were due to loss of 
control, whilst the corresponding figure for approach and landing was 39.3%. 
Interestingly, the report concludes that inexperience - a high proportion of GA 
flight hours are by inexperienced pilots - was not a significant factor in any of 
these figures. 
 
Table 8: Accident Factors and Issues 
Table 8 above highlights that aircraft handling and control is a major influence 
on the overall accident rate. This is significant since the vast majority of GA 
aircraft are flown manually.  
4.2.4.2 Commercial Manned Accidents 
It is important to now consider manned commercial aircraft to see if there are 
any differences in the accident profiles with GA. The major differences of course 
are that large commercial aircraft are subject to more stringent regulations both 
for manufacture and operation. Additionally, the pilots are much more highly 
trained, current on type and they operate in a rigidly controlled airspace. 
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The table below indicates commercial aircraft accidents classified according to 
Phase of Flight. 
Figure 20: Commercial Aircraft Accidents in Flight Phase [39] 
It can be seen that, again, Approach and Landing are the most dominant (36% 
compared to the GA figure of 40%)83. Also Take Off and Initial Climb in Figure 
1Figure 20 is 17% compared to the GA figure of 16%. Therefore despite the 
differences in operation highlighted, there seems to be a broad similarity 
between the two manned aircraft types in terms of accidents by Phase of Flight. 
In addition, [39], shows that, for Fatal Accidents involving the Worldwide 
Commercial Jet Fleet (2001-2010), 23% were due to Loss of Control (LOC), 
20% due to Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFiT) and 20% during Landing.  The 
full range is shown in the figure below:  
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 There is a slight discrepancy in the use of the terms: Approach and Landing. For GA, 
Approach is often used to describe manoeuvring in the vicinity of an airfield whereas for 
commercial aircraft there is a clear distinction between initial approach, final approach and 
landing. The terms Landing (GA) and Final Approach and Landing (Commercial) are taken to 
be roughly equivalent. 
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Figure 21: Fatal Accidents involving the Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet 
2001-2010 
This reduction in accidents due to LOC is probably due to the far more 
prevalent use of autopilots, however this still remains the greatest category for 
manned commercial aircraft. 
4.2.5 Unmanned Aircraft Accident Analysis 
A review of unmanned aircraft accidents is now presented. As stated in the 
Introduction, the scope of this subject is focused on Medium to Large UASs 
such as Global Hawk, Predator and Reaper. In addition, the primary emphasis 
is on the Human aspects of accidents. 
4.2.5.1 Background and Historical Aspects 
There is a large body of information on accident trends for modern UASs, 
compared to their predecessor RPVs, but unfortunately much is incomparable 
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without significant effort for a variety of reasons. UASs came very much to the 
fore in the Bosnian war of 1992-1995 and the losses during that time could not 
often be confidently ascribed to being accidents or as the result of enemy 
action. In addition, these early, and therefore immature, systems were very 
much prototypes rushed into service. Finally, the weather conditions in which 
these prototypes had been developed (sunny California) were very much 
different to the far more hostile climate of the Balkans. All these factors 
therefore make the analysis of UAS accident prior to 1999 extremely difficult if 
not impossible. Subsequent analysis is somewhat easier but still difficult 
because of the variety of taxonomies used. An overview, with accompanying 
notes, of the more notable analyses and data sources available is given in the 
table below: 
Ref. Author(s) Title/Data Notes 
1 A.P.Tvaryanas 
W.T.Thompson 
S.H.Constable 
US Military Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle Mishaps: 
Assessment of the Role 
of Human Factors Using 
the HFACS Classification 
System (March 2005) 
Used HFACS and 
provides a 
substantial analysis 
of the differences 
between USAF, 
Army, Navy and 
Marine operators 
and their accidents  
2 S.D.Manning 
C.E.Rash 
P.A.LeDuc 
The Role of Human 
Causal Factors in US 
Army UAV accidents 
(2004) 
Analysed US Army 
accidents using 
HFACS and the US 
Army’s own 
classification 
taxonomy DA PAM 
385-40 
3 B.M.Rogers 
B.Palmer 
Human Systems Issues in 
UAV Design and 
Analysed US Army 
and Air Force 
accidents using a 
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J.M.Chitwood Operation (2004) human-systems 
issues taxonomy 
4 K.W.Williams A Summary of Unmanned 
Aircraft Accident/Incident 
Data: Human Factors 
Implications (2005) 
Analysed in all US 
Services using a 
novel two tier 
classification system 
5 USAF United States Air Force 
Class A Aerospace 
Mishaps 
Accident Reports 
and Summaries for 
all USAF air 
accidents between 
2000-2011 
Table 9: A Summary of UAV Accident Analyses 
4.2.5.2 Review of Recent Studies 
Ref 1 above found that human causal factors were present in 68% of UAS 
accidents (mishaps in US parlance). However, there was a marked difference in 
patterns of human failure across the three forces. The USAF operators (who are 
generally trained pilots) generally failed when involved in instrumentation and 
sensory feedback systems, automation and channelised attention. 
Navy/Marines failures were generally associated  with workload attention and 
risk management while the Army failures were more procedural, publications, 
training and organisation. Specifically, they identified a preponderance of skill 
based errors in the Air Force and violations in the Army, but no difference in 
decision based errors [40]. 
Ref 2 above provided a comparison of taxonomies, HFACS and the US Army 
methodology and found broad agreement but favoured HFACS due to its ability 
to further separate causal factors. The results are in general agreement with 
Ref1 above with decision and organisational errors dominating for the US Army 
accidents[41].  
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Ref 3 proved to be unavailable but a review of this was conducted by [40] which 
reported that they found the highest number of accidents occurred among those 
with the least UAS experience (<500 hours) and those with the most flight 
experience (> 1000 hrs.). This fact could be supportive of the view that pilot 
remoteness may be a key factor. Experienced pilots, but inexperienced UAS 
operators, may find the transition from cockpit to ground station a difficult one. 
Ref 4 notes that many of the human factors issues identified are highly 
dependent on the system being flown, the type of automation employed and the 
user interface. Particularly of note is the observation that these aircraft 
(Predator, Reaper and Global Hawk) are not flown in the conventional sense 
but rather “commanded” (cf. Para. 2.2.5 and below) and that the user interface 
should focus on facilitating the task of issuing commands and verifying that 
those commands have been accepted and followed84[42]. 
4.2.5.3 UAV Accident Analysis 
Accident analysis for all UAV accidents, where data is available, is given at 0. 
Due to the concerns above regarding machine specific causes, a subset of this 
data has been used for the analysis. This subset consists of accidents for which 
the USAF has published an accident report and which cover only Predator and 
its larger cousin, Reaper, both of which are controlled in an identical manner.  
In conducting the analysis, as most other researchers have found, it was noted 
that most accidents have several contributing factors. If these are all taken into 
account, the summation of causes will be greater than 100%. Since this was 
never intended to be an in depth analysis but more of an investigation to 
determine major trends, where possible, only the primary cause was selected. 
In addition HFACS, as presented at Reference, has some anomalies. Primary 
amongst these is the classification of inattention. “Failed to Prioritise Attention” 
is given as an example of an Unsafe Act, Skill Based Error. However, 
Channelised Attention is given as an example of “Pre-conditions for Unsafe 
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 An seemingly obvious point which makes one wonder at the design concepts the HF 
engineers followed.  
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Acts, Substandard Conditions of Operators, Adverse Mental States. To 
discriminate between these it is necessary to consider the underlying basis of 
HFACS, which is Reason’s model. An Unsafe Act is the final act of the operator 
(to use Reason’s use of the word) leading directly to the accident occurrence. It 
is an active failure. Pre-conditions for Unsafe Acts is a latent failure which may 
occur several seconds or even hours before an accident. Adverse Mental 
States also implies a degree of stress, tiredness or mental limitation. For this 
analysis, if the operator was unaware of a developing state requiring his 
attention or failed to direct his attention appropriately and that directly 
contributed to the accident, it was classified as a Skill Based Error. If it was due 
to stress or any other adverse mental states, it was classified as a Pre-
condition85. 
Finally, it is important to make a distinction between types of Human Error. In 
this analysis, Human Error has four contributors: Operator Error (an unsafe act), 
Supervisory Error,  Design Error (by the human designer, and Maintenance 
Error (by the human maintainer). The last two categories, together with Weather 
and Manufacturing Error, are not included in the HFACS part of the analysis. 
The results of the analysis are  presented below. 
Results by Primary Cause 
Primary Cause Number % of Total 
Operator Error 20 37.8 
Manufacturing Error 3 5.7 
Design Error 10 18.9 
Mechanical Failure 9 17.0 
Maintenance Error 7 13.2 
Supervisory Error 2 3.8 
Weather 2 3.8 
Total 53  
Table 10: Primary Causes of Predator/Reaper Accidents 2000 – 2011 
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 As it turned out, all inappropriate attention directions were classified as Unsafe Acts.  
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From the above, it can be seen that 39 failures (74%) were directly  due to 
human error, though only 19 of these can be ascribed to the operator as seen in 
the table below. 
HFACS Primary Cause Number % of Total 
Unsafe Acts 19 59 
Pre-cursors to Unsafe Acts 0 0 
Unsafe Supervision 2 6 
Organisational Influences 11 34 
Total 32  
Table 11: HFACS Analysis of Predator/Reaper Accidents 2000-2011 
All but one of the causes due to Organisational Influences were due to a poor 
design of the vehicle. In many of these cases, the accident was directly 
attributable to a single point failure. For manned aircraft (military and civil), 
certification regulations, as described in Para. 4.1 (though civil), are specifically 
targeted at identifying, and mitigating by design, such single point failures.  
What is somewhat surprising is the fact there appears to be no Pre-cursors to 
Unsafe Acts as the primary cause. This again highlights the problem of not 
considering all the causal factors in an attempt to produce a probabilistic 
approach to accidents analysis. 
Since the focus of this study is the reduction in accidents due to decision/control 
mechanisms, maintenance, design, and reliability factors were ignored. Only the 
identified Unsafe Acts were further analysed and the results presented below. 
HFACS 
Unsafe Acts 
Number  % of Total 
Errors    
 Skill Based Error 11 58 
 Decision Based Error 4 21 
 Perceptual Error 3 16 
Violations Routine 1 5 
Total  19  
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Table 12: HFACS Analysis of Unsafe Acts-Predator/Reaper Accidents 
2000-2011 
A full list of these 19 unsafe acts is provided in the table below. 
 Cause Unsafe Act Notes + POF HFACS Cause 
1 Pitot static icing - Non-use of 
pitot heating 
Skill Based 
Error 
Cruise Failed to follow 
procedure 
2 Incorrect procedures during 
hand over of control 
Skill Based 
Error 
Climb Failed to follow 
procedure 
3 Pilot loss of control. Landing 
attempted on wind gust limits 
Decision Error Manual 
Flying 
Landing 
Accepted an 
Unnecessary Hazard 
4 CFIT-  Failure to monitor altitude Skill Based 
Error Descent 
Failed to Prioritise 
Attention 
5 Pilot loss of control, Incorrect 
diagnosis of icing. 
Decision Error Cruise Over controlled the 
Aircraft 
6 Late executed go around Decision Error Manual 
Flying 
Landing 
Poor 
technique/airmanship 
7 Failure of pilot to correct high 
flare 
Violation 
(Routine) 
Manual 
Flying 
Landing 
Committed approach 
outside published 
command criteria 
8 Crashed short of the runway Skill Based 
Error 
Manual 
Flying 
Landing 
Failed to follow 
procedure 
9 Pilot failed to control aircraft 
glide-path 
Perceptual 
Error 
Manual 
Flying 
Landing 
Due to misjudged flight 
path 
10 Pilot turned off Stability 
Augmentation 
Decision Error Manual 
Flying 
Cruise 
Inappropriate 
procedure 
11 Engine Fuel shut off signal 
inadvertently sent 
Skill Based 
Error 
Cruise Failed to follow 
procedure 
12 Inadvertent engine shut down in 
flight 
Skill Based 
Error Cruise 
Failed to Prioritise 
Attention 
13 Pilot induced oscillation on 
landing 
Perceptual 
Error 
Manual 
Flying 
Landing 
Due to misjudged flight 
path 
14 Controlled Flight into Terrain Skill Based 
Error Cruise 
Channelised attention 
of flight crew 
15 Crashed on Touch and Go Perceptual 
Error 
Manual 
Flying 
Landing 
Due to misjudged flight 
path 
16 Crashed during Taxi Skill Based 
Error 
Taxi Failed to follow 
procedure 
17 Crashed during Take Off Skill Based Manual Failed to follow 
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Error Flying 
Take Off 
procedure 
18 Crashed during Hi AOA demo Skill Based 
Error 
Manual 
Flying 
Cruise 
Failed to Prioritise 
Attention 
19 Crashed in descent Skill Based 
Error 
Manual 
Flying 
Descent 
Failed to follow 
procedure 
Table 13: HFACS Unsafe Acts-Predator/Reaper Accidents 2000-2011 
Noteworthy of the above are the facts that 7 “Failed to Follow the Correct 
Procedure” (Checklist), 4 “Failed to Prioritise Attention” and 11 (at least) were 
during manual flight control. In addition, and this has to a be a subjective 
judgement, the accidents in bold print are considered to be due in large 
measure, to operator remoteness. In fact, all of the accidents above were either 
whilst flying manually (which is difficult anyway due to remoteness) or due to 
pilot remoteness anyway being a major factor. The conclusion must be reached 
that remoteness is a major issue for the accident rate. 
The conjecture raised by the above observations is that, if we move to fully 
automatically controlled flight and mitigate in some way the effects of pilot 
remoteness, we should be able to substantially reduce the number of accidents 
caused by unsafe acts. 
In terms of Phase of Flight, the following table, which reinforces the prevalence 
of Landing accidents,  summarises them: 
Phase of Flight Number Notes 
Taxi 1  
Take Off 1  
Climb  1  
Cruise 7 Two under Manual Control 
Descent 2  
Approach and Landing 7 All under Manual Control 
Total 19  
Table 14: Unsafe Act Accidents by Phase of Flight 
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4.2.6 A Summary of Accident Rates 
Evidence was presented earlier that the accident rate for GA was about 6-7 per 
100,000 flight hours. Large commercial aircraft are about 0.01 per 1000, 000 
flights hours. The USAF86 have produced the following tables for Global Hawk,  
Reaper and Predator: 
Figure 22: RQ004 Global Hawk Mishap History 
Figure 23: Q9 Reaper Mishap History 
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 At http://www.afsc.af.mil/organizations/aviation/aircraftstatistics/index.asp  accessed on 10 
July 2011 
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Figure 24: RQ001 Predator Mishap History 
The following points are noted: 
• Global Hawk already has an excellent record despite losing 4 aircraft 
in its early prototype days. Big improvements in reliability and design 
have made a large contribution to this but at increased costs. Global 
Hawk cannot be flown manually. 
• Reaper is newer than the others and its rate is about twice as much 
as GA. It has more automation than Predator but can still be flown 
manually. 
• Predator is the most mature but also the least sophisticated and its 
current rate is about the same as GA. 
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4.3 A Bayesian Model for UAS Accidents 
4.3.1 Introduction 
It has already been noted that that humans not only cause accidents but, by use 
of their special skills in reasoning and experience, plus their ability to 
successfully react to unforeseen and complex situations, they also are capable 
of preventing the propagation of errors and circumstances that could ultimately 
result in an accident. Evidence exists [43], which indicates that for every 300 
incidents that could result in  aircraft accident, humans can and do prevent 290 
of these with a further 9 leading to a major incident and only 1 actually resulting 
in an accident. However, as has been highlighted, operator remoteness in a 
UAS, as compared to a manned aircraft, is likely to degrade that performance. 
The evidence presented in the accident analysis above, whilst acknowledged to 
be fairly approximate, would tend to indicate a reduction of about 50% in that 
performance.  
4.3.2 Requirements, Limitations and Assumptions 
In developing a model to help identify, understand, and improve the decision 
architecture of UASs, the accident model had the following requirements, 
limitations and assumptions: 
 The model should only encompassed human and machine control errors 
– reliability modelling was not addressed. 
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 The model should reflect the fact that humans directly in the loop do 
prevent accidents. 
 The model should reflect the accident evidence presented above. 
 The model should be based on the Reason Model of Human Error using 
the HFACS taxonomy. Organisational and supervisory errors are not 
included at this stage. 
In order to understand the contributions made by humans alone and to reflect 
the 1 in 300 accident evidence presented above, a human error model was 
developed first. It should be noted that no attempt has yet been made to 
analyse the relative probabilities for the underlying causes – they are all 
currently set to be equal for each area. However, the probabilities of the 
possible outcomes do reflect the evidence presented in Para. 4 
4.3.3 Human Error Bayesian Model for Aircraft Accidents 
The human error model for aircraft accidents is shown below and indicates the 
relative probabilities for an accident given that a major incident has occurred. 
This model reflects the evidence and the requirements stated earlier.: 
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Pre-Conditions for Human Acts
Physical Env
Technological Env
Adverse Mental States
Adverse Physical Mental Sta ...
Adverse Physiological States
Crew Resource Management
Personal Readiness
Safe Conditions
 1.0
 1.0
 1.0
 1.0
 1.0
 1.0
 1.0
93.0
Human Acts
Skill Based Error
Decision Error
Perceptual Error
Knowledge Based Error
Routine Violations
Exceptional Violations
Skilled Response
1.46
1.46
1.46
1.46
1.46
1.46
91.2
Outcome Probabilities
No Mishap
Minor Incident
Major Incident
Accident
86.6
10.2
2.64
0.52
 
Figure 25: Human Error Bayesian Model for Aircraft Accidents 
4.3.4 The Preliminary Model for UAS Accidents 
The Human Error model was then degraded to cater for operator remoteness, 
extended to include machine acts and the outcome probabilities modified to 
reflect the accidents rates in Para. 4.2. The four control operation types, RPV, 
RPV with automatic take-off and landing, fully automatic and semi-autonomous,  
were added and subjective assessments made to determine relative outcomes. 
Again it should be noted that this is a preliminary model and indicates relative 
probabilities for an accident given that a major incident has occurred.  The 
model is shown below: 
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Human Acts
Skill Based Error
Decision Error
Perceptual Error
Knowledge Based Error
Routine Violations
Exceptional Violations
Skilled Response
6.51
6.99
6.64
2.21
2.21
0.82
74.6
Pre-Conditions for Human Acts
Physical Env
Technological Env
Adverse Mental States
Adverse Physical Mental Sta ...
Adverse Physiological States
Crew Resource Management
Personal Readiness
Safe Conditions
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
 1.0
93.0
Machine Acts
Decision Error
Knowledge Based Error
Blind Automation
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Figure 26: Preliminary UAS Accident Model 
The variation according to the different operation types is shown in the following 
four diagrams: 
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Figure 27: Remote Pilot Vehicle Operation 
The RPV operation model results reflect the facts that skill based, perceptual 
and decision errors predominate for human acts whilst decision and knowledge 
based errors are zero for machine acts.  
For RPV operation with automated take-off and landing, there is a reduction in 
skill based errors but an increase in “blind automation” – the acts of a machine 
which blindly follow an inappropriate control sequence such as continuing a 
take-off when it would be better to abort. The results for this operation type are 
shown below: 
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Figure 28: RPV Operation with Automated Take-off and Landing 
 
For highly automated UAS types, such as Global Hawk, the model is further 
modified showing a reduction in skill based error and increase in automation 
errors. This shown below: 
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Figure 29: Fully Automated Operation 
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For autonomous operation, decision and knowledge based errors in machine 
acts are introduced. Those of humans are reduced accordingly. The model for 
this operation is shown below: 
 
Figure 30: Autonomous Operation 
4.4 Results and Inferences 
The main thrust for the work undertaken to date is to understand how the 
decision architecture for autonomous operation is affected by the need to shift 
control acts from the human operator to the machine whilst maintaining, or 
preferably reducing, the accident rate. Whilst noting that this work is on-going, 
the initial results indicate the following: 
 Introducing machine decision making, in itself, will increase the accident 
rate. 
 Inevitable increases in machine decision errors in autonomous system 
operation must be matched or bettered by reductions in human errors, 
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particularly skill, perceptual and decision errors. 
 Human errors can be reduced by increasing human situational 
awareness (SA). This in turn may be achieved by improving the dialogue 
from the machine to the human, cross-checking apparently irrational 
commands. 
 Machine decision errors and “blind automation” errors must be reduced 
to a minimum. This can be achieved by substantially increasing machine 
SA. Again, this could be used to cross-check human commands and 
improve human SA. 
 Useful gains can be made by reducing machine knowledge errors. 
4.5 Conclusions and Future Work 
A preliminary model of the causes of accidents for UASs of differing control 
operation has been presented. This model already indicates where 
improvements in the decision architecture must be made if the benefits of 
autonomous operation, namely workload reduction, are to be realised without a 
commensurate increase in the accident rate.  
It was originally intended to quantify these to show a theoretical level of safety 
that can be achieved. Completion of the research however, indicates that it is 
unwise to state such a quantification. The reasons for this are various. Primarily, 
it was hoped that the quantative nature of the accident analysis using Bayesian 
methods would facilitate such an approach. However, accident analysts, fairly 
universally, suggest that no two accidents are the same and that hindsight is 
very much a wonderful thing. It is precisely because no two accidents have the 
same causal chain that the HFACS approach finds multiple causes for each 
accident and as such the probability of their occurrence never, or at least rarely, 
adds up to 1, thereby negating a probabilistic approach. Wonderful hindsight 
can give a false illusion that, from the investigation of past accidents, we could 
predict accidents in detail. If we could do that, we could design against every 
future accident which we clearly cannot. All that can be done is to investigate, 
assess our vulnerability to such a causal chain that has been learned from 
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experience and put in place safeguards to negate or reduce the probability of 
history repeating itself. And that is what has been proposed here.  
Accident researchers, particularly those investigating UAS accidents [40],  have 
commented that the statistics are very much vehicle specific. A particular design 
flaw in the HMI for Predator is assessed to be culpable for many accidents but 
that flaw does not read across to other vehicles where the design is different.  
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5 Strategies and Implementations for UAS Safety 
Improvements 
5.1 Safety Improvements to the Proposed Architecture 
In the previous Chapter, the conjecture was raised that we move to fully 
automatically controlled flight in all phases of flight and mitigate in some way 
the effects of pilot remoteness leading to unsafe acts, we should be able to 
substantially reduce the number of accidents.   
When the operator and autonomous system are separated, there is scope for 
having separated situation awareness and many examples are captured in 
Table 13: HFACS Unsafe Acts-Predator/Reaper Accidents 2000-2011. If this 
separated situation awareness differs, perhaps by only a small but critical 
factor, there is increased opportunity for an accident trajectory to progress. 
Since autonomous systems are data driven, any method of restoring situational 
awareness to a common and consistent level will reduce the probability of that 
trajectory progressing through to an accident. 
To generate that consistency requires: 
 effective communication between operator and AS of each other’s intent, 
situational state  and belief set 
 identification of  belief set and state differences 
 assessment of the potential consequences of a lack of consistency 
 recovery action needed to re-align the difference 
Recognising that the above needs to be achieved with a minimal increases in 
bandwidth and preferably none, ways in which the above can be realised using 
existing dialogue must be researched.  Some of these are identified below: 
5.1.1 The SA Abduction Loop 
There are several models of Situational Awareness (SA) but very few ways of 
measuring it effectively. One method is that proposed by McGuinness and 
Dawson [44] and is called the Quantitative Analysis of Situational Awareness 
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(QUASA). The basis for this method is as follows. If a person believes 
something in his environment to be true and it is, then that is good SA. Similarly, 
if something is believed false and it is, it also good SA. Conversely, If something 
is believed to be true and it is false, then that is bad SA and so on.  This can be 
summarised as: 
 Scenario Facts 
Beliefs 
True False 
True  High SA Low SA 
False Low SA High SA 
Table 15: QUASA SA Beliefs 
The overall SA metric is formed by summating those environmental aspects and 
their results, true/false, as follows: 
SA =  (∑ (T/T + F/F )) - ( ∑ (T/F + F/T)) 
The QUASA concept can now be used for shared SA. In our case, we actually 
do not know the absolute truth, only our individual beliefs, man and machine. 
However, what we are interested in is shared SA. In other words, what do we 
agree to be true/false and what do we disagree to be true/false. 
Thus the basis becomes now: 
 Operator Beliefs 
Machine Beliefs 
True False 
True  High Shared SA Low Shared SA 
False Low Shared SA High Shared SA 
Table 16: SA Shared Beliefs 
If the beliefs have different levels of importance, weightings (W) can be applied 
to generate the metric as follows: 
Shared SA = ( ∑ (T/T + F/F) * W1 ) - ( ∑ (T/F + F/T) * W2 )) 
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The problem now translates to one of aligning these beliefs. The operator 
should be able to find out what the machine believes to be true/false (and, 
ideally, degrees in between) if his GCS is set up to highlight these. How though 
does the machine discover the operators beliefs? Well, firstly these can be 
explicitly passed by the operator but this may prove to be cumbersome. Another 
way suggested here is by abduction and an example is given to illustrate this 
based on a real UAV accident87. In this accident, the pilot thought the aircraft 
was on the ground, and as it was in difficulty, shut down both engines to stop it. 
Unfortunately, it was, in fact, airborne. Using this example, the process to be 
followed is: 
• Command received –”Shut down both engines”. This is flight safety 
critical and would attract a high weighting.  
• A database of all checklists is scanned with the result that this 
command is only normally used when the vehicle is on the ground as 
part of the post flight shut-down checks  
• Therefore, abduct that the operator’s belief is that the vehicle is on 
the ground. 
•  Compare with own belief and generate the metric as detailed above. 
•  If the metric is below a set threshold, the command is queried. 
It is interesting to note, that if such a process had been in place for the 
Predator/Reaper accidents described earlier, particularly Numbers 2, 11, 12, 14, 
16, it is entirely possible they may not have progressed through to becoming an 
accident. The abduction and belief checking would represent a new barrier in 
                                            
87
 “Crashed after take-off from N'Dolo. Apparently the pilot was afraid the aircraft would not 
get airborne in time before the end of the runway, and he switched off both engines, but as 
the aircraft was already in the air it crashed a few hundred metres after the end of the runway 
on Boulevard Triomphal. One woman on the ground was killed and at least three others were 
injured”. Widely reported by quoted here from http://belmilac.wetpaint.com/page/IAI+-+Eagle+B-
Hunter+UAV+(Unmanned+Aerial+Vehicle) accessed 8 July 2011 
139 
the Swiss Cheese model to the final unsafe act by the remote operator. Note 
that such a system is unnecessary, or at least far less important, in a manned 
aircraft. 
5.1.2 Critical Belief Set Handling 
So what beliefs are important to either cross check, monitor or abduct from? 
Earlier the rule-set for autonomous machine operation of the vehicle was 
presented. All of these are in the form: 
IF (belief + certainty) THEN (decision, action) 
The belief that leads directly to a rule being fired into action can be considered a 
critical belief as without it being present the behaviour would be absent. This 
belief that leads to a control function (or in the AIMS architecture, a plan) can 
then be assessed for safety criticality, impact or involvement as a contributory 
cause. Such an assessment procedure is described below. 
5.1.3 Hazard Analysis 
In addition to any extra, and for autonomous systems, novel, mitigations that 
may be employed to reduce the likelihood of an unsafe act, a conventional 
Hazard Analysis should be adopted as a matter of course. To demonstrate this, 
it is useful to introduce a non-exhaustive List of Hazards as an example, 
including their severity and possible mitigations. Note that these are linked by 
the regulations for certification set out in Table 7. 
Hazard Severity Mitigation Short Label 
Collision with another 
aerial object 
Catastrophic Safety-critical aerial 
collision avoidance 
Air collision 
UAS collides with 
terrain or ground-
based obstacle 
Catastrophic Safety-critical ground 
collision avoidance 
Ground 
collision 
UAS Flies into 
Dangerous Weather 
Conditions 
Hazardous Weather Detection and 
Avoidance Routing 
Weather  
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Hazard Severity Mitigation Short Label 
Engine(s) Failure Hazardous Twin Engine or High 
Engine Reliability 
Power Failure 
    
UAS runs out of fuel 
and consequently 
collides with terrain 
Hazardous Safety-critical fuel 
control 
Fuel 
depletion 
Failure to lower 
undercarriage before 
landing 
Major Safety-critical control Gear not 
lowered 
Attempted take off 
when not aligned on 
appropriate runway 
Hazardous Safety-critical control Unaligned 
take off 
Loss of flight control Hazardous Safety-critical control Loss of 
control 
Collision with airfield 
objects or 
static/taxiing aircraft 
Major Safety-critical control Airfield 
ground 
collision 
Running engine 
hazard to ground 
crew 
Major Ground operating 
procedures 
Running 
engine 
hazard to 
ground crew 
Failure to inform 
operator 
Minor Autonomy of control is 
expected to determine 
safe action without 
operator comms. 
Failure to 
inform 
operator 
Failure to follow the 
Rules Of the Air 
(ROA) 
Major Reduction of safety 
margin will not of itself 
cause an accident 
Failure to 
follow ROA 
Table 17: List of Identified Hazards 
Several methods are available for a Hazard Analysis and they are all routinely 
done in systems design. One is Fault Tree Analysis whereby the probability of 
failure of an item is assessed and the consequences of that failure is analysed. 
A good example of this is given in Chapter 6. Such an analysis is useful when 
failure rates or probabilities of hardware components are available (it is of no 
use for software). Another method is Safety Case Assessment, whereby 
consideration is given to probable scenarios and an analysis of likely outcomes 
in the event of certain circumstances is made. When a formal system design is 
141 
under consideration, a common analysis tool is a Functional Failure Analysis 
(FFA). This considers end event functions88. If these are deemed to have an 
effect on safety, an analysis is performed by considering the consequences 
when the : 
• Function is not provided when demanded 
• Function is provided when not demanded 
• Function that is provided is wrong or in error. 
If the consequence or effect is unsafe in any of the above categories, a 
mitigation is required. This could be to have a back-up function always available 
(standby altimeter, compass etc.), to improve the integrity of the function by 
reducing the probability of the effect occurring to the appropriate hazard level 
(as discussed in Para. 4.1), or to have cross monitoring or “common sense” 
applied, usually by the pilot.  As will now be obvious, if the pilot is remote, that 
monitoring may well be not be done effectively and the consequences lost or 
misunderstood. Just as importantly, the automation applied may well be hiding 
the output of the function, in which case a similar outcome will exist. In the case 
of an autonomous system being in control, it is obvious that such a control 
system will have to perform the monitoring and mitigation normally done by the 
pilot.  This can be done by introducing Plausibility Checking. 
5.1.4 Plausibility Checking 
Plausibility checking is a simpler alternative to continuous monitoring. It involves 
assembling separate facts to form a belief that can be directly compared to 
belief state under consideration. The key aspect is that the facts assembled 
must be independent in every way to the variable under consideration. A good 
example, and one which will explained in more detail in the next Chapter, is fuel 
quantity. Fuel quantity is a critical belief (for powered flight at least). Fuel 
quantity is provided by fuel gauges of which there may be several. These are 
                                            
88
 An end event function is one that is delivered externally i.e. to the environment, from the 
system under consideration. 
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not normally duplicated in a manned aircraft; it is usually left to the pilot to 
assess their veracity. In an unmanned autonomous aircraft, where critical 
mission decisions such as routing, alternate diversion options, flight altitude etc.  
need to be made, it is essential that an equivalent to the pilot function is 
provided. This can be achieved in several ways and one is presented here. By 
the passage of time and a knowledge of fuel flow, or look up table  for average 
consumption per minute, an assessment of approximate fuel quantity can be 
made. All of these variables are separate to the gauges and are therefore 
suitable for plausibility checking. In formal terms such a  check forms an AND 
gate in the fault tree and therefore the probabilities of the fuel gauge failing AND 
the plausibility check being wrong can be multiplied. This will provide a lower 
probability of overall system failure than that of the fuel gauge alone. 
In short, for manned aircraft, we take the plausibility checking and cross 
monitoring function normally undertaken by the pilot, for granted. It is not known 
whether these functions have been introduced to date for current unmanned 
automated UAS89 but future autonomous aircraft will certainly have to have 
them and if so, it is likely that their accident rate will improve over that achieved 
to date. 
5.2 Human Machine Interaction for Safe Autonomous Systems 
Operation 
A recurrent theme throughout this thesis is the relationship between the system 
and the Human and although a complete review and analysis of the HMI for 
autonomous systems is beyond the scope of this work, there are certain 
important aspects which must be addressed into order to complete the picture. 
It has already been seen in the accident analysis that the HMI, in itself, can 
cause accidents due to confusion and misinterpretation. A move to autonomous 
system operation will require a fundamental change to how such systems are 
managed in order to release the potential of these systems whilst at the same 
                                            
89
 I think this is highly unlikely for reasons formulated in the next paragraph. 
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time ensuring that such systems will have an improved safety record. Before 
this though, a brief review of those aspects covered so far is given: 
5.2.1 A Review of Control Modes for UASs  
The following control modes for UASs in general were previously presented and 
the general aspect of their nature highlighted: 
• Remotely Piloted – The pilot is in direct (immediate and constant) 
control of the vehicle. This mode of operation will not be discussed 
further because, as noted earlier, the trend is towards increasing the 
level of automatically piloted flight due to the need for Beyond Line of 
Sight operation (no immediate control feedback available) and to 
drive down (human) costs. 
• Supervised Automation – The pilot is a remote supervisor of the 
automation which is directly controlling the vehicle.  
• Autonomous Operation – The pilot is a remote manager of the 
autonomous system which is supervising the automatic operation of 
the vehicle, where authorised. 
These latter two modes will now be discussed in some detail in order to 
examine the differences, pros and cons. 
5.2.1.1 Supervised Automation 
Increasing levels of automation, supervised by the pilot in manned aircraft, has 
been the overwhelming trend over the last 10-20 years for cockpit design. The 
fact that humans are psychologically ill equipped for this (supervision) task, is 
noted by virtually every textbook on Human Factors. 
This automation has been introduced into the manned aircraft cockpit in 
successive levels [45] each one of which tends to further remove the pilot from 
the basic control loop. This is not in itself a bad thing. The manned aircraft 
accident rate has been slowly but surely reducing over many years and some of 
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that, or perhaps a lot, can be attributed to increased automation [46]. Certainly 
automatic systems are more reliable, more accurate and faster than humans. 
However, there are problems. One of these is called the “Ironies of Automation” 
introduced by Bainbridge in 1987 [47]. She notes that: 
• Systems designers, who regard humans as unreliable and inefficient, 
strive to replace them with automation. In doing so they make a 
significant contribution to accidents. This particularly manifest when 
the designer is not an expert – particularly relevant to the air 
environment.  
• Design engineers tend to automate those functions which are simple 
and easy to do, not those that are complex and which the pilots need 
most. In short, the designer still leaves functions to be handled by 
humans because they cannot think of an effective way of automating 
them 
Norman [48] makes the same point: “automatic equipment seems to function 
best when the workload is light and the task routine: when the task requires 
assistance, when the workload is highest, this is when the automatic equipment 
is of least assistance—this is the 'irony' of automation” . 
Unfortunately cockpit automatic systems, such the Airbus Flight Management 
System (FMS), as noted in [46], possess no intuition, no intelligence, no 
discernment and no decision capacity. In fact the majority of such systems 
comply with the Principles of Occam’s Razor [29], they are limited, by design, in 
their knowledge to the control at hand. As such they do not have, “The Big 
Picture”, which means that their operation is not always appropriate. In short 
they are not generally “Situationally Aware” and rely completely for this aspect 
on the pilot, who, as we have noted, is sometimes out of the loop, especially in 
times of high workload, stress or problem fixation. As will be seen later, to have 
such awareness is fundamental to an autonomous system. As Norman [48]. 
says:  
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“The problem, I suggest, is that the automation is at an intermediate 
level of intelligence, powerful enough to take over control that used to 
be done by people, but not powerful enough to handle all 
abnormalities. Moreover, its level of intelligence is insufficient to 
provide the continual, appropriate feedback that occurs naturally 
among human operators. This is the source of the current difficulties. 
To solve this problem, the automation should either be made less 
intelligent or more so, but the current level is quite inappropriate”. 
The above comments also point out that automation is fine when everything is 
going well and is routine. When the “abnormalities” or emergencies occur, a 
situation that may well be not expected by the designers, the pilots have to 
cope. This situation is common in aircraft accidents as indicated in the previous 
Chapter. The conclusion to draw from this is any on-board system should also 
be capable of handling, or at least providing support, in emergency or abnormal 
situations. From the Predator accident analysis, there were several incidents of 
procedures not being followed correctly. An on-board system to provide 
assistance in such situations must therefore be considered highly beneficial. 
5.2.1.2 Autonomous Operation 
The details of autonomous operation and the fact that the operator is now in a 
managerial role, perhaps controlling a “team” of several vehicles, has already 
been made.  The primary means of interfacing with the proposed decision 
architecture is by authorisation of proposed or modified plans and through them, 
setting objectives90, either at a microscopic or macroscopic level. By operating 
at the plan level, there becomes a need for the human manager to be aware of 
intent of the autonomous system. The concept of intention is at the heart, or 
some would say, the consequence, of the decision process. Decisions, followed 
by intentions, are commitments to act, either now or in the future. These 
intentions are acted upon when the appropriate time or triggering event 
                                            
90
 Plans can be simply seen as a sequence of one or more actions to either achieve, or 
maintain, a goal state. That goal state may be specified as an objective. 
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occurs91. Because the actions of the vehicle are specified by these intentions, a 
clear and unambiguous display of them to the manager is fundamentally 
required. In addition to intentions, the feedback requirements, identified by 
Norman above, of what the automation is doing is also required. Finally, it is 
highly important that the manager, like any other manager of human resources, 
needs to have confidence and trust in the system to which he has authorised 
the tasks. 
5.2.2 Displays for Autonomous Air Systems 
In Para. 2.3.5, it was noted that new models of HMI and appropriate design 
guidelines will be required to be developed for autonomous air systems. These 
can now be considered and some principles developed but first it is instructive 
to consider the transition from manned cockpits in the air, to control stations on 
the ground. 
5.2.2.1 Current UAS Workstations 
Shown below is the operator interface of the most advanced UAS currently 
flying, which of course is an example of supervised automation, Global Hawk. 
Figure 31: Global Hawk Operator Interface 
                                            
91
 In the morning, you may make a decision to have dinner that evening. Thus you intend to 
have dinner. When you have it may be a time, say 19.30, an elapse of time, say 30 minutes 
after arriving home, or a particular event, say when you are hungry, when it has been heated 
etc. The decision was made in the morning, the intention remains until it is either retracted or 
triggered. 
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It can be seen that this display bears every similarity with that of an aircraft 
cockpit despite the fact that the operator cannot manually fly it. This gives, of 
course, the illusion that the operator has flight control. This illusion is reinforced 
by the fact that the crews wear flight overalls (usually with wings) and are 
frequently referred to as pilots92. This concept of a “cockpit on the ground” 
reinforces the other illusion referred to earlier that the pilot is “in effect” in the 
vehicle. When it is considered that delays on the satellite link may be of the 
order of seconds, it could be quite dangerous to believe that the displays an 
operator is seeing are in real time, when they clearly are not93. There have been 
proposals to take this illusion to the extreme by redesigning the workstations in 
order to more fully immerse the operator. A picture of such a “cockpit” is shown 
below (note the control column). 
 
Figure 32: Raytheon Immersive Cockpit 
                                            
92
 I don’t dispute the fact that in the RAF and USAF, they are, in fact, qualified pilots 
93
 During a recent Sense and Avoid Trial, the “pilots” watched the TCAS display like hawks 
until it was pointed out that the display was several seconds in arrears. They were under the 
illusion that it was a real time display because that what was they were used to. 
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 It is contended that current, and proposed as above, operator workstations are 
not only unsatisfactory to operate automated aircraft and may well be 
dangerous under certain circumstances, They are unquestionably unsuited for 
autonomous vehicles, even for those operating at the lowest PACT levels. 
5.2.2.2 Concepts of Autonomous System HMI Displays 
As noted before, the primary needs are to show intention of decision, the status 
of conferred authorisation, the current (critical) states of the vehicle, particularly 
with respect to the automation, and finally the likely future states of the vehicle.  
With these requirements in mind, a concept display for discussion is shown 
below. 
Figure 33: Concept Display for an Autonomous UAS 
This is in fact three displays. A Plan – Intent Graph at the top showing past, 
current and future plans/intentions, a fuel graph showing current and predicted 
fuel states together with fuel requirements and reserves in the middle, with both 
joined by a common timeline. At the bottom is the status of the major planning 
and authorising functions in terms of their PACT level. These will now be 
explained in more detail. 
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The Plan – Intent graph is expanded below: 
 
Figure 34: Concept Plan - Intent Graph 
The time line at the bottom shows the take-off time (11:00) and predicted 
landing time (12:50) together with elapsed mission time (0 -110 minutes). Time 
NOW (11:42.45) joins the plan-intent graph with the fuel graph (not shown 
here). In the middle are the past (greyed out), current (yellow outline) and future 
(white boxes) Phases of Flight. The transition times of these phases are shown 
by vertical lines connecting the Plan-Intent graph to the timeline (green for past 
times and blue for future times). The Plan-Intent graph at the top shows the key 
events (and their times). The current plan is shown in green (past) and blue 
(future intent). The red lines show alternate plans that may be invoked. If they 
had in the past (perhaps on resumption of communication) they would be 
shown as green and if they are intended in the future or now, in blue. This 
display covers past actions and future intentions of the autonomous vehicle as 
required above. 
The fuel graph is more traditional but nonetheless important and is shown 
below. 
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Figure 35: Concept Fuel Graph 
Actual fuel used is shown on the green line and can be easily compared to that 
predicted before flight (white line). This particular graph shows that fuel is being 
used at about the predicted rate, indicated by the slope, (therefore no fuel leak) 
but is above that predicted for the current time (perhaps faster progress, more 
favourable winds or different air data). The coloured boxes, every 20 minutes (a 
normal fuel check point), show the actual (green) or estimated (yellow) fuel at 
those points, the planned fuel (brown), the required fuel (red) to complete the 
planned mission (which includes contingencies) and the allowance (blue), which 
is the difference between actual/estimated and required. The planned 
alternates94 for landing, together with their fuel requirements are also shown, 
with the current selection highlighted in brown. This graph is a real time graph 
and will show updates if a different route is flown or different diversions are 
selected. 
The major planning functions and their PACT level are shown in the graph 
below. 
                                            
94
 Aircraft usually plan on having two alternates landing airfields. One is in case the weather 
at the destination falls below landing limits, sometimes called the weather diversion. The other 
is in case an aircraft crashes at the destination airfield thus rendering the runway unavailable.  
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Figure 36: Concept PACT Graph 
The concept PACT graph show the status and authorisation levels of the major 
planning areas, routing, emergency handling, diversion, Sense & Avoid, Flight 
Phase and Autopilot. On the right is an explanation of the status whilst in the 
centre are a range of buttons/captions indicating the state (grey indicates 
available, green indicates selected (by either the operator, or for Sense and 
Avoid, by the operator or Master Executive), black is unavailable). This 
particular graph shows that the autopilot control is being handled by the Master 
Executive at PACT 5A and that the Master Executive will transition the flight 
phase plans (also at 5A). The other functions at PACT4A are as stated and the 
Master Executive will only propose plans for these functions.  
These displays when combined and used in conjunction with more conventional 
displays meet the requirements outlined above and should make a positive 
contribution to safe operation of the vehicle. 
5.3 Summary of Strategies 
To summarise, the strategies that can be assembled in order to reduce the 
accident rate of UASs and which must be employed in autonomous UASs, the 
following is proposed: 
• All flight control functions should be automated with no manual control95. 
These flight control functions will then have to be implemented as a 
safety critical system in order to be certificated. In doing this, care must 
                                            
95
 This has been done for the Global Hawk UAS. However, it is not known whether the 
controls have been implemented as a safety critical system. 
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be given towards the exact implementation. Directly linking the flight 
controls to a sensing system can be dangerous96 
• Provide weather detection and avoidance mechanisms fully integrated 
within the decision architecture. 
• Provide better fuel management procedures. These should be 
integrated with the overall flight management and routing planning 
centres. 
• Provide a more efficient means of handling emergencies, particularly 
checklists and formal procedures. 
• Introduce a range  of cross monitoring, plausibility checking and 
abduction feedback mechanisms 
• Provide improved HMI to show/provide : 
 autonomous system intent  
 increased feedback of aircraft state, particularly those deemed 
critical, either to the on-board autonomous system and/or the 
GCS. 
 status of authority for the key control mechanisms 
In order to check the above and assess whether there are further mechanisms 
that need to be considered to improve safety, some exemplar scenarios are 
now analysed in detail.  
                                            
96
 A tragic but exemplar case is that of Air France 447 whose air data sensors gave out 
conflicting signals and caused the flight control system to enter a steep descent from which it 
never recovered. In addition, and as will be seen, flight controls only have a limited awareness 
of the world around them and will quite happily fly into a hill if they have been so instructed. 
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6 Exemplar Scenarios Applied to the Proposed 
Improvements 
In order to confirm, or otherwise, that the model findings and whether its 
inferred solutions are necessary and sufficient to support the thesis, the 
following exemplar scenarios were analysed and conclusions drawn:  
1. Sense & Avoid 
2. Mission Management 
3. Take Off and Landing 
4. Lost Link (Communications) Handling 
5. Emergency Handling 
6.1 Sense and Avoid 
In a manned aircraft, the pilot has many responsibilities to other air users. 
Among the more primary of these is the so called “See and Avoid” requirement. 
This requires a pilot to make a constant and vigilant watch for other aircraft and, 
if safe and/or regulated separation with another vehicle(s) is in danger of being 
violated, to safely manoeuvre, according to the Rules of the Air, to increase 
separation to the safe or required level. That this is a prime requirement of any 
air vehicle is obvious, however despite this there are some 10 mid-air collisions, 
primarily involving GA aircraft, usually in clear skies, in daylight, in the USA 
each year; the majority proving fatal38.  
There have been 177 mid-air collisions between GA aircraft in the USA over the 
last 10 years which accumulated 200million flying hours38. This indicates that 
the probability of a mid-air collision, at least for GA aircraft, is approximately 8 x 
10-7 per flying hour. The number of mid-air collisions for other aviation types 
(airliner, military etc.) is so small as to be statistically insignificant in 
comparison, so the quoted figure can be reasonably used as an input to the 
overall accident rate. Of course this figure includes the failed mitigation strategy 
of each pilot be able to first see, and then avoid, the collision (or else they would 
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not have collided). The baseline collision risk probability without mitigation is 
clearly higher. That is: 
  ProbMid-air Collision = ProbCollision Risk * ProbSafe Separation Failure * ProbMitigation Failure –Pilot A 
* ProbMitigation Failure- Pilot B 
In developing the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) control logic, the 
methodology called for generation of an Safety Encounter Model. Such models 
describe the probability of a mid-air collision. These outputs from these models 
are highly dependent on airspace type, aircraft type and traffic densities. 
Consequently, different models are used in the USA and Europe. The European 
model is a substantial revision of a model specified by ICAO and is described at 
[49]. The Encounter Models are usually modified to reflect real data. A 
generalised output of the European model is presented in the table below. This 
only gives an approximate view on safety encounter probabilities, but it is 
consistent with other encounter models and is suitable for consideration for the 
required level of detail here. 
 
Table 18: Various Expressions of the Assumed Collision Risk without 
ACAS50 
The figures in the above table are broadly in line with that of the actual GA 
accident rate due to mid-air collisions presented above. 
There are many mechanisms employed to reduce the probability of a mid-air 
collision, such as the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) surveillance and monitoring, etc. however none of these devolve 
the air user from meeting the above basic requirement in any way. 
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Clearly a UAS has to have an equivalent function in order to satisfy regulations 
and this is commonly called “Sense and Avoid97. 
6.1.1 Application of the Decision Architecture to the Sense and 
Avoid Scenario 
Collision avoidance in manned aircraft comprises two basic mechanisms: 
identification that a collision will occur, and a subsequent manoeuvre initiated to 
generate safe separation, either vertically, horizontally or a combination of both. 
Collision identification can be achieved by a variety of processes and players, 
such as: 
 Air Traffic Controllers when one or both aircraft are under their control or 
receiving advisory reports. For area controllers, their ATC consoles have 
a variety of automated devices alerting them to the possibility of a conflict 
and highlight the affected aircraft on the displays. When aircraft are in 
Controlled Airspace, the ATC controller holds primary responsibility for 
collision avoidance. The same is true for ATC controllers in the tower at 
airfields. He will advise the positions of aircraft in his visual (and 
sometimes radar) circuit. 
 The pilots in either aircraft may identify that a collision possibility is 
occurring. This may be visual or they may have equipment to help 
identify this such as TCAS. 
For unmanned aircraft, the process is no different except that the pilot is now 
remote. He therefore cannot use his eyesight directly, but will rely on sensors. 
These can be of many types such as Electro Optics, radar, datalink and data 
broadcasts. For UASs with conventional architectures, the pilots must maintain 
a vigilant search using these sensors for other air objects and respond 
appropriately. Using the proposed architecture should confer several benefits, 
most of which will decrease the chance of a mid-air collision. The processes 
that the architecture will allow are presented in the schematic below. 
                                            
97
 There is an increasing trend to rename this function to be “Detect and Avoid”. 
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Figure 37: Collision Avoidance Process 
The process can be described in terms of a timeline as follows: 
 The Master Executive (ME) can be pre-authorised (at level 5a) to 
respond to Sense and Avoid resolution manoeuvres. This would be 
advisable if the expected false alarm rate was low. This would be outside 
the vicinity of airfields and if there was a low rate of manoeuvring. Such 
pre-authorisation would allow extremely fast response times (this is 
discussed in detail later). If the ME is authorised at level 5a, it would 
manoeuvre according to the plan generated by the Sense and Avoid sub-
system planner following receipt of the conflict advisory message. 
 When at level 4a, on receipt of a conflict advisory, the ME would report 
this using the communications link to the pilot by either sending: 
o intruder data 
o additional data including a collision timeline 
o manoeuvre plans for the resolution of the conflict 
 The pilot would consider his response. If his aircraft is in controlled 
airspace, and there is plenty of time, he may wish to report this to the 
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ATC controller (who has the responsibility for collision avoidance. He can 
then either do nothing or send: 
o authority to manoeuvre 
o order a modified manoeuvre 
 The UAS receives the message via the communications link and actions 
the response. 
 The aircraft then manoeuvres to avoid the intruder achieving the 
appropriate safe separation. 
This timeline can be modelled according to the following schematic: 
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Figure 38: Collision Timeline Model 
It can be seen that if TM4A is larger than TM5A then TPM will be negative. This 
means that the time to include the pilot in the loop is larger than that required to 
generate a safe separation. In such a situation, the ME will wait until the last 
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safe time to act and then respond at Level 5A, by invoking an escalation of the 
authority levels as follows: 
 Request authority to manoeuvre (at Level 4A) 
 If no reply has been received by X seconds to manoeuvre, request 
authority to manoeuvre (at Level 4B with a time-out of X seconds). 
 If no reply has been received by the end of the time-out, escalate the 
authority to manoeuvre to 5A 
 Manoeuvre at 5A to avoid the conflict 
The above is an example of ME authorisation escalation due to time pressure. 
We can rearrange the formulas in the schematic above to calculate TPM as 
follows:   
TPM  =  TTC  - TCTC - TDDL  - TDP  - TUDL  - TCM  - TSB  - TSS   
where TTC  is the initial time to collision. 
In practical terms, it is likely that TDDL  =  TUDL98. 
The above formula was modelled in Matlab using the following terms: 
Time to Collision TTC   This is calculated using:  
 
                                             
where Detection Range is modelled as a random Gaussian distribution with a 
Mean Detection Range and a standard deviation of 500m. The mean detection 
ranges used  were 7km, 8km and 9km. These cover typical sensor ranges for 
electro-optic and millimetric radar sensors. The distribution for 8km is shown 
below: 
                                            
98
 The justification for asserting that “TDDL  =  TUDL“ is that the causes for delays to the uplink is 
quite likely to be the same as that for the downlink and therefore cause a similar delay. 
gVelocityClo
angeDetectionRTTC
sin
=
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Figure 39: Gaussian Detection Range Model (Mean 8Km) 
Closing Velocity is the vector sum of intruder/own aircraft velocities. These 
velocities were modelled as random Gaussian distributions with a mean of 
250m/s and a standard distribution of  30m/s. This is modified to take into 
account the Track Crossing Angle99 (TCA) which is modelled as a Gaussian 
random variable between + 30 degrees of own aircraft’s nose. The resulting 
closing velocity when TCA is taken into account has a mean of 240 m/s. This is 
shown on the figure below: 
                                            
99
 The Track Crossing Angle is the difference in headings between two aircraft. It is 
conventionally described as TCA  = 0 for the head on collision case, and TCA = 180 for the 
tail-chase scenario. 
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Figure 40: Closing Velocity Model 
The closing velocity modelled thus represents a worst case (in terms of time to 
collision) Head On collision scenario. 
Taking the distributions for Detection Range and Closing Velocity, a distribution 
of Times to Collision can be calculated. This is shown below: 
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Figure 41: Distribution of Modelled Time to Collision 
 Time to Compute and Communicate, TCTC, TCM In the AIMS 
architecture, the time from initial detection to assembling the 
communication message for transmission can be calculated as follows: 
For computing the initial detection, calculating the collision geometry and 
generating the communication request for authorisation, there are seven 
virtual  channels connecting the seven computing applications all of 
which are running at 10Hz. It seems reasonable to infer that this should 
take a least a minimum of 0.7 seconds. Similarly, on receipt of the 
authorisation, there are six virtual channels between six computing 
applications before the autopilot can be set to initiate the manoeuvre. 
Again, these applications are all running at 10Hz. Accordingly, TCTC was 
set at 0.7secs and TCTC set at 0.6 secs. 
 Downlink /Uplink Delay Time, TDDL , TUDL A full (or even partial) 
discourse on the delays, or latencies, involved in UAS communications is 
beyond the scope of the thesis. The main contributors it appears are not 
the physical aspects but rather the system aspects51 such as: Line of 
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Sight Vs. Beyond Line of Sight (Sat-comms) topologies, number of jumps 
between satellites, distance of receiver/transmitter from satellite’s nadir, 
geo-stationary Vs. low earth orbit, and many others. For satellite 
communications, used when the UAS is Beyond Line of Sight, then in 
terms of typical values, a generally held view51 was that a figure of the 
order of 1-2 seconds was appropriate. In support of this, Eurocontrol 
conducted a study to generate Communications Operating Concept and 
Requirements (COCR) for the Future Radio System (FRS)52.  A table 
which details the acceptable latency for the Air Traffic Service (ATS) is 
reproduced from that document below. This shows that the one-way 
acceptable latency value at the 95 percentile is 1.2 seconds. 
 
Table 19: Most Stringent Future Radio System Allocated Data 
Requirements 
As only a general conclusion was required as an output of the model, the 
latency times, TDDL and TUDL, were modelled as a random Poisson 
distribution100 which gives the probability mass function of the expected 
arrival of the signal with a mean of 1.2 seconds. 
                                            
100
 The justification for using this distribution is based on the study conducted by Eurocontrol to define 
acceptable latency requirements for a variety of communication systems. To quote” For most services, the 
COCR assumes a statistical allocation of latency based on a Poisson distribution” taken from 
Communications Operating Concept and Requirements for the Future Radio System (COCR) Ver 2.0 
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Safety Buffer Time, TSB The Safety Buffer Time is inserted into the 
calculation to cater for the fact that it imprudent to wait until the last 
possible millisecond to start generating safe separation due to: 
o the fact that the dynamics of the calculation may not be stable 
over time 
o the input sensor data will have errors in it 
o the calculations may also have errors due to rounding and 
approximations 
o aircraft have to roll in the direction of manoeuvring before they can 
start generating lateral separation 
The Safety Buffer Time used in the modelling was fixed at 5s. 
Safe Separation Time, TSS The Safe Separation Time is the time 
in which the aircraft can generate sufficient separation to avoid collision. 
The Safe Separation Time used in the modelling was the time for an 
aircraft to complete a 45degree Rate One101 turn viz. 15s. 
 Pilot Decision Process Time, TDP  The time for the pilot to make a 
decision and respond is based on evidence generated in deriving the 
ACAS Performance Model. This model has the safety encounter model, 
modified by a pilot response model. The ACAS Control logic assumes 
that the pilot will react to an ACAS generated Resolution Advisory (RA) 
within 5 seconds by commanding an acceleration of 0.25g to achieve the 
required 1500 fpm vertical velocity. For our model, it seems reasonable 
to suppose that a ground based pilot would not be any dissimilar in his 
performance, and arguments can be made for it to be worse, based on 
the fact that his situational awareness would be poorer due to his 
remoteness. Initially therefore, the model used a value of  TDP = 5s. 
However, evidence was found that, in order to validate this figure, the 
EUROCONTROL ASARP project has analysed on-board data recorded 
                                            
101
 A Rate One turn is a turn that completes a 2π turn in 2 minutes. This corresponds to 30 
degrees of bank angle and is considered to be a normal manoeuvre of an aircraft. 
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by some contributing European airlines during a period of three years. To 
support a comparison with the ACAS Control logic standard pilot 
response, the actual pilot responses were quantified in terms of:  
o Time between the issuance of the RA and the beginning of the 
manoeuvre,  
o Vertical acceleration taken to perform the manoeuvre,  
o Vertical speed achieved by the manoeuvre.  
The data gathered to validate the 5s figure in fact showed that the mean 
pilot response time was in fact 6.7s and also indicated that on 20% of 
occasions, no response was made at all. The figure below provides an 
overall picture of the observed pilot responses and the frequencies for 
each of the different response types. This distribution defines the ACAS 
pilot response model. In line with the figure commonly observed for the 
European airspace, this response model includes a 20% proportion of 
non-responding pilots. The model makes no mention of why a “no 
response” occurs. However since the main reason for the RA is to cue 
the pilots for a visual check, it is entirely possible that the pilots felt that 
no response was the correct action. 
 
Figure 42: ACAS Pilot Response Model Distribution 
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In accordance with the above model, and in the absence of any other evidence, 
the figure used for TDP was a random Gaussian distribution with a mean of 7s, 
an SD of 1s. However due to the fact that there were no reasons for a “no 
response” given above, this aspect was not included in calculating TDP. The 
calculated TDP therefore represents a “best” case. 
6.1.2 Results for the Sense and Avoid Decision Model 
Initially, the basic Performance Margin outcomes were computed and these are 
shown below for detection ranges of 8km and 10km. Sample sizes were varied 
from 10,000 – 40,000 and little significant variation in mean or SD was found. 
5A 4B 20 secs 4A
 
Figure 43: Performance Margin for Detection Range = 10km 
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5A 4B 20 secs 4A
 
Figure 44: Performance Margin for Detection Range = 8km 
Using an average closing velocity of 234m/s (a mean of 250m/s modified by the 
average TCA) over the difference in detection range between the two models of 
2km, the time difference would be 8.5s. The difference between the modelled 
means for 8km and 10km is 8.1s. The results therefore appear believable. 
Experimental Results 
In order to further validate the Sense and Avoid Performance Margin model, an 
experimental system was set up. This used a fully working Sense and Avoid102 
system operating in a Synthetic Environment and integrated with a 
representative vehicle flight system. The trial scenarios used a head on collision 
vector (Track Crossing Angle  = 180 degrees) with detections according to the 
sensor model outputs. The system operated according to the timeline as 
described above and the timings of the dispatch and receipt of authorisations 
together with the manoeuvre initiation time were logged. 
Thirty nine runs were recorded. The raw data collected is shown at Appendix G. 
Only those runs where full results were logged, the TCA was 180 deg. and a 
desired CPA of 926m was set were further analysed for this summary – a total 
                                            
102
 The system was fully representative of a working SAA system. Details of this system are 
provided at Appendix G. 
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of 21 runs. These results are also shown at Appendix G and a summary 
presented below: 
Detection Range Mean = 9676.2 m Stud Dev. = 924.6 m 
Closing Speed Mean = 250.96 m/sec Std Dev = 9.38 m/sec 
Down/Up Link Latency Mean = 2.048 sec Std Dev = 0.805 sec 
Notional Pilot Decision Time 5 sec  
Required CPA 926 m  
Achieved CPA Mean = 926.8 m Std Dev = 11.55 m 
Performance Margin Mean = +1.97 sec Std Dev = 3.69 sec 
Table 20: SAA Experiment  - Parameters for CPA926 runs 
The recorded Performance Margins for the 21 runs are shown below: 
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Figure 45: Sense and Avoid Experimental Results (CPA-926) 
In order to determine whether these results are consistent with those obtained 
from the SAA Timeline Matlab model, the Matlab model was modified to use the 
experimental parameters recorded above. However, it should be noted that the 
manoeuvre time the model uses, together with the safety margin time, were 
both notional at 15 and 5 seconds respectively and based on “reasonable” 
assumptions regarding turning circles. In addition, the model performance 
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margin is based on the collision point at the time of first detection and assumes 
no manoeuvring.  
In the case of the experimental results though, the manoeuvre initiation time 
was a function of the algorithms determining the latest time to avoid a collision 
and of course this varies according to the precise geometry of that particular 
run. The algorithms also have a notional fixed safety buffer time of 7 sec. In 
order to rationalise these differences, a spreadsheet model determining the 
differences between using a fixed collision point and a point of closest approach 
(CPA) was developed. The spreadsheet results are at Appendix G and a 
graphical output is shown below: 
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Figure 46: Collision Point and Closest Point of Approach Graph (CPA-926) 
Each aircraft (the SAA aircraft and the intruder) is started at time, t = 0 at a 
range of 3060m from the notional collision point, each with a velocity of 
125.6m/sec, which they will reach at,  t = 24.3 sec. However, to achieve the 
desired CPA of approximately 900m, the SAA aircraft commences a Rate One 
Turn (3 degrees/sec) at time, t = 7.0 sec (17.3 sec to notional collision). The 
CPA is reached at time, t = 23.0 secs which is 1.3 sec earlier than the notional 
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collision point. From this we can deduce that the latest time to manoeuvre is 
16.0 secs (17.3 – 1.3) from the closest point of approach. 
The original Matlab model was therefore further modified to use a Pilot Decision 
Process Time, TDP of 5.0 sec, a Safety Buffer Time, TSB of 7.0 sec and a Safe 
Separation Time, TSS of 16.0 sec. Furthermore, the speeds and detection 
ranges used were as the figures in Table 20. This modified Matlab model gave 
the following  Performance Margin distribution: 
5A 4B 20 secs 4A
 
Figure 47: Modelled Performance Margin using Experimentally Derived 
Inputs (CPA-926) 
This can be compared with those achieved experimentally in Table 20 
(reproduced below): 
Mean = +1.97 sec Std Dev = 3.69 sec 
 
As a further comparison, 9 experimental results were available with a desired 
CPA of 463m.  The above process was repeated for these runs. and the results 
are also shown at Appendix G and a summary presented below: 
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Detection Range Mean = 8978 m Std Dev = 1363 m 
Closing Speed Mean = 261.4 m/sec Std Dev = 3.3 m/sec 
Down/Up Link Latency Mean = 3.0 sec Std Dev = 0 sec 
Notional Pilot Decision Time 5 sec  
Required CPA 463 m  
Achieved CPA Mean = 463.75 m Std Dev = 3.45 m 
Performance Margin Mean = +3.0 sec Std Dev = 5.4 sec 
Table 21:SAA Experiment  -  Parameters for CPA-463 runs 
The recorded Performance Margin for these runs is below: 
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Figure 48: Sense and Avoid Experimental Results (CPA-463) 
Again the collision plot was repeated with these figures as shown below: 
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Figure 49: Collision Point and Closest Point of Approach Graph (CPA-463) 
Again each aircraft (the SAA aircraft and the intruder) is started at time, t = 0, 
this time at a range of 1886m from the notional collision point, each with a 
velocity of 130.7m/sec, which they will reach at,  t = 16.5 sec. However, to 
achieve the desired CPA of approximately 460m, the SAA aircraft commences 
a Rate One Turn (3 degrees/sec) at time, t = 3.0 sec (13.5 sec to notional 
collision). The CPA is reached at time, t = 14.0 secs. which is 2.5 sec earlier 
than the notional collision point. From this we can deduce that the latest time to 
manoeuvre is 11.0 secs (13.5 – 2.5) from the closest point of approach. 
Note that in the first scenario, a 45 degree turn was sufficient to generate the 
required separation, whilst in this scenario, a turn of 39 degrees was sufficient.  
Again the original Matlab model was therefore further modified to use a Safe 
Separation Time, TSS of 11.0 sec. This modified Matlab model gave the 
following  Performance Margin distribution: 
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Figure 50: Modelled Performance Margin using Experimentally Derived 
Inputs (CPA-463) 
These results can be compared with those achieved experimentally in Table 21 
(reproduced below): 
Performance Margin Mean = +3.0 sec Std Dev = 5.4 sec 
 
Discussion 
Sensor Performance - The first thing that is apparent is to do with sensor 
performance. The results show that, if the mean detection range of the sensor is 
less than 8km, then more than 50% of Resolution Advisories will result in the 
decision architecture operating in an autonomous mode at the PACT Level 5A. 
There will be literally no point in contacting the pilot as impact will occur before 
he can respond (at least 50% of the time). As previously noted, a detection 
range of 8km for millimetric wave radar and electro-optic devices is by no 
means pessimistic. Such a result indicates a major advantage for this 
architecture compared to others and highlights the benefit postulated earlier, 
that the architecture allows human intervention right up to the point when 
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corrective action must be taken whether the human has intervened or not. It 
should be noted that this is a fundamental consequence of the architecture’s 
general operation and not a feature applied for a special case.  
Distribution Tail Results – The number of samples used was 40,000. A small, 
but significant number of results gave Performance Margins of less than 20s for 
the 8Km case. This figure represents a combination of input distributions at their 
extremities and is such that almost instant reaction is required upon detection. 
That the architecture can support such a reactive operation again demonstrates 
its versatility. Again, it should be noted that the architecture is not designed 
specifically to have a reactive mode that is switched in when appropriate, but 
rather that the architecture can operate seamlessly from reactive, through to 
deliberative and finally to subordination to the human controller without any 
special invocation of a particular control mode. 
Comparison with other control/decision architectures: 
 Remotely Piloted Vehicles – Notwithstanding the fact that there are no 
RPVs currently, or expected to be, fielded that are fitted with a S&A 
system, the limitations previously highlighted clearly show that, given 
similar detection ranges, 50% of potential collisions cannot be avoided by 
the pilot in control since he will have insufficient time to respond. 
 Automated systems – the only automated system currently fielded that 
has an S&A system is Global Hawk, which is fitted with TCAS. TCAS has 
been declared unsuitable for use on many UASs due to the following 
considerations: 
o It has been primarily designed for use by airliners operating on the 
airways systems of the world. As such, all the safety studies that 
were conducted to certify TCAS assumes that the pilot is on-board 
the vehicle53 and the Operating Procedures for its use call for the 
pilot to attempt to make visual contact with the intruding aircraft 
and manoeuvre according to their judgement (and not the 
proposed RA message). This is possibly an attempt to reduce the 
false alarm rate. 
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o TCAS requires that the intruder aircraft is fitted with either a Mode 
S or Mode C transponder. Not all aircraft are so equipped. 
o The climb rates of UASs and Global Hawk in particular are 
different from that expected in the TCAS logic. This fact alone has 
prevented the FAA certifying the use of TCAS on Global Hawk. 
o TCAS on Global Hawk has not been integrated with the Flight 
Control System and is not certified for automatic use. 
Moding - When considering the use of automation for a Sense and Avoid 
scenario, some thought needs to be given to its moding. If automatic responses 
are required in order to prevent collisions, the equivalent of operation at 5A, 
then the human must set this prior to any incident, say on climb out or pre-flight. 
Consequently, he is effectively now out of the loop and cannot intervene unless 
it is to turn the automation off. If, however, he insists on being in the loop at all 
times and responses can only be initiated when sanctioned by him, then the 
overall system will miss responding in 50% of potential collisions (given the 
above scenario.). Such an automatic system will inherently therefore have 
limitations in its moding. The autonomous, rather than automatic, decision 
architecture proposed is the only architecture known that will ensure that the 
human is kept in the loop until such a point where that situation is no longer 
beneficial and autonomous action to prevent an accident is initiated. 
Assumptions and Constraints – It has been assumed throughout that the 
Sense and Avoid action, once initiated, will be perfect and prevent the accident. 
Any other consideration would require a full analysis of Sense and Avoid 
performance which is outside the scope of this thesis. The main thrust of this 
analysis is to model the point at which the Information - Decision - Action 
sequence is initiated, and by which of the two controllers, human or machine, 
within the general requirement to keep the human controller in the loop for as 
long as practicable. 
Effect on the accident rate – The scenario outlined above is a worst case 
scenario for a time critical Sense and Avoid solution in that it only considers 
Track Crossing Angles (TCA) from 150 -180 degrees, which is clearly 1/6th of 
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the overall range of TCAs (0 -360). It is therefore reasonable to assume that the 
effect of having the proposed architecture, which is beneficial in 50% of the 
modelled cases, will be effective in 1/12th (i.e. 8%) of all cases, given that TCAs 
are equally and randomly distributed. The effect of not responding to a Sense 
and Avoid action can be regarded as identical to a pilot of an ACAS equipped 
aircraft not responding to a Resolution Advisory. In the ACAS performance 
analysis [50], the following is stated: 
“A pilot who never follows ACAS RAs faces a 
risk of collision that is 45.8%, rather than 27.8%, 
of that faced by the pilots of unequipped aircraft. 
Thus she faces more than one-and a-half 
times the risk faced by typical pilots, and 
more than three times the risk she would 
face if she always followed RAs and 
followed them accurately”. 
 
Is this a fair comparison? In the absence of some quite complicated encounter 
modelling, it may well be justified as a best case since ACAS is carried only by 
large aircraft and modelling assumes encounters typically of this sort. As 
presented earlier, the accident statistics for GA aviation are about twice as bad 
as those predicted by the ACAS encounter model. Therefore, it can be argued 
that initiating a Sense & Avoid manoeuvre will prevent at least 1 in 3 collisions 
(i.e. 33%) (based on the ACAS encounter model) and, for GA aviation, as much 
as possibly 1 in 1.5 (i.e. 66%) (based on the GA accident statistics). Since these 
are rough estimations only, a good working figure of 50% will be used. 
6.2 Flight Management 
The architecture makes specific provision for the management of each flight. 
This requires the generation and maintenance of a flight or mission plan103. This 
flight plan is generated by the Mission Planner. This planner updates the 
mission plan according to progress, generates contingency plans for action in 
                                            
103
 The noun  “Flight Plan” is used to denote the actual plan of the flight in terms where it is 
going, when it will arrive and how much fuel it will use. It is also used to describe the form (in 
the UK, Form CA42) that will be submitted to the Air Traffic Management System to either 
inform them of the flight or request clearance to enter the system. It is the former description 
that is relevant here.  
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the event of an emergency and ensures that a safe termination of the flight can 
always be made. This termination plan includes: 
 actions to ensure navigation to land at the designated airfield with more 
than the minimum authorised fuel on board. This includes an adaptive 
routing algorithm which enables the aircraft to plan flights around 
dangerous weather such as thunderstorms and turbulence, which UASs 
are particularly vulnerable to. 
 an algorithm to select the most suitable alternative airfield to land at if 
required. 
 a forced landing sub-system which will identify a suitable site, ensure that 
it is clear of human inhabitancy and provide suitable guidance to it. 
 a safe ditch function. 
The above are incorporated into the architecture in order to reduce the 
probability level of a “Hazardous or potentially “Catastrophic” accident to an 
acceptable level. The acceptable level of probability of failure at the latter 
category is of the order of 1 x 10-7 per flight hour. 
6.2.1 FLIGHT MANAGEMENT FAILURE DATA 
In 2007, there were 90 accidents [38] in GA in the USA attributed to Fuel 
Management failures. Of these 66 were directly linked to faulty pre-flight 
planning and in flight monitoring of the fuel. Out of a total of 21.7m flight hours 
logged, this constitutes a failure rate of  3.1 x 10-6 per flight hour due to fuel 
mismanagement. There were also 15 accidents due to inadvertently 
encountering poor weather and icing which represents an accident rate of 7.0 x 
10-7 per flight hour. Combining these gives a total for flight management failures 
for GA of 3.8 x 10-6 per flight hour. 
From the UAS accident analysis in Para., the Predator type had one accident 
when the aircraft ran out of fuel following a loss of communications and two 
accidents when it was inadvertently flown into dangerous weather conditions. 
Up to and including 2009, the Predator fleet had accumulated 655,463 flight 
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hours. The above therefore represent a combined mission mismanagement loss 
rate of 4.6 x 10-6.  
First to consider is whether the figures for UAS and GA are comparable (other 
than that the figures are almost identical)? Predator flies long endurance 
missions, upwards of 20 hours on average, sometimes many miles from a 
recovery airfield. Conversely, GA flights are of the order of 1-2 hours, often 
within 10-20 miles of an airfield and with good visual (VFR operation) lookout for 
poor weather. It could then be argued that these three factors (flight time Vs. 
distance from base Vs. visual lookout) balance themselves out. 
If we accept that the loss rate is of the order of 4 x 10-6 and that loss of the 
aircraft is classified as “Hazardous” (which requires a probability of <1 x 10-7), a 
mitigation strategy of weather avoidance routing and on-board flight 
management would only have to have a performance better than 25:1 to 
achieve an acceptable loss rate. If it achieved 250:1, it would be acceptable at 
the “Catastrophic” level. To investigate system performance, we have to also 
understand the failure rate of such a system. This situation can be summarised 
by the following equation: 
Prob Flight Management Accident = Prob Flight Management Error *  Prob Flight 
Management Error Mitigation Failure 
where we surmise that: 
Prob Flight Management Error  ~ 4 x 10-6 and Prob Flight Management Accident is 
required to be <1 x 10-7 
6.2.2 FLIGHT MANAGEMENT FAILURE ANALYSIS 
In the assessment above, failures due to poor flight management were 
subdivided into fuel and weather related. Only the fuel aspects are now  
assessed in further detail: 
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Fuel Management Failure Analysis 
All powered aircraft including UASs have a self-contained fuel system. This 
system can be quite complicated in large aircraft but even in light aircraft the 
principles and architecture have common components, typically, tanks, lines, 
pumps, valves and gauges. A diagram of a typical fuel system on a light aircraft 
is shown below:  
 
Figure 51: Simple Fuel System104 
Failures in any of these components can lead to fuel system failures. In 
assessing fuel system failures it is important to recognise the difference 
between fuel starvation and fuel exhaustion. The former describes fuel being on 
board an aircraft but is unable to be burnt by the engine(s) and the latter 
describes the situation when there is no more fuel on board. A simple fault 
tree105 below describes this situation and assigns possible (but not exhaustive) 
causes:  
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 “Aircraft Fuel Management”: Experimental Aircraft Info website at 
http://www.experimentalaircraft.info/flight-planning/fuel-management.php 
105
 A fault tree is a tool that allows the analysis of an undesired state of a system. It traces the 
top level state, via intermediary causal states to bottom level causal events. These states and 
events are graphically linked by gates which define their logical relationships, (e.g. AND or OR 
gates). By specifying the these logical relationships, together will knowledge of the probability 
of the bottom level event occurrence, it is possible to derive the probability of the top level 
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Figure 52: Fuel System Fault Tree (Top Level) 
The failure on the above fault tree that is under consideration here is the Fuel 
Management Failure whereby flight termination is caused by running out of fuel 
before the aircraft can land safely. The other causes or failures come under the 
control of the Health Management System and are out of the scope of this 
thesis and not considered further.  
Given the above, it should now be possible to identify what would cause a Fuel 
Management Failure and attempt to ascribe a probability to it. In order to do 
this, it is necessary to examine the architecture to determine the components 
which contribute to this process. 
The module responsible for managing fuel during flight is the Mission Manager. 
This takes the pre-flight Flight (and Fuel) Plan and updates it during flight 
according to actual, as opposed to planned, routing and fuel consumption. As 
such it maintains an up-to-date estimate of fuel remaining at the planned 
                                                                                                                                
state occurring.  
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destination. However, a variety of changes to the flight plan may occur. These 
are: 
 Change to the planned destination due to operational, weather or other 
constraints. In such a case, changes to the planned alternates106 are 
also quite likely. 
 Change of routing imposed by the operating authority, ATC or 
otherwise, such as routing around poor weather etc. This can include 
changes of Flight Level (altitude) and/or speed which will alter the fuel 
consumption rate. 
 Changes in the environmental conditions encountered as opposed to 
that predicted, such as temperatures or winds. Again these will change 
the fuel consumption rate and/or extend/reduce the flight times. 
 Changes to required time on task if that is the mission type (such as a 
Search and Rescue mission). 
 Emergencies which require the UAS to land at the Nearest Suitable, or 
if urgent, the Nearest Available airfield. 
All of the above will necessitate updates to the flight, and therefore fuel, plans. If 
the update indicates that the fuel remaining at the destination is outside of 
stipulated constraints107, then a major revision to the flight plan is required. As in 
common with the rest of the architecture, an updated plan will be proposed to 
the ground based pilot (if available). In general, and in order to make the 
reaction to the critical belief immediate, the Mission Manager constantly 
calculates the following: 
 Updates to the Flight and Fuel Plans according to actual conditions 
                                            
106
 In general, alternates are considered for weather or unavailability at the planned 
destination whilst the flight is in progress. These are sometimes referred to as the Weather 
Alternate or Alt 1 (which is usually a fair distance from the original destination, for obvious 
reasons) and the Crash Alternate or Alt 2(should a crash at the planned destination close the 
airfield). The latter, of course, can be very close to the original destination.  Therefore the fuel 
states to reach these alternatives are usually quite different. Which one is chosen depends on 
many things but primarily the likely weather at the planned or alternate airfields. 
107
 The “Fuel at the Destination” constraint is a complicated sum composed of many parts, 
such as weather, type of approach, unusable fuel, safety margin etc. In the UK, it is 
mandatory for civil traffic to have at least 30minutes of fuel remaining at the destination.  
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encountered. These will provide estimates to the fuel remaining after 
landing 
 Contingency routes to: 
o Return to Base 
o Divert to the Planned Alternative 
o Divert to the Nearest Suitable 
o Divert to the Nearest Available 
o Nearest Safe Forced Landing site 
o Nearest Safe Ditching area 
 Algorithms to choose the best alternatives to the above sites based on 
selected criteria 
 Updates to the actual weather at the above sites 
The required behaviours for Fuel Management are generated by the rule-set 
below:  
No Rule Antecedent  
(Critical Belief) 
Belief 
Partition 
Rule Consequent 
(Decision/Action) 
Decision 
Partition 
PoF
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1 IF Fuel is insufficient for 
planned destination plus 
reserves  
Mission 
Manager 
THEN Declare Fuel 
Priority  
Mission 
Manager 
All 
2 IF Fuel is insufficient for 
planned destination  
Mission 
Manager 
THEN Divert to 
Planned Alternative  
Mission 
Manager 
All 
3 IF Fuel is insufficient for 
planned alternative  
Mission 
Manager 
THEN Return to Base  Mission 
Manager 
All 
4 IF Fuel is insufficient for 
Return To Base  
Mission 
Manager 
THEN Divert to 
Nearest Suitable  
Mission 
Manager 
All 
5 IF Fuel is insufficient for 
Diversion Nearest Suitable  
Mission 
Manager 
THEN Divert to 
Nearest Available  
Mission 
Manager 
All 
6 IF Fuel is insufficient for 
Diversion Nearest Available  
Mission 
Manager 
THEN Plan to Force 
Land  
Mission 
Manager 
All 
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 Phase of Flight. i.e. Take-off, Landing, Cruise etc. 
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Table 22: Rule–set for Fuel Management Behaviours 
 
In Para. 3.1.7.1, the concept of safety critical chains were presented. 
These are initiated by control functions, normally by the pilot. In the AIMS 
architecture, these control functions are initiated by the appropriate 
manager, and in the above case, the Mission Manager. The control signals 
are routed via the Mission Controller to the Vehicle System for final 
implementation. As discussed in Para. 3.1.7.1, these control signals are 
themselves initiated, not now by a Pilot but by a Critical Belief in the 
Decision Partition. These beliefs, for Fuel Management at least, are the 
Rule Antecedents in  
Table 22 above. Failure to generate these beliefs will therefore result in a 
potential Fuel Management Failure. These beliefs are themselves generated in 
the Information (or World Modelling) Layer at the appropriate Belief Partition. 
Thus we can show the full architecture for the generation and control 
implementation of the required behaviours for Fuel Management in the Figure 
below: 
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Master Executive for 
Authorisation
(if possible or required)
Mission Controller
Flight Path 
Manager
Ground Controller
Mission 
Manager
Fuel, Weather and 
Navigation Sensors
Vehicle System
Core AIMS
Architecture
Information 
Processing
Fuel State
Nav Data
External Env
Critical Beliefs
Rule
Outputs
New  Route and
Destination
Steering
Autopilot
Commands
Autopilot
Commands
Weather
Data
 
Figure 53: Control Chain for Fuel Management Behaviours 
It can be seen that the decision chain in the architecture shown above allows for 
ground controller/pilot intervention in a fully autonomous manner. That is, the 
pilot, if available, can be included in the loop for authorisation or, if 
communications failure prevents this, a timely decision will made autonomously. 
This point is discussed in more detail further. 
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From the chain above, a fault tree for the analysis of the Fuel Management 
Failure state, as identified in the top-level fault tree in Figure 52, can then be 
developed. This is shown below: 
Figure 54: Fuel Management Failure Fault Tree109 
The above fault tree shows the top level state, “Fuel Failure” which is caused by 
a failure of the system to identify insufficient fuel for the destination AND the 
pilot failing similarly. The latter is caused by either human error OR by losing 
communications. In failing to identify sufficient fuel, the system has either used 
the wrong data in its calculations, OR the computing centre has failed. The 
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 In this fault tree above, base level events are signified by a circle and bar (“London 
Underground” symbol), an AND Gate by the symbol AND GATE  and an OR gate by the symbol 
OR GATE
. A “Transfer” gate, i.e. one that has only one underlying causal state or event, retains 
only the bar. The symbol “Q” specifies or derives the probability of the state or event. A 
justification for these probabilities is given later. Note that an AND gate effectively multiplies 
the underlying probabilities whilst an OR gate effectively adds them. 
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events which can cause these effects are shown at the bottom of the tree. It can 
be seen, by inspection, that the overall top level state probability can be 
reduced to an acceptable level by introducing extra AND gates in the underlying 
tree structure or by reducing the probabilities of the major contributing base 
level events. 
Summary 
To summarise, a link has been developed which traces the hazard of a flight 
management failure leading to catastrophic loss of the aircraft which has an 
acceptable probability of occurrence of <1 x 10-7. One of the contributors to a 
Flight Management failure is that of a Fuel Management Failure. Using the 
architecture of the decision making system, a failure chain was developed from 
which a fault tree analysis was conducted. This fault tree specifies the link 
between the top level failure state and the underlying causal events and 
indicates its probability of occurrence. 
Discussion 
Now that a direct link has been made between the hazard and its underlying 
causal chain, a comparison and assessment can be made between different 
decision architectures. In addition, alterations and improvements can be 
suggested to the original decision architecture in order to reduce the probability 
of occurrence of the hazard to an acceptable level. 
Decision Architecture Comparisons 
The alternative architectures to be compared are: 
 A manned aircraft decision architecture 
 The decision architecture of the “Predator” UAS  
 The proposed architecture as previously defined and illustrated 
Each of the above have apparently only slight or subtle differences but in fact 
these differences can have a major impact which will be clearly illustrated using 
the above analysis tools. 
186 
Manned aircraft architecture 
The crucial difference between the UAS architecture and manned aircraft is that 
there is no increase in probability of failure due to communication loss – the 
pilot(s) is always in communication by his very presence. In addition, the pilot 
will monitor the fuel gauges and should notice any anomalous readings. Ideally, 
fuel management will be conducted using a manual or automated fuel log110. In 
addition, pilots will use simple, mental rules of thumb for the fuel calculations 
which constitute a form of plausibility checking. Referring to the above fault tree, 
the probability of Pilot Monitoring Failure (PMF) is dominated by the 
Communications failure event. Eliminating this for manned aircraft suggests that 
the PMF probability is reduced to around 1 x 10-5. For large commercial aircraft, 
with sophisticated Flight Management Systems, using this figure for PMF 
reduces the probability of  overall Failure to Manage Fuel Correctly to 
something of the order of 1.2 x 10-10. This figure may only be a coarse estimate 
but according to Airsafe111, there have been only six such accidents in the last 
45 years, and at least three of these were compounded by poor weather. 
Predator UAS architecture 
On Predator, there is no on board fuel management system and the protection 
for Fuel Management Failure resides solely with the flight crew. As such, the 
fault tree for this architecture is the RHS of the above fault tree. As discussed 
earlier, this is dominated by the probability of long term communication loss 
which interestingly was the circumstances of the Predator loss referred to 
earlier. A clue as to why there are not more Predator accidents due to Fuel 
Management Failure, since communication loss is quite frequent, is possibly 
                                            
110
 A Fuel Log is a graph of expected fuel remaining (Y axis) versus flight time (X axis).  
During  the flight, actual fuel remaining is plotted and compared with that originally expected 
at that time. Deviations can be attributed to several variables or causes such as 
extended/reduced estimated time of arrival, higher/lower fuel burn rates or unanticipated fuel 
loss. By extrapolating the actual fuel plots over time, estimates can be made of the fuel 
remaining after landing.  
111
 Airsafe: A website for communicating safety matters for air passengers at 
http://www.airsafe.com/events/noengine.htm  
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that Predator has a lost link procedure which calls for it to climb to a safe 
altitude and conduct an alternative mission (which is usually to Return to Base 
(RTB)). Since Predator has a long endurance, and generally plans for a Return 
to Base anyway, the probability of running out of fuel after curtailing its mission 
prematurely is obviously greatly reduced. However, that operational doctrine (of 
planning to RTB) constrains the employability of Predator to those sort of 
missions and it would be expected that the loss rate would be much higher if 
long range transit missions were routinely conducted. 
Conclusion 
By including Fuel Management functionality into the architecture and having a 
decision making system that can act according to its predictions of estimated 
fuel at the planned destination, the following advantages are envisaged: 
 The UAS loss rate due to fuel mismanagement will be reduced, perhaps 
by an order of magnitude 
 Mission plans and operational doctrine can be more versatile and 
flexible, with more alternatives being available to ensure safe completion 
of the air mission.  
 This latter advantage may help to convince regulatory and operating 
authorities to allow the UAS into non segregated and routine classes of 
airspace.  
6.3 Take Off and Landing 
It is bad to be low and it is bad to be slow. So never, ever, get low and slow112 - 
Anon. 
It is in the Landing phase of flight that aircraft have the most accidents and 
UASs are no different. In fact, they are more likely to be worse for reasons that 
will become apparent. There appear to be three main contributors as to why 
accidents are more prevalent in these phases. Firstly, there is nearly always a 
lack of time in which to initiate corrective action because of the proximity of the 
                                            
112
 Ancient pilot homily (if pilots can be considered ancient) 
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ground. Humans are reasonably fast at the skill level but, as has been noted, 
can become ponderous or even frozen at the knowledge or planning levels. 
Machines, as has already been demonstrated, can be nearly instantaneous at 
the reactive level.  In addition, humans can suffer from attention fixation where 
concentration on a particular aspect leads to loss of situational awareness of 
other aspects. This has been cited as the main reason for many mid-air 
collisions of GA aircraft which frequently occur in broad daylight and on the 
approach to landing113 [38]. Secondly, the number of alternatives available to a 
decision maker during these phases is much reduced and it is frequently true 
that, of these alternatives, there may not be a fully satisfactory solution. Finally, 
aircraft in these phases are at the end of one extremity of their operating 
environment and invariably have low potential and low kinetic energy (the low 
and slow) with which to extract themselves from difficulties. Given the remote 
operation of UASs and the inherent lack of intimate control, it should be of no 
great surprise to note that UASs have an even poorer record of accidents 
occurring in these phases. 
In  order to overcome some of these difficulties, many modern UAS114 now have 
automated take-off and landing modes thus relieving pilots of the skill levels 
required to remotely achieve these operations. However, it has already been 
noted that automation brings its own difficulties such as removing the pilot from 
the loop and being either inherently inflexible or complex in operation. So how 
could an autonomous UAS with the proposed decision architecture improve 
things? Several areas are identified below. 
In reviewing the performance of an autonomous architecture in a Sense and 
Avoid scenario, two aspects were noted. The inherent ability to include the pilot 
in the decision loop for a long as possible to rectify an escalating problem and 
the ability to make reactive decision/control sequences.  In addition to these 
aspects, the proposed autonomous decision architecture also has the ability to 
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 The reference cites concentration on the touchdown point and a high level of arousal as to 
the main reason why a good lookout during the approach, essential in all aspects of flying, 
particularly in the proximity of other aircraft, is often overlooked. 
114
 Global Hawk, BAE Systems Herti and Mantis UAS and Reaper are good examples. 
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rapidly assess a series of alternative Courses of Action (CoA), selecting and, if 
authorised, implementing the most cost beneficial (literally). 
To illustrate these aspects, an analysis of the an accident [54] occurring to an 
Airbus A320-214 when it ditched in the Hudson River has been made. The 
accident details and the timeline, taken directly from the official accident report, 
are given in the table below: 
 
 
NTSB Accident Report US Airways Flight 1549 
Airbus A320-214, 
New 
Jersey January 15, 2009 
Loss of Thrust in Both Engines After Encountering a Flock of Birds and Subsequent 
Ditching on the Hudson River 
 
Timeline of Events  
Ref 
No 
Local 
Time 
Time 
Diff 
Elapsed 
time from 
start 
(secs)  
1 15:27:11 0 0 Multiple bird-strikes occur at 3,000ft in the climb out 
2 15:27:13 2 2 Engines start to fail 
3 15:27:18 5 7 Crew realise engine failure 
4 15:27:21 3 10 Captain makes decision to start the APU 
5 15:27:23 2 12 
Captain makes decision to take manual control of the 
aircraft 
6 15:27:26 3 15 Captain has manual control of the aircraft 
7 15:27:28 2 17 Captain calls for checklist 
8 15:27:33 5 22 
Captain calls Mayday and starts to turn back to La 
Guardia airport  
9 15:27:50 17 39 Ist Officer starts checklist 
10 15:28:05 15 54 ATC comms  Interrupts checklist 
11 15:28:07 2 56 
Crew start to realise that landing at an airport may 
not be an option 
12 15:28:11 6 62 Captain replies to ATC 
13 15:28:14 3 65 Ist Officer resumes checklist 
14 15:28:31 17 82 ATC comms  Interrupts checklist 
15 15:28:35 4 86 Captain replies to ATC 
16 15:28:36 1 87 TCAS Traffic advisory message 
17 15:28:37 1 88 Crew discuss ATC message 
18 15:28:45 8 96 PWS Wind shear alert 
19 15:28:45 0 96 Ist Officer resumes checklist 
20 15:28:46 1 97 ATC comms  Interrupts checklist 
21 15:28:55 9 106 Captain replies to ATC 
22 15:28:59 4 110 Ist Officer resumes checklist 
23 15:29:02 3 113 ATC comms  Interrupts checklist 
24 15:29:03 1 114 Captain replies to ATC 
25 15:29:05 4 118 TCAS Clear of Conflict message 
26 15:29:07 2 120 Ist Officer resumes checklist 
27 15:29:11 4 124 Captain warns passengers to brace for impact  
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28 15:29:15 4 128 GPWS warning at 1000ft altitude 
29 15:29:16 1 129 Ist Officer resumes checklist 
30 15:29:21 5 134 ATC comms  Interrupts checklist 
31 15:29:33 12 146 
Captain replies to ATC warning that the aircraft would 
be going to ditch 
32 15:29:37 4 150 Ist Officer resumes checklist 
33 15:29:45 8 158 
Captain orders flaps; crew give up checklist and start 
to prepare for the ditch 
34 15:29:53 8 166 
ATC loses radar contact with aircraft but advises 
relative position of Newark airfield  
35 15:30:01 8 174 Flaps at position 2, aircraft at 250 feet, 170 knots  
36 15:30:17 16 190 
Crew make decisions on further flap settings - aircraft 
at 150 knots 
37 15:30:24 7 197 Three GPWS "Terrain, Terrain" warnings 
38 15:30:41 17 214 Aircraft at 50 feet 
39 15:30:44 3 217 End of transcript. 
Table 23: Event Timeline of US Airways Flight 1549 Accident 
There are several points worth noting from the above but not all are in scope for 
this thesis. What is worth mentioning is the exemplary crew co-operation and 
communication displayed. There can be little doubt that this crew demonstrated 
human performance, in all aspects, at  its very best. 
Diagnosis of Engine Failure  The crew noticed the birds just before impact, 
felt the effect of the impact, heard both engines spooling down and correctly 
diagnosed a double engine failure within 7 seconds. There must be 
considerable doubt that a remote pilot would even be aware of the bird-strike, 
would certainly not have felt the impact and may have even taken considerable 
time to notice the engine winding down in the absence of any audio clues. In 
automatic flight, the first he would probably be aware of is the aircraft losing 
height for what would appear to be unknown reasons. There have been several 
instances of exactly this general sequence of events in the Predator accidents 
reports referenced at 0.  
This highlights a key aspect in the strategy for improving the overall level of 
safety is to incorporate system health management and subsequent emergency 
handling in the decision architecture, since correct handling of emergencies has 
a direct influence on the accident statistics (as does incorrect handling!). If the 
diagnosis of a system failure is clear cut and there remains plenty of time for the 
human controller to put in place emergency actions following the failure, there 
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seems little that an on-board decision making system can do to improve 
performance. Unfortunately, and for a variety of reasons, such benign 
conditions are relatively uncommon.  
Let us consider the process chain from the detection of an anomaly through to 
its safe mitigation. An example of such a process is well documented as Open 
System Architecture - Condition Based Maintenance (OSA-CBM) and, although 
developed primarily for aircraft maintainability, it remains relevant to a real time 
air incident. This process follows the steps outlined below: 
Sensor Readings → State Detection →  State Diagnosis →  State Prognosis 
→  Impact Assessment → Capability Assessment →  Failure Mitigation →  
Failure Handling. 
It can be seen from this that this process highlights that a simple single failure 
(such as a fuel leak or engine failure) can progress through to have a direct 
impact on operational matters such as diverting to an alternative landing site 
(handled in the proposed architecture by the Mission Manager. Even though the 
initial failure may be contained within a small sub-system component. The 
impact of that failure may require a co-ordinated response, such as airfield 
selection, fuel and route re- planning (and validation) and pilot authorisation, at 
the highest level.  
In several demonstrations of the AIMS decision architecture operating in routine 
flight with an on-board health management system115, the engine failure was 
diagnosed within 5 seconds of the triggering event and corrective action 
initiated.  
The conclusion to be reached here is that there is a definite requirement for an 
effective Health Management System, capable of sophisticated reasoning to 
diagnose failures, predict the impact of that failure and propose mitigating plans 
                                            
115
 This failure condition was demonstrated several times to VIP guests. All guests who were 
current or ex aircrew were astounded by the speed of response of the system. Having 
personal experience of such a situation, I can assure the reader that it can take several 
seconds for a crew to respond appropriately. 
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to the higher levels of authority. Such a system must of course be integrated 
within the decision architecture with the Health Management System informing 
the Emergency Manager with appropriate beliefs and plans. The Emergency 
Manager would then select and sequence the appropriate plan to the Mission 
Controller and task the Mission Manager (in this exemplar) to handle the 
operational consequences. The Mission Manager would then inform the Master 
Executive which would in turn seek the appropriate authority if required. Such a 
sophisticated and complex architecture would be very difficult to design as a 
stand alone automatic system. It is, however, a relatively simple addition to the 
proposed decision architecture since the required infrastructure and message 
handling is generic. This factor illustrates that the scalability of the proposed 
architecture. 
Check List Procedures In a multi-crew aircraft, it is a standard response to 
any emergency to take control of the aircraft, carry out immediate emergency 
actions and then institute a formal “check and respond” of each subsequent 
action in the appropriate checklist116. In the Airbus 320, for failures that can be 
identified by the aircraft sensors, the appropriate crew actions are displayed on 
the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM). For others, the crew can 
refer to the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), which contains abnormal and 
emergency procedures for such events The fact that the QRH checklist in this 
case was 3½ pages long and, as it turned out, inappropriately designed, is 
irrelevant to this analysis. What is of note is that the 1st Officer has to retrieve 
the (bulky) QRH, find the appropriate checks and be prepared to read them out 
                                            
116
 The process followed in this case54 was detailed in the US Airways A319/320/321 Pilot 
Handbook (PH), Chapter 9, “Non-Normal Operations”. This states, in part, that, when a non-
normal situation is evident, the pilots should methodically accomplish the following steps:  
1. PF (Pilot Flying)  - maintain aircraft control;  
2. Identify the non-normal situation, PM (Pilot Monitoring)  - cancel the warning or caution, 
if applicable;  
3. PM - determine if situation requires an Immediate Action or if it is an ECAM Exception;  
4. PM - accomplish Immediate Action Items, if applicable;  
5. Captain - assigns PF;  
6. PM - accomplish non-normal procedure; and  
7. PM - accomplish ECAM follow-up procedures, if applicable.  
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aloud when called for. All of this takes valuable time. In this particular case, he 
actually never got past the first three checks in the list and was repeatedly 
interrupted by Air Traffic Control (ironically, trying to help). As the official 
accident report noted: “Further, the flight crew never reached the ditching 
portion of the checklist, which most directly applied to the accident situation”. 
There are several instances of accidents where the crew become interrupted in 
the checks and either re-start at the wrong point or fail to complete them 
through lack of time. In the accident analysis, 7 Predator accidents were directly 
caused by the operator failing to carry out the correct procedure. 
In the AIMS decision architecture, the Master Executive Emergency Manager is 
responsible for the checks117 being carried out. These are initiated in response 
to a complex chain of events discussed earlier. To carry out these checks, the 
Emergency Manager sequences the checks to the Mission Controller in turn 
until all actions are complete. In the engine failure demonstration, the complete 
checklist was completed118 in less than 2 seconds. In the Airbus accident, as an 
aside, the Captain remembered that one check was to start the Auxiliary Power 
Unit (APU) and this vital119 check was completed within 10 seconds.  
To conclude, autonomous sequencing of the appropriate plan (checklist) is 
easily achieved by the AIMS architecture and at high speed120. Additionally, 
once called for (or, in our ontology, proposed to and authorised by the pilot at a 
PACT level of 5A) it is uninterruptible by ATC and does not lose its correct 
sequence. In comparison to automated UASs, would there be much of a 
                                            
117
 The Emergency Planner is the holder of the Emergency Plans (i.e. checklists) and 
provides them to the Emergency Manager on receipt of the appropriate request as detailed in 
Figure 13: Generic 4-Layer . This process mirrors human actions but of course can be done 
far faster and more accurately.  
118
 The checks completed were: 1 - Correctly identify failed engine, 2 - Shut it down, 3 - Set 
transponder to the emergency code, 4 - Determine nearest suitable landing airfield, 5 – Plot 
new route to the airfield, 6 – Self-authorise new route, 7 - Turn onto new route. These 
demonstrations did not include the pilot in the loop as no Ground Control Station was then 
available and therefore it represents operation at the PACT 5A level 
119
 As it turns out, had this not been done before ditching, a mode of the autopilot in this 
aircraft would have prevented a successful outcome by invoking manual flight control laws 
when it sensed they were below 100 feet without the undercarriage down and without power. 
It is believed that this autopilot mode was unknown to the aircrew. 
120
 The decision architecture normally runs at 10Hz. It could easily be made to run at 50Hz. 
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difference? Well, once invoked almost certainly not – an autonomous 
architecture operating at PACT 5A is no faster or better than an automatic 
system switched on. However, the AIMS architecture selects the appropriate 
plan and proposes it to the pilot. If the pilot thinks the architecture has got it 
wrong, he can refuse to authorise it whereas an automatic system would just 
carry on. Again, the human remains in the loop at the appropriate level. 
Alternative Options After 22 seconds, the Captain started to turn back to 
the originating airfield of La Guardia (LGA) but after 56 seconds realised they 
may not make it successfully. To quote from the report: 
At 1528:46 (97 seconds in), the controller stated that runway 4 at LGA was 
available, and the captain responded, “I’m not sure we can make any runway. 
Uh what’s over to our right anything in New Jersey maybe Teterboro?” The 
controller replied, “ok yeah, off your right side is Teterboro Airport [TEB].” 
Subsequently, the departure controller asked the captain if he wanted to try 
going to TEB, and the captain replied, “yes.” At 1529:27 (140 seconds in), the 
departure controller then asked the captain which runway at TEB he would like, 
and the captain responded, “we’re gonna be in the Hudson.” It seems 
reasonable to assume that the option of ditching was selected at that point. 
The AIMS architecture is specifically designed to create alternative plans and to 
propose the best one for selection. Not only that, it constantly updates its plan in 
the light of current beliefs (and these may rapidly change, as in this accident) 
and monitors progress of a chosen plan. If a better one is subsequently 
identified, then that plan is proposed instead. Additionally, it generates plan 
metrics thus highlighting how much better (or worse) the current plan is in 
relation to the identified alternatives. This is in stark contrast to an automated 
UAS or even one that is manually controlled.  
An analysis of the decision options available to the Captain was made after the 
accident and concluded, after several simulations, that it was possible to return 
to La Guardia but not necessarily with a guarantee of safety. However, most 
experts concur that he did the “right thing” in terms of safety of his passengers. 
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Algorithms generating and analysing options for exactly this type of event have 
been developed121 and could possibly be beneficial in presenting decision 
options to the crew.  
6.4 Lost Link Procedures and Communications Handling 
It has already been remarked upon that the communication link with the UAS is 
essential for effective human management (rather than control or supervision) 
of the on-board autonomous system. It has already been noted that this link is 
neither instantaneous (as in manned aircraft) nor guaranteed to be available (a 
failure rate of 1 X 10-3 per flight hour has been quoted). Most current medium 
sized UASs have, what is termed, a lost link procedure which is an automatic 
mode instigated when the link has been determined to have been lost. A 
description of the Predator lost link procedure, as described in the NTSB 
Accident Report of the crash at Nogales, Arizona on 25 April 2006 [55], is given 
below122. Global Hawk has a similar procedure but is also capable of flying to a 
pre-planned destination and carrying an emergency landing automatically even  
without ground support. However, the system output when communications are 
lost needs to be somewhat more sophisticated than merely safe navigation and 
landing if full airspace integration is to be achieved. The main drivers for this are 
equivalence (the need to conform to regulations) and safety. Without human 
management of the mission, the aircraft needs to be able to generate safe 
routes. These routes must be validated against flying into the ground at the 
chosen altitude, conforming to any airspace restrictions and avoiding dangerous 
weather. The UAS must also able to handle emergencies that may arise and be 
capable of avoiding other air users in emergency collision scenarios. Ideally, the 
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 These require a reference to be found 
122
 To quote directly from the report, “..when the UA goes into a lost-link profile, it will initially 
turn to a pre-set lost-link heading, go to full power, and climb for 51 seconds at a commanded 
airspeed of 105 knots. If the UA is within 200 feet of the lost-link altitude (or higher), this first 
step is skipped. In the next step, the system generates a waypoint at the pre-set lost-link 
altitude, 2.5 nautical miles from the location where the UA started the lost-link profile, in the 
direction of the lost-link heading, and the UA proceeds to that waypoint. Once the UA reaches 
that waypoint and the lost-link altitude (or 30 minutes later, whichever comes first), it will 
proceed to fly the remainder of the lost-link profile. This portion of the lost-link profile consists 
of a predetermined series of altitudes and locations, which form a path that the UA will 
autonomously fly. If a data link cannot be re-established, the UA cannot land, and it will 
eventually run out of fuel and crash at some location along the lost-link profile route. 
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UAS should also be capable of interacting with the Air Traffic Control agencies 
and other air users in a transparent way. In short, and returning to familiar 
ground, the UAS must be self-aware, and in a fairly sophisticated way in order 
to be effective. 
As mentioned, Global Hawk is the most sophisticated UAS currently in 
existence. In lost link conditions, it is capable of flying pre-planned routes to 
alternative landing airfields and carrying out a safe landing. However, the 
caveat is “pre-planned”. The routes are validated before take-off and are stored 
as contingency plans for several points (every 5 minutes has been suggested) 
along its mission route. This is why it takes some 24 hours to fully plan a 
mission (though there are believed to be unconfirmed plans that some form of 
on-board route planning will be introduced). 
The AIMS architecture is capable of operating at whatever level of authority that 
has been invested on it. The level of sophistication of behaviour is high but this 
is only due to the number of autonomous functions it has been designed to 
have. When operating in a lost link situation, it will revert all authority levels to 
PACT 5B (full authority to act appropriately, but no feedback to the pilot 
because he is not available). If this is compared to an automatic system, then, 
provided that the functionality is the same, and the triggering mechanisms 
(beliefs for AIMS, variable states for automation), there can be nothing to 
choose between them in terms of improved behaviours. The AIMS architecture 
would be easier to program though, since it is predicated on selection of the 
best alternative plans rather than hard coded conventional methods and has 
been noted is fundamentally scalar. 
In conclusion, AIMS offers only a slight, and arguable, advantage over an 
automated system for the lost link situation. However, in comparison to current 
UAS, even Global Hawk, it should prove to be highly responsive to handling a 
lost link situation.  
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7 Summary of Results 
7.1 The Thesis 
In Chapter One, the general thesis was proposed. This stated that the role, 
responsibilities and environment of an autonomous UAS, are sufficiently 
different from those of other conventionally controlled manned and unmanned 
systems to require a different architectural approach. Such an architecture must 
also demonstrate acceptable safety, performance and robustness to unforeseen 
events. This led to the following questions being posed: 
1. What do the issues of role, responsibility and environment force the 
architecture to achieve that is not found in other architectures? 
2. Can existing autonomous system architectures address these issues?  If 
so, how, to what degree and why? If not, why not? 
3. What effect does the fact that the operator is remote have on the 
underlying accident rate compared to manned aircraft? Are the accident 
mechanisms the same or different? 
4. How does the need for operator interaction affect the design of the 
architecture. 
A review of the subsequent work will now be made to assess whether these 
questions have been satisfactorily answered. 
7.2 Problem Analysis 
In evaluating the problem at hand, it was argued that the trend to reduce costs 
by introducing increasing levels of automation had upper limits when also 
attempting to increase UASs versatility, safety and performance. The argument 
was proposed that a move to autonomous operation would potentially remove 
this limit. However, it was noted that such an autonomous vehicle would have to 
be capable of operating in conjunction with a human controller at whatever level 
of authority was invested by him or, if he was unavailable, at whatever level 
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was appropriate to the situation. This latter requirement requires the 
architecture to be self-aware and identify, and commit to, appropriate courses of 
action – features that are inherent to autonomous systems and not necessarily 
to increased automation.   
7.3 On the Decision Architecture 
A review of several architectures was undertaken and discussed in terms of 
their suitability at Appendix C. It was noted that there were several that had 
favourable attributes but none that would fit all the requirements previously 
identified. A review of the nature of autonomy was undertaken, together with 
methods for suitable human control. From this a generic 4-Layer architecture 
was developed based on a fusion of robotic and avionic practices which could 
operated with mixed levels of authority by a human controller. This architecture 
was further developed to produce a hierarchical model with specific functionality 
to address the issues of versatility, safety and performance. This functionality 
was carefully partitioned according to the identified decision space and in so 
doing demonstrated the scalable nature of the architecture. By adding 
increased functionality where required, a route to increased versatility of 
operation is demonstrated. 
In deriving the requirements from an analysis of the problem, together with the 
analysis of current approaches and the development of the proposed 
architecture, it is considered that Questions 1 & 2 above were answered by that 
study and proposal. Additional material in support of this was provided in 
summarising the lessons learned from implementing and operating the 
architecture in its synthetic environment. These lessons provided further 
evidence that moving to a plan based system of control whereby appropriate 
plans are generated as consequence of implementing a better HMI based on 
the setting of objectives. Further, enhancements were suggested by the move 
to a fuzzy rule based system. 
However, to assess Question 3 and the issue of acceptable levels of safety, an 
accident analysis of manned and unmanned aircraft was undertaken. 
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7.4 Accident Analysis and Overall Safety Contributions 
The accident analysis of manned aircraft, commercial and those in General 
Aviation, showed common trends. Namely that accidents frequently occur in the 
Landing Phase of Flight and that the primary cause of 70-80% of accidents was 
human error. Additionally, foremost amongst the causes were Loss of Control 
(though less so for commercial aircraft with autopilots). However, weather123 
detection and avoidance and fuel management were also important factors for 
autonomous control system to consider. Mechanical reliability, maintenance and 
design were important factors but outside the scope of a such a system’s 
control and therefore this thesis. These factors were also present, and to a 
similar degree in relation to the overall accident rate, when considering 
unmanned systems. However, additional factors, attributable (in part) to 
operator remoteness, appeared to be present in 7 out of the 19 accidents 
analysed. In addition, loss of control was again a prevalent factor for the 
Predator/Reaper family of UAVs but of course entirely absent for Global Hawk 
(no manual control available and none lost so far in automatic flight control).  
This analysis indicated several avenues for improving UAS safety and 
strategies for incorporating these into the decision architecture were proposed. 
These were: 
• All flight control functions should be automated with no manual control. 
• Provide weather detection and avoidance mechanisms fully integrated 
within the decision architecture. 
• Provide better fuel management procedures integrated with flight 
management planning.. 
• Provide a more efficient means of handling emergencies, particularly 
checklists and formal procedures. 
                                            
123
 The term weather is used here in its formal meteorological sense. e.g. icing, rain, 
thunderstorm, turbulence etc. 
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• Introduce a range  of internally generated cross monitoring, plausibility 
checking and abduction feedback mechanisms 
• Provide improved HMI to show/provide : 
 autonomous system intent  
 increased feedback of aircraft state, particularly of those 
automated functions and those deemed critical, either to the on-
board autonomous system and/or the GCS. 
 status of invested authority (PACT Level) for the key control 
mechanisms 
It was considered that incorporating these mechanisms into the decision 
architecture would substantially improve the accident rate and although no 
target figure could be formally calculated, a improvement of between 50% and 
75% was postulated. 
In developing and presenting these proposals, it is considered that satisfactory 
answers to Questions 3 & 4 above are completed. 
7.5 Analysis of Exemplar Scenarios 
In order to validate the above proposals and to further examine the 
architecture’s inherent features, a detailed analysis of the architecture’s 
response in exemplar scenarios was undertaken. 
7.5.1 Sense and Avoid 
A detailed performance analysis of the response of the architecture in a Sense 
and Avoid scenario was undertaken. This showed two main results. Firstly, that 
if detection ranges were less than 8km, impact would occur before an operator’s 
response had been received in 50% of occasions. Unlike an automatic system, 
the architecture is capable of keeping the operator in the loop for the maximum 
time possible. This appears to be generally true of the autonomous architecture 
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and the analysis supports Norman’s criticism’s of automated systems in Para. 
2.2.5.2. and at the same time provides a more robust alternative approach. In 
addition, the analysis highlighted than under certain circumstances when a 
nearly instantaneous response was required to avoid a collision, the 
architecture was capable of reactive behaviour. Under more leisurely 
conditions, the architecture appears to an outside observer as undertaking 
deliberative behaviours. This is a inherent feature of the architecture and 
requires no specific switches or modes to swap between the two. 
The analysis concluded that having a Sense and Avoid System on board the 
collision risk would reduce by a factor of 50% or more. 
7.5.2 Flight Management 
Two aspects of flight management were considered. Adverse weather 
detection/avoidance and routing/fuel management. The preliminary analysis 
concluded that having such functionality on-board would reduce the probability 
of an accident due to those causes to an acceptable level.  
The fuel management scenario was then analysed in detail This concluded by 
noting that including Fuel Management functionality into the architecture and 
having a decision making system that can act according to its predictions of 
estimated fuel at the planned destination, the following advantages could be 
realised: 
 The UAS loss rate due to fuel mismanagement will be reduced, perhaps 
by an order of magnitude. 
 Mission plans and operational doctrine can be more versatile and 
flexible, with more alternatives being available to ensure safe completion 
of the air mission. This advantage may help to convince regulatory and 
operating authorities to allow the UAS into non segregated and routine 
classes of airspace.  
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7.5.3 Take Off and Landing 
In the Take-Off and Landing scenarios, it was noted that that accidents in these 
phases generally occur  because of the limited time to identify and mitigate the 
offending cause. The event timeline of an exemplar real world scenario was 
analysed in detail. This was then compared with an analysis of what an 
automated and an autonomous system architecture, both with remote 
operators, could accomplish. 
This analysis concluded that a remote operator would have considerable 
difficulty is diagnosing the scenario presented. This highlighted a clear 
requirement for a capable Health Management System, fully integrated into the 
decision architecture. The analysis suggested that an automatic system with the 
required functionality and human interaction would very difficult to design but for 
the proposed system, was merely a relatively simple architectural addition. This 
demonstrates the scalability of the proposed architecture. 
The exemplar analysis also showed that autonomous sequencing of the 
appropriate plan (checklist) could be easily achieved by the AIMS architecture 
and at high speed. Compared to an automated system, it would generally keep 
the operator in the loop (potentially in a variety of ways) and help by proposing 
alternative courses of action (plans). Finally, it was noted that the architecture is 
designed specifically around the generation and handling of plans as the 
primary means of communication (unlike an automatic system) and as such is 
inherently capable of presenting alternative courses of action to the human 
operator. 
7.5.4 Lost Link Procedures and Communication Handling 
Many UAS accidents have been caused by lost communications and its 
consequences.  The analysis considered mitigating responses to losing contact 
with the human operator and concluded that fairly sophisticated functionality 
needed to be incorporated into the design to accommodate this. In comparison 
with an automated system, no extra advantage could be found in terms of 
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performance in this situation, assuming that the automatic system had the same 
functionality. However, it was noted that, due to the scalability of the 
architecture, such functionality could be fairly easily incorporated into the design 
whereas for an automatic system, a complex design would be required. 
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8 Conclusions and Future Work 
In Chapter 2, the notion was proposed that having an autonomous system 
controlling an unmanned air vehicle in conjunction with a human operator would 
improve the versatility of employment, safety and performance of that vehicle, 
particularly in comparison with an automatic system. The safety aspect has 
been sufficiently covered in the accident analysis and exemplar scenarios as 
summarised above. In addition, the performance and versatility that the 
autonomous system of the vehicle has been shown to be much improved, 
primarily by the integration and selective partitioning of increased functionality 
within a common architectural framework. 
In developing the decision architecture and undertaking an analysis of its 
features, some common themes emerge and these are now brought together. 
8.1.1 Human Control Integration 
From the outset, it was noted that such an autonomous vehicle would have to 
be capable of operating in conjunction with a human controller and or if he was 
unavailable, at whatever level was appropriate to the situation. Implementation 
of the PACT levels, provided a suitable route to achieving this. In addition, 
improved HMI concepts were proposed to further enhance the operators shared 
understanding.  
In making the comparison with automatic systems, the true nature of how an 
autonomous system can keep an operator in the loop for as long a possible 
emerged, particularly in the Sense and Avoid exemplar. This was quite 
unforeseen, as was the degree to which an automatic system keeps the 
operator out of the loop (although this had long been suspected by HF 
researchers). 
The use of plans also enables a better HMI by proposing alternative courses of 
action which the architecture generates. 
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8.1.2 Scalability, Versatility and Functionality  
The functional partition of the architecture and the common means of 
implementation (planner, manager, controller) provides the required scalability, 
which consequently confers versatility, if required.   
8.1.3 Safety 
The study provided strong evidence of the functionality required for improved 
safety. It also showed how this functionality could be partitioned according to 
the decision space (flight, emergency, health, HMI protocol, etc.). Because of 
the scalability of the architecture any new avenues for improved safety could be 
easily incorporated. 
In addition, a method for identifying deficiencies in shared situation awareness 
was presented in the form of an Abduction Loop. Improved ways of achieving 
higher integrity in critical beliefs (which generate behaviour) was identified by 
using plausibility checking. 
8.2 Recommendations for Further Research 
8.2.1 Trust, Legality and Ethics 
When considering possible negative aspects to the implementation of an 
autonomous control system for a UAS, the subject of investing sufficient trust 
for human devolvement of authority was raised. The USAF Chief Scientist also 
notes that “In the near- to mid-term, developing methods for establishing 
“certifiable trust in autonomous systems” is the single greatest technical barrier 
that must be overcome to obtain the capability advantages that are achievable 
by increasing use of autonomous systems” [56]. This study made no further 
effort to research this topic as it was outside the scope of the Thesis. However, 
it is clear that there is a pressing need for more work on understanding the 
factors required for acceptance of autonomous systems, particularly airborne 
ones, into routine life. The study also noted on similar concerns regarding  
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ethics and legality and whilst some work has been done in these areas, much 
remains to be done. 
8.2.2 Fuzzy Rule Based Approach 
It was noted that moving to a fuzzy rule based approach may deliver a better 
HMI by the use of linguistic variables more familiar to the human operator’s 
situation awareness. It could also prevent rapid swapping of behaviours as 
beliefs change. A move to implementing such a system is recommended as 
further research. 
8.2.3 Agent Programming 
The final implementation of the architecture showed the beneficial impact of 
implementing the authorisations solely by using a plan based structure. This is 
in line with agent programming languages. Unfortunately, all of these currently 
available will be hard to certify for the airborne environment due to the 
languages used (mainly JAVA) and/or because they have developed as a 
research tool at a University. A High Integrity language, such as SPARK ADA, 
would be capable of certification and research is recommended to understand 
the factors that would enable certification of such a programming language or 
library toolbox. 
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Appendix A On the Definition of Autonomy and Automation 
A.1 The Definition of Autonomy 
The word “Autonomous” is derived from the Greek autonomos : auto-, auto- + 
nomos, law. 
An internet search on the definition of Autonomy rendered the following: 
A person’s ability to make independent choices. 
www.alz.org/Resources/Glossary.asp  
An autonomous being is one that has the power of self-direction, possessing 
the ability to act as it decides, independent of the will of others and of other 
internal or external factors. 
www.filosofia.net/materiales/rec/glosaen.htm  
Freedom from all external constraints. Independence consisting of self-
determination. 
www.carm.org/atheism/terms.htm  
Independence, self-government 
www.imuna.org/c2c/app_a.html  
The amount of control an individual has over his or her working life. Autonomy 
can relate to performance goals (the outputs of a role) and performance 
methodologies (the way in which goals are achieved). Increased autonomy is 
normally associated with higher levels of job satisfaction. However, too much 
autonomy can involve a high level of role ambiguity and role uncertainty which 
can be potent sources of stress for many individuals. 
www.oup.com/uk/booksites/content/0199253978/student/glossary/glossary.htm  
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The ethical principle that independent actions and choices of an individual 
should not be constrained by others. 
www.setnlegalservices.org/glossary.htm  
Government agencies will be more effective when they have higher levels off 
autonomy in relation to external stakeholders, but not extremely high levels of 
autonomy ·Autonomy to manage its mission and tasks tends to enhance an 
agency's performance of the mission and tasks ·Autonomy does not mean 
leaving out stakeholders 
fs.huntingdon.edu/jlewis/Syl/PA/306StillmanStudOuts.htm  
An aspect of the responsiveness of health systems whereby one enjoys the 
freedom to decide for oneself on alternative treatment, testing and care options, 
including the decision to refuse treatment, if of sound mind. 
www.emro.who.int/mei/mep/Healthsystemsglossary.htm  
The quality or state of being self-governing; especially the right of self-
government. 
www.historyteacher.net/EuroProjects/DBQ1998-1999/glossary24-99.htm  
A term that refers to the independence of the moral or ethical agent in decision-
making. 
www.texascollaborative.org/Urban_Module/glossary.htm  
Immunity from arbitrary exercise of authority: political independence  
Personal independence  
wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn  
Ability to operate on one’s own. (See AUTONOMY) (MP) 
www.biol.tsukuba.ac.jp/~macer/biodict.htm  
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Separate, independent. 
www.anbg.gov.au/glossary/webpubl/lichglos.htm  
Functioning independently of other components or systems; self-governing or 
self-controlling; possessing virtually complete closure in normal operation. 
www.islandone.org/MMSG/aasm/AASMGlossary.html  
Refers to an economic variable, magnitude, or entity that is caused 
independently of other variables that it may in turn influence; exogenous. 
www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/a.html  
Describes a self-contained system that carries out programs or performs tasks 
without outside control by acquiring, processing and acting on environmental 
information. 
www.rcmicroflight.com/library/glossary.asp  
Independent; self-contained. 
www.mariner.org/chesapeakebay/native/vocab.html  
(of political bodies) not controlled by outside forces; "an autonomous judiciary"; 
"a sovereign state"  
existing as an independent entity; "the partitioning of India created two separate 
and autonomous jute economies"  
(of persons) free from external control and constraint in e.g. action and 
judgment  
wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn 
From the above certain nouns are repeated several times such as: independent 
[12], operate/action/decide/control [14], self [10], so we could conclude that 
controlling oneself independently is a fairly good starting point for defining 
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autonomy.  If there is such variety in the definition of autonomy, it comes as no 
surprise that there is even more so when considering the definition of 
autonomous agent. However, it would be reasonable to argue that an 
autonomous agent is an agent that controls itself independently.  
Throughout the vast library of documentation on agency, there are a few 
recurring themes and it is worth elucidating these as a basic framework or 
blueprint for what constitutes an agent.  This blueprint draws particularly on the 
work of Nwana [57] and, Graesser and Franklin [58].  
The basic concept of an agent, and nearly all, if not all, the definitions of agency 
require the agent to be situated.  That is, it must exist in an environment and be 
de facto a part of that environment. Thus we can argue that it controls itself 
within an environment. Clearly, it must do something in that environment and 
this requires it to sense and act. It is obviously no use doing just anything, so 
the actions it performs must be in furtherance of some agenda or objective(s).  
This agenda could change over time or because of some other influence in the 
agent or the environment. So a basic list of properties is: 
• To exist and be in, and part of, an environment 
• To sense objects or attributes of or within that environment 
• To independently act in order to influence or change that environment 
and/or its objects in accordance with an agenda. 
So, if these properties are accepted we can now re-define our notion of an 
autonomous system as: 
An autonomous system is one that operates within an environment and is 
capable of independent decision and action in pursuit of its objectives. 
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The UK MoD have definitions for autonomy and automation and these are 
reproduced below: 
The MoD’s definition, from JDN 3/10 [6], is: 
‘An autonomous system is capable of understanding higher level intent 
and direction. From this understanding and its perception of its 
environment, such a system is able to take appropriate action to bring 
about a desired state. It is capable of deciding a course of action, from a 
number of alternatives, without depending on human oversight and 
control, although these may still be present. Although the overall activity 
of an autonomous unmanned aircraft will be predictable, individual 
actions may not be.’ 
A.2 On the Definition of Automatic 
Automation or an automatic machine is generally defined slightly differently 
although some views are uncomfortably close to those for autonomy. Automatic 
comes from the Greek automatos : auto-, auto- + -matos, willing. The Free 
Dictionary124 gives three views: 
operating with minimal human intervention; independent of external 
control – this is quite similar to that for autonomy but without requiring 
associated decisions or objectives. 
like the unthinking functioning of a machine; "an automatic `thank you'" – 
this view is at the heart of the meaning of automatic; a machine that does not 
“think”, but just does when instructed. 
                                            
124
 The Free Dictionary by Farley. Accessible at http://www.thefreedictionary.com. 
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without volition or conscious control; reflexive – again this view implies a 
lack of connection between action and reason. 
This is the MoD’s JDN 3/10’s definition for an automated system:- 
‘In the unmanned aircraft context, an automated or automatic system is 
one that, in response to inputs from one or more sensors, is programmed 
to logically follow a pre-defined set of rules in order to provide an 
outcome. Knowing the set of rules under which it is operating means that 
its output is predictable.’ 
In summary, if we consider autonomous and automatic modes of operation, 
especially where a human controller is involved we can consider the following 
differentiators: 
• Automatic Systems are pre-programmed in their actions - the 
operator invokes a control mode, the machine follows the control 
mode program until it is instructed to do something else or finishes 
• Autonomous Systems have choice in their actions - the operator 
invokes an authority to make a decision, the machine invokes the 
control mode it has decided upon 
The above encapsulate the views of an automatic machine as being something 
that does not think, does not decide, nor acts according to an agenda, whereas 
an autonomous system should be capable of at least one of these, and 
preferably, all three. It also re-forces the view that autonomous machines 
should be authorised to make decisions. This may mean real time, operator-in-
the-loop control authority, or pre-authorised control, perhaps even hard-coded 
at the design and implementation stage.  
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Appendix B Theories of Decision Making 
B.1 Classical Decision Theory 
Classical decision theory, variously known as Utility Theory or Rational Decision 
Theory, is based on the concept that a decision maker will choose the course of 
action, from a set of two or more alternatives that maximises the expected 
utility. Expected utility is a function it is based on a combination of pay-off, the 
likelihood of occurrence and the risk attitude of the decision maker. Keeney and 
Raiffa [59] identify classical (and simple) decision analysis as a 5-step problem: 
1. Pre-analysis.  Identification of the problem and the viable action 
alternatives. 
2. Structural Analysis. Information gathering on the choices available 
and the appropriate structuring of these into, say, a decision tree.  
This results in identification of decision nodes (under the control of 
the DM), and chance nodes (under the control of external influences).  
3. Uncertainty Analysis.  The assignment of probabilities to the 
branches emanating from the chance nodes.  This may be by 
subjective assessment, past empirical data, expert testimony etc. 
4. Utility or Value Analysis. Utility values are assigned to 
consequences associated with paths through the tree. Each path will 
have a consequence. These are ranked in preference by the DM. By 
combining each preference with its associated probability, a 
statement of expected utility for each course of action is determined. 
5. Optimisation Analysis. The analysis is completed when the DM 
calculates the optimum path through the decision tree.  This 
sequence of preferred actions is the one that maximises the expected 
utility.  In terms of decision theory, it is his optimum strategy. 
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B.2 Naturalistic Decision Making 
Newer models of decision making try to capture aspects of human decision 
making such as: creativity, adaptability, impulsiveness, confidence etc. some of 
these ingredients as well as overcoming some of the shortfalls of Utility Theory. 
These models which try to solve real world problems involving human decision 
processes are often referred to as naturalistic.  
Naturalistic models reflect the fact that in the real world, data is incomplete, 
problems are ill-structured, goals are shifting, ill-defined, or competing, a 
multitude of interdependent decisions are required, time stress is often intense; 
stakes are typically high and multiple players are involved [60].  The research 
into naturalistic decision models has shown that in the above circumstances, 
the decision maker falls back on using his experience and the available data, to 
build a mental model of the environment. Projection of this model into the future 
on a ‘what-if’ basis and subsequent evaluation in terms of immediate objectives 
form the basis for the decision for a course of action. In addition, the best 
course is not always chosen.  Frequently, decision makers have been shown to 
accept the first satisfactory course of action to be considered; a process known 
as satisficing.     
All this indicates that the first main objective for a decision maker is the 
achievement of the correct mental model of the relevant world; a state which 
has come to be known as Situation Awareness (SA).  The next step is to project 
that into the future and predict outcomes given possible actions and re-actions.   
B.3 Situation Awareness 
There is no single unified view or theory of SA.  One of the most quoted 
definitions comes from Endsley [61] who suggested: “the perception of 
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
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comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near 
future”.  This definition can be considered to encompass three levels of SA, viz.: 
• Level 1 SA:  The identification of key elements, events or facts. 
Endsley uses the word, perception, which implies a belief in the in the 
mind of an observer. Therefore, each fact or element can be ascribed 
an underlying level of  truth or uncertainty. 
• Level 2 SA: The generation of appropriate explanation(s) for the 
existence of the above elements. Endsley describes this as 
comprehension. Using a simple metaphor of cause and effect , this 
can also be seen as hypothesising about the cause of the above 
effects.  As such, each hypothesis will also have an associated level 
of belief or uncertainty.  
• Level 3 SA: The prediction of future events and situations based on 
the perception of the current situation.  Projection of current beliefs or 
prediction of the future based on beliefs of the present can also be 
ascribed levels of uncertainty, this time based on conditional 
probabilities; i.e. given a belief of Condition A, what is the probability 
of Condition B occurring or Bel (B|A). 
If we take Endsley’s view, the process is one of Perception, Comprehension 
and Projection or tuple (Pr, C, Po). 
There are two major and influential models describing naturalistic decision 
making.  They both relate to dynamic environments where the knowledge is 
incomplete and the decision maker is very experienced.  
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B.4 Recognition Primed Decision Making 
This concept was produced by Gary Klein in 1987 [62]. He characterises 
Recognition-Primed Decision Making (RPDM) as the fusion of two processes: 
situation assessment and mental simulation. People use situation assessment 
to generate a plausible course of action and mental simulation to evaluate that 
course of action. Courses of action are evaluated relative to their applicability in 
a given situation, rather than to their preferability with respect to other possible 
courses of action. That is, the first satisfactory course of action is selected, 
rather than the “best” course of action. Such a process is known as satisficing.   
In other words, the major effort of the decision maker is focused on achieving 
good SA; by weighing the evidence, seeking new facts and forming a mental 
model of the situation.  Once this achieved to a satisfactory level, the decision 
maker draws on his experience to select the appropriate course of action.  The 
model also explains the notion of ‘jumping to conclusions’ where action is 
initiated without achieving satisfactory SA.   
In utility theory, high quality SA is assumed at Stage 1. RPDM can be 
considered as a complementary precursor to the decision theoretic approach 
Therefore it may well prove to be that that RPDM, combined subsequently with 
utility theory, if time is available, is a more complete basis for decision making, 
particularly machine based decision making. 
B.5 The Observation – Orientation – Decision – Action  Cycle 
The concept of the OODA Cycle was first introduced by John R.Boyd [63]. He 
was top rate fighter pilot in the Korean War, a military historian, an important 
influence on U.S. (particularly the Marine Corps) military doctrine and, if he had 
ever formally published his work, he would have been a distinguished 
APPENDIX B: THEORIES OF DECISION MAKING 
 
 
      
Page No - 219 - 
 
academic. The cycle provides a simple, though impressively complete, model of 
the process of decision-making.  
The cycle has since been used as the basis for the analysis of air combat 
effectiveness by Bartolamasi [19] where it is alternatively referred to as the 
‘Information – Decision – Action (IDA)’ cycle. 
In recent years, poignantly almost immediately after Boyd’s death in 1997, the 
OODA cycle has also been applied to business decision making.  In fact, the 
cycle applies to any system in a dynamic environment, capable of some form of 
situational cognition, selecting and deciding on an appropriate response and 
implementing the chosen course of action. 
An original Boyd version of the OODA cycle is shown, in its final incarnation 
dated 1996, in Figure 6, below: 
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The OODA “Loop” 
Sketch
Observation DecisionOrientation Action
Note how orientation shapes observation, shapes decision, shapes action, and, in turn is
shaped by the feedback and other phenomena coming into our sensing and observation
window.
Also note how the entire “loop” (not just orientation) is an on-going many-sided implicit
cross-referencing process of projection, empathy, correlation and rejection.
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Figure 55: Boyd’s OODA Cycle 
Information is collected and collated. Orientation then takes place, which results 
in the information being placed into a context. This context provides the 
decision maker with a mental model of the current situation which can be 
assessed with relation to his objectives and his current plan. At some point, the 
decision maker (DM) will be faced with the choice of selecting a suitable course 
of action from two or more alternatives. 
Measures of overall effectiveness can be ascribed to the scope of an individual 
cycle, and the speed with which it is conducted.  These are collectively known 
as the Tempo of Operation.  Boyd suggests that the objective of a competitor is 
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to conduct operations at a tempo greater than his opponents and is a necessary 
condition for winning.  
During earlier work on the performance of an intelligent agent [17], it was shown 
that operating the agent at significantly higher decision rates brought about a 
corresponding increase in performance. Whilst no claim was made for the proof 
of Boyd’s theory, the findings represent  strong evidence for this.
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Appendix C Example System Architectures 
C.1 Example System Architectures 
The following provides examples of architectures that can be considered as 
contributing to, or as candidates, for the proposed UAS decision architecture. In 
each case a description of the architecture is given together with an 
assessment of their suitability. 
C.2 Example Control Architectures 
C.2.1 4D-RCS [64] 
Description 
The 4D Real-time Control System (RCS) architecture was designed for 
sensory-interactive robotics where the emphasis was on combining commands 
with sensory feedback so as to compute the proper response to every 
combination of goals and states. It has evolved from RCS-1 (mid 1970s), where 
the application was to control a robot arm, through RCS-2 (used for 
manufacturing control), to RCS-3, where the application was an autonomous 
undersea vehicle. 4D-RCS has been used for the control of Experimental 
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (XUVs) and were demonstrated in a series of field 
tests in 2002/3 [65]. The prefix “4D”, refers to the application of Dickmanns’ 4D 
approach to human vision [66] within the RCS control architecture. 
RCS purports to be a cognitive architecture and models the brain as a hierarchy 
of goal-directed sensory-interactive intelligent control processes. As it is a 
reference architecture, these processes are not defined or specified and may be 
implemented in a variety of means such as neural nets, finite state automata or 
production rules [67]. 
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The RCS architecture consists of a hierarchy of nodes, where each node 
represents and operational unit at different levels of granularity. Each node 
contains four processing units: Behaviour Generation(BG), World 
Modelling(WM), Sensory Processing(SP) and Value Judgement(VJ).  
A schematic of an RCS node is shown below: 
 
Figure 56: A 4D-RCS Node 
The Behaviour Generator (BG) is the deliberative or planner process and 
consists of a planner and a set of executors. Higher level tasks are 
decomposed and sub-tasks are generated. These are cascaded down through 
the system until primitive tasks are generated and applied to servos. Thus 
planning and execution are tightly knit. VJ is applied in two ways: firstly to 
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sensory processing to determine value and confidence, and secondly to plans 
to determine the expected results of tentative plans. The WM maintains the KD 
at the appropriate level that is the best estimate of the external world. The 
hierarchy of WM processes in the architecture represent the overall system KD. 
Knowledge data is therefore accessible by design throughout the node 
hierarchy. The operator interface covers each level in the hierarchy. 
A specific feature of this system is that, because of the nature of the hierarchy 
of nodes and the fact that similar processes exist at each level in the hierarchy, 
though at different granularities, each level corresponds to a different 
time/distance window. At the highest level, plans may be for a 24 hour window 
for, say, 5000sq km maps, whilst at the lowest level, plans for servo actuation 
may exist for only 20 milli-seconds or correspond to a single pixel. Again at the 
highest level, the task is defined by the top level mission goal. At successively 
lower levels, the task is further decomposed into sub-tasks and finally, at the 
lowest levels sub-tasks correspond to primitive actions for the controls, servos 
and actuators to respond to. 
The basic model that runs whilst the planning period is open is as follows: 
1. The BG planner hypothesizes a tentative plan, 
2. The WM predicts the probable result of this plan 
3. The VJ evaluates the probable outcome value 
4. The plan selector within the BG planner checks to see if this result is 
greater than the previous probable outcome value of the plan that is 
already in the current best plan buffer, and, 
5. If it is, then the tentative plan replaces the current best plan in the plan 
buffer. If it is not, the program continues to the next cycle. 
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6. At the beginning of the next cycle, the contents of the plan buffer is 
moved into the executor plan buffer and 
7. Re-planning commences. 
The above occurs at every level in the RCS hierarchy within the 
spatial/temporal horizon of that level.  Because the plan and executor buffers 
are separate, the planning sequence can operate asynchronously (i.e. slower) 
than the execution process.  This is claimed to provide not only deliberative and 
reactive processes, but also a pre-emptive process. Furthermore, it also allows 
for these processes to be distributed throughout the hierarchy.  
The authors claim that the architecture addresses the three key issues which 
theoreticians [68], [69], [70] have proposed as major obstacles to meaningful 
machine intelligence: 
• Abductive Inference – the ability to reason from consequent to 
antecedent. This is (allegedly) enabled by the top-down structure of 
the hierarchy driven by mission goals, and the in-built process of 
assessing consequences (or outcome values) prior to committing to a 
plan.  
• Symbol Grounding – the establishment of a direct correspondence 
between internal symbolic data and external real world entities, 
events and relationships. This is apparently achieved (by analysis of 
RCS schematics, not by authors claims) by classification of sensor 
inputs, generation of confidence levels/values and prediction of next 
sensory inputs. In short, the establishment of coherent Situational 
Assessment in the accepted form of Endsley (see Appendix B). 
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• The Frame Problem - the problem of predicting what in the world 
changes as a result of action and what stays the same. The view is 
that this in itself is caused by modelling the world entirely by logical 
propositions. Humans (and other animals) of course do not do this 
and the RCS authors claim that their architecture, in its support for 
image analysis and models of human vision, do not also. 
Suitability 
RCS is an interesting architecture and apparently highly suitable for the control 
of  a UAS for several reasons: 
• It has been designed from the outset as a real time control system and 
has been used to develop the autonomous control system for an All 
Terrain Vehicle and an autonomous crane, the NIST RoboCrane [71]. 
These have both been successfully demonstrated. 
 BG clearly contains the TLA elements of Planning, Sequencing and 
Control and these are augmented with information processing, SP and 
WM.  
 At a higher level of abstraction, RCS is a methodology for designing a 
control system as well as a reference architecture. As such, it does not 
specify functionality or partitioning, software implementation or even 
make statements about what environments it is suitable for. It does not 
therefore specifically exclude or inherently rule out operation in airborne 
environments. 
 RCS does implement certain standards, defines roles and responsibilities 
for its control levels and applies sound hierarchical and control principles. 
At a lower level it provides engineering guidelines for building and testing 
intelligent vehicle systems. It is therefore much more than an academic 
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exercise for the research of autonomous systems and clearly much 
thought has gone into its use for engineered products. 
However, there are some negative aspects: 
 Although the elements of a TLA are present, the way in which these 
elements is combined in terms of process are not wholly in keeping with 
the principles underlying a TLA. In fact, RCS is not a layered architecture 
in that sense but something quite the opposite. In RCS, each node 
contains the three layers and it is the nodes themselves that are layered 
at different levels of granularity (time, distance and image). In theory at 
least, even a servo operating at 50 Hz can have a deliberative planning 
layer and world modelling, which would normally be considered quite 
ridiculous. Such a system is fundamentally different from the precepts of 
the TLA. However, that is not to say it is unsuitable. 
 There is no reference to the ability to make decisions in different ways. 
The fundamental reasoning system in RCS is deliberative and whilst it 
should be simple to closely couple the SP to the control executors by 
bypassing the WM and deliberative processes, it should be noticed that 
the scheduling, as described by the model design and node schematic 
above, is driven by the output of the planner. In short, the architecture is 
set up for involving planning at all stages. Having said that, the inclusion 
of a reactive process should be a simple affair. However, given that the 
architecture is designed specifically for intelligent control, it would have 
been preferable to see alternative decision processes, such as those 
outlined in Figure 8, to be far more explicitly embedded in the 
architecture. 
 RCS is available as a class of libraries in C/C++, JAVA and ADA. There 
may be aspects of certification which could preclude the use of these 
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libraries within a UAS.  
C.2.2 Coupled Layer Architecture for Robotic Autonomy (CLARAty) 
Description [72] 
CLARA is an architecture developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) for 
developing robots to be deployed on planetary missions but can be applied to 
almost any vehicle. It has been developed in response to the following 
perceived needs: 
• To achieve acceptance from a wide community, but primarily from the 
robotics and autonomy communities. 
• To bridge the gaps between user, developers and academia operating to 
implement a diverse range of solutions to achieve differing types of 
problems. 
• To leverage existing software in research and NASA flight efforts. 
• To leverage standard practices in industry to avoid continued re-
invention of the wheel and enable NASA robotics efforts to adopt 
techniques and solutions commonly used in commercial products. 
The developers of CLARA are critical of the standard TLA, the layers of which 
they describe as “Functional, Executive and Planner” and which they perceive 
as increasing in intelligence from reflexive, to procedural, to deliberative. 
Specifically, the following criticisms are made: 
• Since the limits of each layer are not strictly defined, they note that 
researchers tend to expand the capabilities and dominance of the 
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layers in which they particularly interested. This, they feel, results in 
systems which are unbalanced. They also note that there is still 
considerable research which blurs the line between the Planner and 
Executive and which questions the hierarchical superiority of one over 
the other.  
• They feel that there is a lack of access from the Planner to the 
Functional level and that often means that two separate world 
models, which may not be consistent, are used. 
• They are critical that researchers tend to associate the concept of 
increasing intelligence with that of increasing granularity in time and 
scope (such as that at the heart of RCS). This they feel, tends to 
obscure the hierarchy that can exist within each of the system levels. 
To correct these perceived deficiencies; they have engineered a two-tiered 
architecture where the Planner and Executive are closely coupled, and have a 
common database, to form a single tier. These two layers are called the 
Decision Layer and the Functional Layer. Maximum use of object oriented 
approaches are made, particularly in the functional layer, and this is used to 
drive the concept of granularity, both in time and function, as a third dimension 
to the two layer hierarchy. Objectives are received and de-composed into sub-
goals which are expressed as constraints. From these constraints, tasks are 
derived125 which are sequenced into commands. These commands are passed 
to the functional layer for execution. Within the sequencer there is strong 
emphasis on resource management for prioritisation of activities. Clearly there 
                                            
125
 Example: An objective would be to “make the joint angle not less than 20 degrees and not 
greater than 30 degrees. For goals, a similar example may be to make the joint angle 22 
degrees, given the above constraints. 
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is no point in scheduling activities for which there is little or no resource 
availability. 
In practical terms, CLARA merges the planning and sequencing layers (or blurs 
the boundary between them, depending on your viewpoint); the functional layer 
is fairly consistent with the conventional TLA control layer. 
Suitability 
Some of the aims of the CLARA project are laudable; in particular, in trying that 
of trying to bridge the gap between users, engineers and academia; in some 
ways they have been successful. CLARA has been used to build highly 
autonomous “planet explorers” yet clearly has a strong theoretical underpinning.  
The main reason for merging the two top layers appears to have been driven by 
the planners need for ready access to functional resource information, (which 
would normally go via the executive). In the case of a small robot, with limited 
power and thousands of miles from Earth, this is clearly an important 
consideration. This is unlikely to be true for a UAS, particularly a large one.  
However, on inspection of the documentation, it cannot be denied that the 
designers have really not produced anything startling or innovative. In fact, they 
have criticised robotic theorists for having uneven balances between the 
planning and executive layers and thus merged the two. They then go on to 
state that CLARA has considerable flexibility by having, at one end of the 
spectrum, a capable decision layer but basic functional level and at the other 
end, the opposite situation – i.e. a similar imbalance at the functional and 
(combined) decision layer. In addition, they freely admit that there is a fuzzy 
partition in the decision layer where the planner is dominant and the executive 
is dominant. Again an area which they themselves criticise others 
APPENDIX C: EXAMPLE ARCHITECTURES 
 
 
      
Page No - 231 - 
 
The documentation, which is considerable but lacks detail and is readily 
obfuscating, in the CLARA project would require that a trial implementation 
would have to be built to substantiate (or otherwise) the designers claims. 
Unfortunately, although early software libraries (written in C++) are available to 
preferred US or Class B countries outside the JPL, the later versions are not. 
C.2.3 Integration of Reactive behaviour and Rational Planning(InteRRaP) Architecture  
Description [73] 
Interrap, as its name implies, was designed from the outset as a hybrid agent 
architecture, combining fast reactive behaviour with slower deliberative plan 
based behaviour. In addition, it was developed for co-operative behaviour 
between multiple agents. It is somewhat older than other architectures 
presented here having been developed circa 1993 and therefore somewhat 
before the development of the TLA with which it shares many common features. 
A schematic of the Interrap agent model is shown below. 
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Figure 57: The InteRRaP Agent Model 
Interrap is a layered architecture with each successive layer representing a 
higher level of abstraction. However, interestingly, there is also a division of 
these layers into those relating to knowledge and control. The lowest layer, the 
one which relates to the environment, comprises the world interface to the 
agent which contains functionality for acting, communicating and perceiving.  
Acting relates to that part of the agent which physically interacts with the 
environment. Communication consists of ingoing and outgoing messages, and 
Perceiving covers sensing and information processing. The knowledge portion 
of this layer is the world model.  
Above the world interface layer is the behaviour based component which 
implements and controls the reactive behaviour of the agent which is defined by 
the Patterns of Behaviour (PoB) database in the knowledge hierarchy. This 
database is two dimensional and the position of a PoB determines its priority. A 
PoB represents procedural knowledge i.e. mechanisms which are not 
represented in a declarative manner but which describe procedures to be 
followed. These are obviously pre-compiled and are there to activate routine 
behaviours which do not require deep reflection of complex planning126. Each 
PoB has an activation pre-condition, success/failure metrics, a post condition 
and an executable body that defines the actions to be performed. These actions 
may be low level primitives, other PoBs or calls for higher level planning.  
Above the behaviour based components is the plan based component 
consisting of a planner and a plan library. However, in planning, the planner will 
always check to see if a PoB exists which will satisfy its goals, or part of them, 
and if there is it will use it. 
                                            
126
 Such as opening a door, starting the car engine, putting a hat on etc. 
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At the highest level is the co-operation based component which can generate 
joint plans that satisfy the goals of a number of co-operating agents. 
Control is both data and goal driven. Perceptual input from the sensors will 
result in changes in the world model which will in turn trigger PoBs. The 
triggering of these PoBs may require the planner to be asked to develop new 
plans to achieve the goals of the agent. These again will result in primitives and 
messages at the world interface. 
Suitability 
Interrap, for all its age (which in the field of robotic architectures is equivalent to 
being pre-historic) was clearly well ahead of its time in its thinking and design.  
It should easily be adapted to incorporate lessons learned from the 
development of the TLA. 
It is particularly relevant to a UAS application for many reasons: 
 It is highly likely that a UAS would have fairly substantial sensors and 
processing in order for it to achieve complex tasks. This corresponds to 
the world interface, which for a UAS, would be the flight control and 
communication system normally called (by UAS designers) the sensor 
and effector suite of the system. The world model can regarded as an 
information processing system which models the state and status of all 
external and internal objects. 
 Our decision system, ideally, would have multiple decision processes. 
These are supported, in principle at least, by Interrap. 
 It is, explicitly, a control architecture by design but also implements 
planning and re-active components. 
 Control in the air domain is extremely procedural.  Many aspects of 
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control are repetitive and common. The concept of PoBs127 in Interrap 
which specify routine behaviour would be highly beneficial to adopt. 
 The concept of achieving mission success naturally leads to a goal 
driven approach. The re-action to uncertain events occurring in the world 
(internal and external) is also a fundamental requirement. Interrap can 
intrinsically handle both. 
C.3 Other Robotic Architectures 
There are many other robotic architectures, some of which are worthy of greater 
interest and inspection. These are mentioned here but may be researched in 
greater detail in follow-on studies. Some examples are:  
C.3.1 JAUS128 
The Joint Architecture for Autonomous Systems has a primary, and some would 
say overriding, aim of providing a standardised architecture across all 
autonomous platforms for reasons of interoperability. In that sense the 
designers share a similar desire to those of CLARAty. The main feature of 
JAUS is the standardised message passing interface independent of functional 
design and hardware. It is not known how mature or developed the architecture 
is but a small search has failed to reveal whether any design team has actually 
used it. 
                                            
127
 The concept and design of the PoB structure could be improved and made more 
sophisticated. The pre-condition as it stands is essentially a rule based trigger. It could be 
modified to be the entry conditions for a case based system which will search though the case 
base and return the PoB with the best goodness of fit. 
128
 Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems home page is at http://www.jauswg.org/  
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C.3.2 Player129 
Player is a not an architecture in the accepted sense but a device server, widely 
used in the robotic community, based on the TCP socket client/server model. It 
is therefore software language independent. 
C.3.3 OSCAR130 
OSCAR (Operational Software Components for Advanced Robotics) is an 
object orientated framework for the development of robotic control programs. It 
is similar to CLARAty in its use of object oriented decomposition but much less 
of an overall architecture. 
C.4 Example Agent Architectures 
C.4.1 Jack  
Description [74] 
JACK is commercial agent programming language and development 
environment that exists as a superset of the JAVA programming language. It 
follows the same principles as Object Orientated programming in that, by 
encapsulating desired behaviours in standardised modular classes, reliable, 
lower cost and scalable development can be more easily realised. Using an 
agent based approach extends that encapsulation. The agents in JACK follow 
the theoretical Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) model of Georgeff and Rao75. This 
model describes deliberative behaviour though the agents acting according to 
its desires (goals or objectives), which force the generation or instantiation of 
                                            
129
 “Overview of Player, Stage and Gazebo”: Robotics Research Laboratory, Center for 
Robotics and Embedded Systems (CRES, University of Southern California available at 
http://robotics.usc.edu/?l=Projects:PlayerStageGazebo 
130
 “OSCAR Overview”, Robotics Research Group, University of Texas, Austin, USA  
available at http://www.robotics.utexas.edu/rrg/research/oscarv.2/.   
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suitable intentions (plans) according to what beliefs (world model) it has about 
its environment. In addition, JACK agents can also act in response to events 
and therefore exhibit reactive behaviour.  
Suitability 
A fundamental problem with JACK is the JAVA basis. Although JACK has been 
used as the autonomous controller for a tactical UAS, the Avatar UAS built by 
Condorra Ltd., this vehicle is a small (5 ft. wingspan), lightweight (7.7lbs) UAS 
and was demonstrated on a test range131 in Australia in 2005. In that 
demonstration, JACK was run on a HP Ipaq PDA and provided the control 
advice to the vehicle system.  
However, at the moment, JAVA is considered unsuitable for airborne systems 
operating under CAA rules in UK airspace and would be unlikely to gain full 
certification132 for any autonomous control actions specified by a JAVA based 
system, particularly those involving safety at any level. This is unfortunate 
because in many ways JACK fulfils most of the requirements. In particular, 
JACK’s capacity to specify plans in a scalar and modular manner, would be 
highly advantageous compared to other ways of writing software based plans. 
This latter point is discussed further in Appendix E and, whilst not fully pertinent 
to this thesis, a Mixed Language Architecture is proposed for study elsewhere. 
                                            
131
 The certification requirements for operation on a test range under carefully controlled 
conditions are simple in comparison to that required for unrestricted operation in UK airspace 
(which is quite crowded when compared to Australia). 
132
 As advised by Andrew Miller, Senior Certification Engineer and Tony Hopwood, Group 
Leader, System Safety Software Group, BAE SYSTEMS, Warton. 
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C.4.2 The JAM Architecture133 
Description 
JAM is an intelligent agent architecture developed in academic research by Dr 
Marcus J Huber. Like JACK it is JAVA based and based on the Belief-Desire-
Intention (BDI) paradigm. Every JAM agent is composed of five primary 
components: a world model, a plan library, an interpreter, an intention structure 
and an observer.  This is depicted in the figure below:  
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Figure 58: The Jam Architecture 
The observer is a procedure external to the interpreter’s main body which is 
primarily used to update the world model.  Changes to the world model, or 
                                            
133
 Marcus.J.Huber. Extracts reproduced, with permission, from the “JAM User Manual” 
available at http://members.home.net/marcush/IRS/Jam/Jam-man.html 
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posting of new goals, triggers reasoning in the JAM interpreter to search for 
plans that may be applied to the current situation.  This is done by filtering out 
plans that do not have acceptable pre-conditions or context fields.  Once the 
Applicable Plan List (APL) has been assembled, the interpreter selects the plan 
with the highest utility and intends it to the goal (i.e. commits itself to execute 
the plan) by placing it in the intention structure.  If the intended goal has the 
highest utility among all goals with intentions, then that plan is executed.  
However, if a previous intention has a higher utility then that plan is executed 
instead.  As the utilities and contexts of the various goals and plans change, the 
agent will switch between goals in order to pursue the highest priority goal.  
The JAM agent consists of a text file specifying the plans, an initial world model, 
initial top level goals and an Observer procedure.  JAM low level functionality is 
extended by writing appropriate primitive functions in Java. When a JAM agent 
has completed all its goals, it stops. 
Suitability 
JAM has the same JAVA limitation that JACK has. However, unlike JACK, it is 
non-commercial and support for it from the originator has now ceased. It has 
been used in previous work [17] and suffers from several limitations.  These 
are: 
• Speed – the JAM interpreter is very slow. Tests, undertaken in 
previous work, show that compared, to a reactive mechanism, the 
JAM interpreter runs 30x slower and this was with a simple plan 
structure (no more than 5 concurrent plans). 
• There is no reactive mechanism built in to the interpreter.  
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• The interpreter’s interface with other parts of the system is (solely) by 
passing strings. 
• The value model associated with plan assessment routine is a simple 
scalar model. 
• It operates with a fixed and pre-defined plan set. 
However, in terms of its ability to select appropriate plans, choose the best one 
and implement it, it would suffice but at a performance level well below that 
which is required. 
C.5  Example Avionic Architectures 
C.5.1 Eurofighter Typhoon Avionic System 
In Para 3.2.7.1, the nature of the Eurofighter avionic system architecture was 
commented on. It is useful to examine this as an example the avionic 
architecture somewhat further and see if there any parallels with those from 
other areas such as robotics.  In addition, it is an example of a complex multi-
functional system which has been designed, implemented and certified. 
The Eurofighter avionic system functional partition is composed of seven major 
sub-systems: 
• Attack and Identification  
• Navigation    
• Communications 
• Integrated Monitoring and Recording System 
• Displays and Controls 
• Armament 
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• Defensive Aids 
The software in these sub-system partitions is written to a minimum of SIL 3 
standard and is distributed among several computing centres which 
communicate via 1553B and other databuses. The layout of the Typhoon 
avionic system is shown below: 
1 Objektum Ltd. 2006
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Figure 59: Schematic of the Eurofighter Typhoon Avionic System (AVS) 
C.5.2 The J-UCAS Architecture and Common Operating System [76] 
Description 
The Joint Unmanned Air Combat System (J-UCAS) project started in October 
2003 and was a joint programme between the US Defence Applied Research 
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and Procurement Agency (DARPA), the US Air Force and US Navy. It required 
the development of a family of UCAVs to demonstrate concept feasibility and 
operational assessment.  
The programme specifically focused on achieving the following:  
• Operator to Vehicle ratios significantly better than 1:1. 
• Operation in challenging and dangerous environments 
• Mission planning times reduced from days for single ship, to hours for 
multi ship operation. 
• Improved communication management 
• Multi ship co-operative targeting and attack compared to non-co-
operative single ship reconnaissance missions. 
The family of development vehicles was designed to use a common core 
system, known as the Common Operating System (COS), which was 
intended to form the basis of a standardised autonomous system. The COS 
represented the architecture, algorithms and software to: 
• Control and manage system resources 
• Facilitate information exchange 
• Provide battle space awareness 
• Enable inter-platform functionality 
• Enable autonomous operation 
• Maintain quality of service 
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The J-UCAS notional decision architecture is described at Reference [77] and 
represented in the schematic below: 
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Figure 60: J-UCAS Notional Decision Architecture 
Again the elements of Execution, Planning and, in particular, a strong emphasis 
on Information Processing are to be seen. Note that is only a decision 
architecture and the control element, though implicit for plan execution is not 
shown. 
The Common Operating System is also described at Reference [76] and 
provides the autonomous system ‘intelligence’ for the overall J-UCAS. The 
Common Operating Systems (COS) enables interoperability among multiple air 
vehicles and control stations, facilitating the integration of other system 
components such as sensors, weapons, and communications. The COS 
encompasses the software architecture, algorithms, applications and services 
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that provide command and control, communications management, mission 
planning, much of the interactive autonomy, the human systems interface and 
the many other qualities associated with the J-UCAS system [76].  
The COS provides the central autonomous core to the rest of the platform as 
described below: 
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Figure 61: COS Interfaces within the J-UCAS Platform 
Compliance and Suitability 
The notional architecture closely follows the TLA but includes an extra layer for 
information distribution and management. Planning appears to be confined to 
routing and contingencies, but could easily be modified to include other areas. It 
appears that there is complete connectivity between all modules. However, as 
APPENDIX C: EXAMPLE ARCHITECTURES 
 
 
      
Page No - 244 - 
 
this is a notional architecture and it is not clear whether it was ever built or 
developed further, it is hard to say whether this architecture, including this 
complete connectivity, is valid. 
The COS, however, appears to be much more thought out in terms of 
functionality and represents a complete view of its integration with the rest of 
the vehicle systems. 
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Appendix D The Synthetic Environment Based Acquisition (SEBA) 
Process for System Implementation 
D.1 Features of SEBA 
D.1.1 The Spiral Development Process and the SEBA Wheel78 
SEBA is predominantly concerned with the construction and management of an 
evolving set of Synthetic Environments (SEs), Models and Simulations (SEMS), 
of increasing complexity. The aim is to mitigate risk by simulating, modelling 
and emulating the necessary variables to ensure the equipment target remains 
within the specified boundaries (ordinarily of time, cost and performance).  
All the information used and derived through the SEBA approach is held within 
a central Knowledge Repository, which may take the form of a Shared Data 
Environment (SDE) or Advanced Collaborative Environment (ACE) and is 
accessible by all stakeholders but partitioned to protect national security and 
commercial sensitivities. With the use of suitable configuration control, a data 
audit trail can be achieved and the components of decision-making traced. A 
knowledge repository also facilitates the management of resources and tools, 
such as the potentially large numbers of integrated models and simulations and 
their associated volumes of data. 
Spiral development delivers an increasingly more detailed concept design, 
which requires more detailed analysis to support acquisition decisions. Within 
the 'SEBA wheel', Figure 1 below, the inner wheel is 'spun' quickly; possibly 
many times for each step progression around the outer wheel, which represents 
the phases of the acquisition process. Each revolution of the inner wheel 
evolves and increases the fidelity of the knowledge appertaining to a solution; 
this knowledge is captured in the expanding central Knowledge Repository. 
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Figure 62: The 'SEBA Wheel' 
D.1.2 Simultaneous Testing79 
SEBA enables early integration of the system design. This not only reduces risk 
from the outset but will allow equipment testing and capability testing to take 
place throughout the concept, assessment and design stages of the systems 
engineering process.  This is in contrast to traditional practices, where testing 
tends to take place as a final stage of the development process.  Within SEBA, 
testing is an integral part of the design process rather than a final quality 
assurance check mechanism. 
D.1.3 End User Involvement79 
Synthetic environments allow the end user to be involved in the acquisition 
process in a full and meaningful way from the beginning of the acquisition 
lifecycle.   This is in contrast to traditional programmes where users may be 
consulted but would rarely be a part of the design team and would probably not 
get to influence the development of capability.  In SEBA the user can be 
involved from the outset by using models of the proposed equipment in a virtual 
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world which therefore allows equipment development to occur at the same time 
as doctrine development.  In the past, the separation of the two has led to a 
capability gap.  With SEBA, the equipment becomes an effective component of 
defence capability much sooner than previously would have been possible. 
D.1.4 Iterative Modelling79 
SEBA allows a process of iterative model development and integration, leading 
to greater understanding and insights earlier in the CADMID process.  The 
evaluators can use simulations to explore the design space, to validate designs 
taking into account any restrictions/limitation of the target environment, and to 
converge upon a capability that meets the need.  This is done in an iterative 
fashion, rather that at one particular stage, which means that the capability is 
developed in a much quicker and more efficient way.  
D.1.5 Experimentation79 
An acquisition process supported by models, simulations and synthetic 
environments allows design teams to concurrently explore greater numbers of 
potential solutions than is currently possible using traditional engineering means 
within a reasonable timeframe. On the other hand, a smaller number of designs 
may be pursued to a greater depth, equivalent to what is currently known as 
Rapid Prototyping.  It also allows the investigation of several different, widely 
varying scenarios, giving confidence that the developed capability will be useful 
and relevant in all envisaged scenarios.  Equally, SEBA allows the exploration 
of the design space through time, allowing the full lifecycle equipment costs to 
be considered at the beginning. Finally, it allows the proposed capability to be 
integrated into existing (and/or proposed) defence capability as a part of the 
design process.  This further strengthens confidence that the capability 
requirement will be met. 
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D.2 Evolutionary Acquisition & Spiral Development80 
The publication of the US Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5000.1 and 
DoD 5000.2 established a preference for the use of Evolutionary Acquisition134 
strategies relying on a spiral development process.  
Evolutionary Acquisition and spiral development are methods that will allow a 
reduction in the time for the delivery of effective capability. These approaches 
are incremental in nature and are designed to develop and field demonstrated 
technologies for both hardware and software in manageable pieces. 
Evolutionary Acquisition and spiral development also allow insertion of new 
technologies and capabilities over time. 
These approaches provide the best means of getting advanced technologies 
into Service quickly while providing continual improvements in capability. 
Evolutionary Acquisition and spiral development are similar to pre-planned 
product improvement but are focused on providing an initial capability that may 
be less than the full requirement as a trade-off for earlier delivery, agility, 
affordability, and risk reduction.  
For Systems Engineers, spiral development is a means whereby a baseline 
system can be developed very quickly with a minimal set of requirements. The 
development process is then one of increasingly refining the quality, scope and 
capability of the situated system, allied with more detailed levels of testing. With 
each spiral, new capability requirements can be developed and included within 
the design.  The performance of this new design can then be measured and 
                                            
134
 Within the Rapid Engineering environment, this is referred to as Incremental 
Development. 
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costed, thus enabling capability driven specification and acquisition within an 
appropriate contracting environment. Further amplification is covered below: 
D.3 Evolutionary Acquisition80 
Evolutionary Acquisition is an acquisition strategy that defines, develops, 
produces or acquires, and fields an initial hardware or software increment (or 
block) of operational capability. It is based on technologies demonstrated in 
relevant environments, time-phased requirements, and demonstrated 
manufacturing or software deployment capabilities.  
These capabilities can be provided in a shorter period of time, followed by 
subsequent increments of capability over time that accommodate improved 
technology and allow for complete and adaptable systems over time. Each 
increment will meet a militarily useful capability specified by the user.  
There are two basic approaches to Evolutionary Acquisition. In one approach, 
the ultimate functionality can be defined at the beginning of the program, with 
the content of each deployable increment determined by the maturation of key 
technologies. 
In the second approach, the ultimate functionality cannot be defined at the 
beginning of the program, and each increment of capability is defined by the 
maturation of the technologies matched with the evolving needs of the user. 
D.4 Spiral Development79 
The spiral development method is an iterative process for developing a defined 
set of capabilities within one increment. This process provides the opportunity 
for interaction between the user, tester, and developer. In this process, the 
requirements are refined through experimentation, evaluation of design options, 
trade off analyses and risk management. Thus there is continuous feedback, 
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and the user is provided the best possible capability within the increment. Each 
increment may include a number of spirals. Spiral development implements 
evolutionary acquisition. 
D.5 Anticipated Benefits and Concerns of SEBA 
D.5.1 Anticipated Benefits 
Currently, SEBA remains a largely unproven process.  However, there are likely 
to be significant benefits associated with it if it is implemented as currently 
envisaged.  Amongst these are the following: 
Reduced Risk - A reduced overall programme risk, through informed and 
timely decision making. Additionally, this risk is driven out far earlier in 
the programme than conventionally.   
Reduced Cycle Time - A reduced cycle time within programmes.  In 
essence, the team will be able to iterate through concepts to assessment 
and design more quickly than traditional methods.  
Reduced Ground and Flight Testing - A reduced requirement for 
exercises and trials during development time, hence reducing costs for 
time, space and prototypes.  
Reduced Development Time and Cost - As a consequence of the above, 
and because of reduced re-work, a reduction in overall programme time 
and cost.  This should ensure that equipments are brought into service 
sooner and are hence current for a longer time. 
Better Visualisation - The ability to effectively visualise requirements and 
cost drivers, and their implications. 
Improved Flexibility  - An ability to adapt quickly and flexibly to changing 
requirements, scenarios and environments.   
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Improved Human Machine Interface Design - Support for the inclusion 
and  evaluation of human factors.  In essence, SEs support the inclusion 
of the human at the outset of and right through the development process. 
Better Interoperability - Representation of the whole system, user and 
environment within the wider defence system of systems. 
Better Teamworking - SEs involve linking multidisciplinary and multi-
organisational teams together.  So an SE based approach positively 
encourages IPTs to work in an integrated manner. 
Better System Employment – As development proceeds, it will be possible 
to continually develop the operational doctrine for its subsequent 
employment. In parallel with this is the opportunity for pre-service training 
in terms of operational use. This latter aspect not only covers 
employment but extends into support and logistics. 
All of the above factors, including the fact of early integration of the system, will 
inspire greater confidence that the system will deliver the desired capability. 
D.5.2 Concerns79 
There are concerns about the SEBA process and its implementation which are 
expressed in Ref 79.  Amongst them are: 
Verification & Validation - The user of any model, simulation or SE must 
have confidence that it is a credible representation of reality.  That is, the 
model must be verified and validated.   
False credibility - It appears to be an unfortunate fact that individuals will 
often attach greater credibility to a SE than the underlying component 
models themselves warrant.  
Configuration Management - The concept of SEBA envisages an iterative, 
integrated approach to the use of models, simulations and synthetic 
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environments throughout the lifetime of a capability or equipment.  This 
necessitates advanced configuration management mechanisms, as 
would be the case in any equipment acquisition programme. 
Interoperability and Scalability - Taking a systems of systems view, it is 
possible that there will be a need to integrate whole SEs to investigate 
wider defence capability, doctrine and concepts.  Hence SEs must be 
designed with interoperability and scalability in mind.   
Cost - The construction of an SE may be a very expensive and time 
consuming process.  The benefit is that going through that process may 
give you a better capability earlier.  The downside is that in the short term 
it may not seem to be the most affordable solution. 
Data Capture and Recording - SEs are used primarily to conduct 
experiments.  Hence these experiments need to be designed using the 
principles of experimental design in line with the purpose and context of 
the problem i.e. each experiment has a defined purpose and results.  
The data need to be captured and recorded as would any other lab 
experiment. 
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Appendix E The Use of Jack in a Certifiable UAS Architecture 
E.1 Architecture Concept 
In developing the proposed solution architecture, a smaller scale model was 
constructed early in 2006, coded primarily in JAVA. A reference view of this is 
shown below: 
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Figure 63: Concept Model Reference Architecture 
This model included simple planning functionality to enable the aircraft to get 
airborne, fly a route, deal with a few emergencies (not fully tested or 
demonstrated) and land safely on the runway. It was noticed that considerable 
programming was required even for these simple plans and the conclusion was 
formed that programming plans was neither a simple nor scalable exercise. This 
would be made worse if plans are required to be generated by the autonomous 
system in response to unusual situations and events135. The preferred choice of 
programming language for a certifiable system is ADA and this language is 
                                            
135
 Which is not envisaged at this stage 
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characterised by being robust, reliable and heavyweight. These characteristics 
make programming of plans likely to be even more difficult – a fact that was 
established during software development of the proposed solution. 
Noting that JACK had been developed with the specific intention of producing 
scalable plans but could not be certified for control use, some thought was 
given as to how JACK could be used. The result was the development of the 
Mixed Language Architecture Concept136 as described below. 
The prime requirement for certification is that the generation of the control 
signal from data must come solely from certified software.  However, it was 
considered that the planning function, in itself, is not necessarily required to be 
certified. In other words, the generation of a proposed plan cannot ever result in 
a control signal. What can, and does do though, is the assessment, selection 
and implementation of a plan. Therefore, it may be possible to gain certification 
by implementing a separation, and preferably a physical separation, between 
the planning functions and the executive/control functions. 
The concept is therefore to use JACK, operating on its own hardware, to 
generate alternative plans and pass these to the Executive for assessment, 
selection and implementation.  The Executive and Controllers would operate in 
their own environment, be programmed in ADA (i.e. applications for which ADA 
is most suited) and would be necessarily certified.  
In order to test this concept, Agent Oriented Software (AOS), the JACK 
developers, were contacted and they agreed to help. They had already 
demonstrated JACK operating under VxWorks using Perc software sourced 
from Aeonics. Meanwhile BAE SYSTEMS had already demonstrated their own 
                                            
136
 Whilst I can and do claim ownership of the concept and the implementation design, the 
system integration effort and final demonstration was done by others. 
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routing software running VxWorks, and the proprietary 3 layer stack operating 
system, on a VME card. The JACK environment, application and Perc, were 
installed on a RIO4 VME card. Using an existing avionic application running on 
a linux based network and connecting the two via Ethernet, successful two-way 
communications were established between the JACK application programme 
and the BAE SYSTEMS application. This was internally demonstrated to senior 
BAE SYSTEMS personnel on 13 December 2006. The implementation of the 
demonstration is shown below: 
PowerPC (RIO4)
Pluto
Uranus
Venus
Uranus is a Sun Solaris machine which is the server for the PowerPC 
cards, providing Target Server File System (TSFS) access through
Tornado 2.2.1
Venus simply hosts the 
minicom session so as to see 
the output from the PowerPC 
card.
RS232 comms over USB
The RIO4 PowerPC card is running vxWorks 5.5.1 along with Aonix
Perc Ultra.  This card then has access to the JACK jar files (jackrt.jar, 
comms,jar etc) through TSFS.
Et
he
rn
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n
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Pluto is a Linux machine on which is hosted an SoI 
Lite application.  This application receives the 
message transmitted from comms.jar (JACK) and 
prints the output to screen.
The UDP communications serving a JACK 
application have been successfully tested, 
running on PowerPC (vxWorks, Perc) and 
SoI Lite (Linux). This demonstrates the 
capability of the infrastructure in place to 
run JACK code.
 
Figure 64: Mixed Language Architecture Demonstration Implementation 
This demonstration is important because it not only demonstrates the feasibility 
of the Mixed Language Architecture in terms of communications and physical 
separation, but also because it utilised hardware and software typical of that 
used in state of the art commercial avionic systems flying today. 
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It is intended that this concept will be further extended during 2007 by a 
collaboration between BAE SYSTEMS and AOS under the ASTRAEA 
Programme. Particular emphasis will be on certifiability and BAE SYSTEMS 
certification engineers (not me) will study the functional system, develop use 
cases for safety functions and attempt to provide a process for certification. 
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Appendix F Description of Example UASs in Current Service [81] 
F.1 MQ-1 Predator: 
The Predator is an armed, multi-role, long endurance UAS (Group 4) that 
carries an EO/IR payload, laser target marker, laser illuminator and signal 
intelligence (SIGINT) payloads. Rated USAF pilots fly these aircraft by one of 
three methods. These methods are: manual flying, semi-autonomous monitored 
flight and pre-programmed flight. With two data link options, Predators can be 
flown LOS within approximately 100 miles of the launch and recovery base or 
flown BLOS via satellite datalinks. Missions can be controlled from the launch 
base or through Remote Split Operations (RSO) from worldwide-based mission 
control elements. The crew and aircraft can re-role to any component of the kill 
chain during one mission while performing the following missions and tasks: 
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), Close Air Support (CAS), 
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) support, precision strike, buddy laze, 
convoy over-watch, raid over-watch, target development, and terminal air 
control. Predators are used primarily for persistent ISR functions. The Predator 
force objective is 185 aircraft, funded through the Military Intelligence Program 
(MIP).  
The Predator has the following performance: 
• Max Altitude: 25,000 ft. ; Employment altitude: 10,000-20,000 ft. 
• Max speed: 120 KIAS; Loiter speed: 80 KIAS 
• Operational Endurance: 22 hrs. 
• Max payload: 300 lbs. externally 
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F.2 MQ-9 Reaper: 
The Reaper is an armed, multi-role, long endurance UAS that carries an EO/IR 
payload, laser target marker, laser illuminator and synthetic aperture radar 
(SAR). Seven external hard points allow an open architecture variety of weapon 
and SIGINT payloads to be carried. Rated USAF pilots fly these aircraft by one 
of three methods. These methods are: manual flying, semi-autonomous 
monitored flight and pre-programmed flight. With two data link options, Reapers 
can be flown LOS within approximately 100 miles of the launch and recovery 
base or flown BLOS via satellite datalinks. Missions can be controlled from the 
launch base or through remote split operations (RSO) from worldwide-based 
mission control elements. The crew and aircraft can re-role to any component of 
the kill chain during one mission while performing the following missions and 
tasks: ISR, CAS, CSAR support, precision strike, buddy laze, convoy over-
watch, raid over-watch, target development, and terminal air control. Reapers 
are used primarily for persistent strike functions while possessing loiter time for 
ISR functions as well. The Reaper FY10 force objective is 319 aircraft. This will 
enable a transition plan for growth to 50 Reaper and Predator combined combat 
air patrols (CAP) by 4QFY11 and all Reaper by FY16. 
The Reaper has the following performance: 
• Max Altitude: 50,000 ft.; Employment altitude: 25,000-30,000 ft. 
• Max speed: 240 KIAS ; Loiter speed: 100 KIAS 
• Operational endurance: 18 hrs. 
• Max payload: 3000 lbs. externally 
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F.3 RQ-4 Global Hawk: 
The Global Hawk can be operated LOS or BLOS and transmit its data to the 
USAF Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) or other nodes including 
the Army Tactical Exploitation system (TES) for exploitation and dissemination. 
The Global Hawk force structure contains two baseline models, RQ-4A and RQ-
4B, in 4 production blocks, funded by the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). 
Seven RQ-4A Block 10 aircraft are equipped with EO, IR, and SAR sensors. Six 
RQ-4B Block 20 aircraft will be equipped with the Battlefield Airborne 
Communications Node (BACN). BACN provides a Tactical Data Link gateway 
between Link 16, the Situation Airborne Data Link (SADL) and the Integrated 
Broadcast System (IBS). Through BACN, users of these three systems can 
share information and form a common tactical picture. Further, BACN provides 
an Internet Protocol based networking capability so military networks can 
interface and share content across both secure and open internet connections. 
BACN provides the capability to "cross-band" military, civilian and commercial 
communications systems. Further, BACN allows soldiers on foot, or platforms 
without advanced communications systems to connect via cellular phones, 
existing narrow band radios, or even an airborne 802.11 to the battle field 
network. Forty-two RQ-4B Block 30 aircraft will have the Enhanced Integrated 
Sensor Suite (EISS) with EO, IR, and SAR and the Airborne Signals Intelligence 
Payload (ASIP) for SIGINT collection. Twenty-two RQ-4B Block 40 aircraft will 
have the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) 
payload; planned capability includes Active Electronically Scanned Array 
(AESA) radar with concurrent high-resolution SAR imagery, high-range-
resolution (HRR) imagery, and robust Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) 
data. The ground stations (10 for the multi-INT systems; 3 for the Block 40) 
consist of a Launch and Recovery Element (LRE) and the Mission Control 
Element (MCE). The crew is two pilots (1 for MCE, 1 for LRE), one sensor 
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operator, and additional support that include one Quality Control (QC) manager, 
and one communications technician. 
The Global Hawk has the following performance: 
• Max Altitude: 65,000 ft. (Block 10), 60,000 ft. (Blocks 20/30/40) 
• Max speed: 340 KTAS (Block 10), 320 KTAS (Blocks 20/30/40) 
• Max endurance: 28 hrs. 
• Max payload: 2,000 lbs. (Block 10), 3,000 lbs. (Blocks 20/30/40) 
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Appendix G Sense and Avoid Experimental Data 
G.1 Sense and Avoid Experimental Setup 
The Sense and Avoid sub system of the AIMS architecture was 
implemented as in Figure 15. The experimental setup was as 
described below: 
Intruder Generator
(Intruder Start Position, Intruder Velocity)
Required  
Range to  
CPA
Requi red 
TCA
Required  
Tim e to  
Col li sion
Intruder Position
Synthetic Environment Hub
In truder Position
Simple Data Fusion
(no sensor model)
In truder Relativ e 
P osi tion
Sense & Avoid Manager
Sense & Avoid Planner
In truder Data
Own ac Data
S& A Plan
S& A Metrics
Master Executive              
Ground Control Station
S&A  P lan
Author isa tion
Request
S &A Plan
Authorisation
Intruder Posi tion
Flight Path Manager
S&A  P lan
Author ity to manoeuvre
Mission Controller
S&A Autopilot Command
Vehicle System Autopilot
Autopilot Command
Autonomous Integrated Mission System
(part of)
S& A Plan
 
Figure 65: Schematic of Sense & Avoid Experimental Setup 
The Intruder Generator generates the intruder’s start position and velocity 
based the on input parameters above. An updated position for all hub objects is 
calculated at each cycle of the Synthetic Environment Hub. Note that an 
application named Simple Data Fusion, which tracks the intruder position, is 
used instead of a millimetric wave radar model (which was unavailable at the 
time of the experiment). 
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G.2 Sense and Avoid Performance Model 
A copy of the Matlab code for the Sense and Avoid Performance Model for the 
10k Detection Range parameter is given below : 
% File: Performance Margin Test file.m 
% A timeline model for sense and avoid variables 
% A positive mean distribution denotes a human can be in the loop 
% a negative one denotes that the autonomous system will perform better 
% Let us simulate ... 
 
PM = 0; 
nSim = 40000; 
result = zeros(nSim, 1); 
sortedres = zeros(nSim, 1); 
meandet = 10000; 
plus = 0; 
neg  = 0; 
 
for k = 1:nSim, 
DetectRange = meandet + 1363 * randn(); 
% Track Crossing Angle +- 30 degs 
TCA = 0.5 *(rand()); 
% closing velocity 100m/s - 200m/s 
CloseVelocity = (261.4 + 3.3 * randn()); %* cos(TCA); 
% initial time to collision 
TimeToCollision = DetectRange / CloseVelocity; 
% downlink latency, poisson with a mean of 1.2 
downlink = poissrnd(1.2); 
% uplink latency, poisson with a mean of 1.2 
uplink = downlink; 
% pilot decision process, gaussian with a mean of 7, SD of 2 
PilotDecisionProcess = 7.0 + 2 * randn(); 
% safety buffer 
SafetyBuffer = 7;% + 1 * rand(); 
% safe separation generation 
SafeSepGen = 11;% + 3 * rand(); 
 
PM = fix((TimeToCollision -  downlink - ... 
         PilotDecisionProcess - uplink - ... 
         SafetyBuffer - SafeSepGen)); 
APPENDIX G: SENSE AND AVOID EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
 
 
      
Page No - 263 - 
 
 
result(k) = PM; 
 
%fprintf('  PerformanceMargin: %.1f\n', PM); 
 
sortedres = sort(result); 
sortmean = chop(mean(sortedres), 3); 
sortdev = chop(std(sortedres), 3); 
skew = chop(skewness(sortedres), 3); 
 
hist(sortedres, 16); 
 
xlabel('Performance Margin(secs)'); 
ylabel('Number of Occurrences'); 
text(10, 8000, ['Mean Det Range(km) = ' num2str(meandet/1000)]); 
text(10, 7500, ['Skewness = ' num2str(sortdev)]); 
text(10, 7000, ['Mean Closing Velocity = 261m/sec']); 
text(10, 6500, ['Distribution Mean = ' num2str(sortmean)]); 
text(10, 6000, ['Number of Samples = ' num2str(nSim)]); 
text(12, 5500, ['Distribution SD = ' num2str(sortdev)]); 
text(12, 5000, ['Pilot Decision = 5 sec']); 
text(14, 4500, ['Safety Buffer = 7 sec']); 
text(14, 4000, ['Safe Sep = 11 sec']); 
text(14, 3500, ['TCA = 180 degs']); 
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G.3 Sense and Avoid Experimental Raw Data as Logged 
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G.4 Sense and Avoid Experimental Raw Data Subset for a Required Closest Point of Approach of 926m 
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G.5 Sense and Avoid Experimental Raw Data Subset for a Required Closest Point of Approach of 463m 
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G.6 Data for the CPA 926m Plot 
 
G.7 Data for the CPA 423m Plot 
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Appendix H UAS Accident Data 
This data 
was 
collected 
from the 
web pages:  
United 
States Air 
Force 
Class A 
Aerospace 
Mishaps, at 
http://usaf.
aib.law.af.
mil/  last 
accessed 
on 5 July 
2011
  Page No - 269 - 
 
REFERENCES 
                                            
[1] Civil Aviation Authority, Directorate of Airspace Policy: “CAP 722 - Unmanned 
Aircraft System Operations in UK Airspace – Guidance”, Section 2 Policy, 
Chapter 1 UAS Operating Principles, Sub Chapter 5 Airspace Principles for UAS 
Operations in the UK, Sub Chapters 5.5 and 5.2 refer respectively, 6 April 2010 
[2] Douglas A. Weigmann and Scott A. Shappell, “A Human Error Approach to 
Aviation Accident Analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System”, 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd., Burlington,  USA, 2003. 
[3] James Reason, “Human Error”, Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
[4] Butler A. Jumper: “Air Force to bring "warfighting" focus to combat drone effort”. 
Defense Daily Network 2005 Jan 25. Retrieved February 10, 2005, from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.defensedaily.com  
[5] Remarks made at a US Air Force Association Conference Feb 2008: General 
Hal Hornberg, Chief of Air Combat Command USAF, 2008.   
[6] James T. Luxhøj , Kimberlee Kauffeld: “Evaluating the Effect of Technology 
Insertion into the National Airspace System “, Department of Industrial and Systems 
Engineering, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 2003.  
[7] Many aspects of this section is referenced from: Lawrence R. Newcombe: 
“Unmanned Aviation: A Brief History of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles”, American Institute 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Reston Virginia , 2004 
[8] One such citation is: Elizabeth Bone and Christopher Bolkcom: “Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research 
Service, The (US) Library of Congress, April 2003 
[9] Sqn Ldr Rajesh Kumar, RAAF: “Tactical Reconnaissance: UASs versus 
Manned Aircraft, Chapter 6 - The Likely Cost of UAS and Manned Aircraft Operations”, 
The Research Department Air Command and Staff College, USAF, March 1997. 
[10]  Lt Cdr. F. Karen Coyle: “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Operational Implications for 
the Joint Force Commander”. Defence Technical Information Center, Ft Belvior, VA. 
p14 (believed unpublished but cited in [8]). 
[11]  UAS Roadmap: “Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap: 2005-2030”, Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, August 4, 2005. 
  Page No - 270 - 
 
                                                                                                                                
[12]  Major James C. Hoffman, USAF and Charles Tustin Kamps: “At the 
Crossroads, Future “Manning” for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles”, Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar 
Maxwell AFB, Alabama, March 2005 
[13] Department of Defence (USA): “Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Reliability Study”, 
February 2003 
[14]  General Audit Office (USA): “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles - Improved Strategic 
and Acquisition Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges”, March 2005. 
[15]  Ella M. Atkins: “Certifiable Autonomous Flight Management for Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems”, The BRIDGE Volume 40, Number 4, Winter 2010 
[16] M.L. Cummings (MIT, Cambridge, Mass), S. Bruni, S. Mercier and P.J. Mitchell: 
“Automation Architecture for Single Operator, Multiple UAS Command and Control”, 
The International C2 Journal | Vol 1, No 2 | 1-24, 2007. 
[17] Patchett C.H.: “The Performance of an Intelligent Agent in Air Combat”: Masters 
Thesis, Cranfield University, 2002. 
[18] Warwick. G. “Trust: The Greatest Obstacle to UAS Autonomy”, Aviation Week, 
13 September 2010. 
[19] Bartolomasi Paulo G., Operational Analysis Department, BAE Warton: “The 
Theory of Manoeuvre Warfare”, BAe Report BAe-WOA-RP-GEN-11175, June 1995. 
Unpublished work. 
[20]  Sheridan, T.B. and Verplank W.L., 1978. “Human and Computer Control of 
Undersea Tele-operators”; Technical Report. MIT Man-machine Systems Laboratory, 
Cambridge, MA. 
[21 ] Parasuraman R., Sheridan T.B, and Wickens C.D. (2000). “A Model for Types 
and Levels of Human Interaction with Automation”. IEEE Transactions on Systems, 
Man, and Cybernetics. Part A: Systems and Humans, Vol 30, No 3, pp. 286-297. May 
2000. 
[22] M. L. Cummings: “Human Supervisory Control of Swarming Networks”, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 
[23]  R.M.Taylor: “Cognitive Cockpit Systems Engineering: Pilot Authorisation and 
Control of Tasks”; Human Sciences, DSTL, Farnborough, UK.2001. 
[24] A.Hill, P.Wllkinson and F.Cayzer (nee Sturrock): ”Adaptive Human-System 
Interaction: Assessment Facility Development Requirements”, BAES-ASE-W-W7N3-
  Page No - 271 - 
 
                                                                                                                                
RP-000027; BAE SYSTEMS, 2006. Unpublished report. 
[25]  IEEE STD 610.12 as adapted by the U.S. DOD C4ISR:”Architecture 
Framework”, Version 2.0, December 1997 
[26]  Bass, Clements, Kazman: “Software Architecture in Practice”, 2nd edition, 
Addison-Wesley 2003 
[27] Erann Gat: “On Three Layer Architectures”, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 
California Institute of Technology, published in AI and Mobile Robots. AAAI Press, 
1998. 
[28] Ralph Hartley and Frank Pitone: “Experiments with the Subsumption 
Architecture”, Proceedings of the International Conference on Robotics and Automation 
(ICRA), 1991.  
[29] English philosopher and Franciscan monk William of Ockham (ca. 1285-1349).  
“Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate" or "plurality should not be posited without 
necessity." This can be taken to mean, in modern life, that in any given model, there 
should be no concepts, variables or constructs that are not really needed to explain the 
phenomenon. By doing that, developing the model will become much easier, and there 
is less chance of introducing inconsistencies, ambiguities and redundancies. 
[30 ] R Edwards:,  Integrated Modular Systems- Architecture Concept Summary; 
April 2001; BAE Systems. Unpublished report 
[30] Tom Erkkinen: “High-Integrity Code Generation and Verification”, Aerospace 
and Defense Digest, February 2005 
[32] UK Ministry of Defence: “Defence Technology Strategy – for the demands of 
the 21st Century”, pp112-113, 2006, available at http://www.mod.uk. 
[33] D.R.Haddon, C.J.Whittaker: “Aircraft Airworthiness Certification Standards for 
Civil UASs”, Civil Aviation Authority, August 2002 
[34] Informal interview with BAE SYSTEMS UAS pilots held during a “Day in the Life 
of a UAS Pilot “ workshop held at BAE SYSTEMS Warton, April 2009. 
[35]  Mica R. Endsley: “Situation Awareness and Human Error: Designing to Support 
Human Performance”, SA Technologies, Inc. 1999 
[36] Denis Besnard, David Greathead & Gordon Baxter: “When Mental Models Go 
Wrong: Co-Occurrences In Dynamic, Critical Systems”, Universities of York and 
Newcastle, 2004. 
  Page No - 272 - 
 
                                                                                                                                
[37]  Kevin Burns: “Mental Models and Normal Errors”, The MITRE Corporation, 
Bedford, MA, 2004. 
[38] Nall Report 2007: Aircraft Operator and Pilot’s Association Aircraft Safety 
Foundation, USA, 2008 
[39] “Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents Worldwide 
Operations 1959 – 2010”: Aviation Safety, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Seattle, 
Washington, USA. June 2011. 
[40] A.P.Tvaryanas, W.T.Thompson, S.H.Constable : “US Military Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle Mishaps: Assessment of the Role of Human Factors Using the HFACS 
Classification System”, USAF, March 2005 
[41] S.D.Manning, C.E.Rash, P.A.LeDuc: “The Role of Human Causal Factors in US 
Army UAV Accidents”, US Army, Fort Rucker, Alabama, 2004 
[42] K.W. Williams:”A Summary of Unmanned Aircraft Accident/Incident Data: 
Human Factors Implications”, Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2004. 
[43] Colonel David L.Nichols, “Mishap Analysis: An Improved Approach to Accident 
Prevention “, Air University Review, Air War College (USAF), July - August 1973 
[44] Barry McGuinness, Ben Dawson:”QUASA: The Measurement of Team and Shared 
Situational Awareness”, Advanced Technology Centre, BAE Systems, Filton, 2004 
(unpublished work). 
[45] Manningham D: “The Cockpit: A Brief History” McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1997   
[46]  Capt Etienne Tarnowski, Experimental Test Pilot, Airbus: “Cockpit Automation 
Philosophy”, NATO RTO HFM Symposium on “The Role of Humans in Intelligent and 
Automated Systems”, held in Warsaw, Poland, 7-9 October 2002, and published in 
RTO-MP-088. 
[47] Bainbridge L: “The Ironies of Automation”,  in J. Rasmussen, K. Duncan and J 
Leplat (Editors)  “New Technology and Human Error”, London: Wiley, 1987 
[48] Donald A. Norman, University of California, San Diego: “The Problem Of 
Automation: Inappropriate Feedback And Interaction, Not Over-Automation”, 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 1990. 
[49] Ken Carpenter: “Draft Specification of the European Encounter Model – a 
précis”. ACAS PROGRAMME, Work Package 1 - Studies on the safety of ACAS II in 
  Page No - 273 - 
 
                                                                                                                                
Europe,  26 February, 2000.  
[50]  ACAS PROGRAMME, Work Package 1:”Final Report on the Studies of the 
Safety of ACAS II in Europe”, ACAS/ACASA 02-014, March 2002 
[51] As discussed with members of the Communications Research Team at Military 
Air Solutions, BAE SYSTEMS on 21 November 2010.  
[52] EUROCONTROL/FAA Future Communications Study Operational Concepts 
and Requirements Team: “Communications Operating Concept and Requirements 
(COCR) for the Future Radio System (FRS)”, Version 2.0, May 2007 
[53] 2nd Lt Thomas B. Billingsby: “Safety Analysis of TCAS on Global Hawk using 
Airspace Encounter Models”, USAF Academy, June 2006 
[54] Aircraft Accident Report  NTSB/AAR-10/03, PB2010-910403: ”Loss of Thrust in 
Both Engines After Encountering a Flock of Birds and Subsequent Ditching on the 
Hudson River, US Airways Flight 1549, Airbus A320-214, N106US, Weehawken, New 
Jersey January 15, 2009”: National Transportation Safety Board, May 4 2010 
[55] Aircraft Accident Synopsis CHI06MA121: ”Predator B Accident, Nogales, 
Arizona, 25 April 2006”: National Transportation Safety Board, October 31 2007. 
[56  Werner J.A. Dahm, Chief Scientist of the U.S. Air Force (AF/ST): “Report on 
Technology Horizons: A Vision for Air Force Science & Technology During 2010-2030”, 
USAF, Washington, May 2010 
[57]  Hyacinth S.Nwana: “Software Agents: An Overview”, BT Laboratories, 
Knowledge Engineering Review, Vol. 11, No 3, pp.1-40, Sept 1996. Also available at 
http://www.sce.carleton.ca/netmanage/docs/AgentsOverview/ao.html 
[58] Stan Franklin and Art Graesser: “Is it an Agent, or just a Program?: A 
Taxonomy for Autonomous Agents”, Institute for Intelligent Systems, University of 
Memphis, Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Agent Theories, 
Architectures, and Languages, Springer – Verlag,1996. 
[59] Ralph L.Keeney and Howard Raiffa, “Decisions with Multiple Objectives: 
Preferences and Value Tradeoffs”, Cambridge University Press, first issued 1976 , re-
issued 1993, ISBN 0-521-43883-7.  
[60] John G. Morris, Christine M. Mitchell, William Potter: “A Designer's Associate: 
Support for the Design of Software for Complex Dynamic Control Systems”, Technical 
Report GIT-COGSCI-94/30, Cognitive Science Program, College of Computing, 
  Page No - 274 - 
 
                                                                                                                                
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, 1994 .  
[61] Endsley M.R: “Towards a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems”, 
Special Issue: “Situation Awareness”, published in “Human Factors” 37(1) pp 32-64, 
1995. 
[62]  G. A. Klein, "Recognition-Primed Decisions" in William B. Rouse (ed.), 
Advances in Man-Machine System Research (Greenwich, CT: Jai Press, 1989). 
[63]  John R.Boyd: “A Discourse on Winning and Losing”, 1986, a collection of 
briefings on competitive strategy. Unpublished reports but available at http://www.d-n-
i.net/second_level/boyd/military.htm and at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-
thry.htm#boyd 
[64 ] James.S.Albus: “A Reference Model Architecture for Intelligent Systems 
Design”; Intelligent Systems Division, Manufacturing Engineering Laboratory, National 
Institute for Standards and Technology, 1999. 
[65] James.S.Albus and Anthony.J.Barbera: RCS: ”A Cognitive Architecture for 
Intelligent Multi-Agent Systems”; Intelligent Systems Division, Manufacturing 
Engineering Laboratory, National Institute for Standards and Technology, 2003. 
[66] Dickmanns E.D: “A General Dynamic Vision Architecture for UGV and UAS”, 
Journal of Applied Intelligence, 2, pp251-270, 1992  
[67] Albus J: “Brains Behaviour and Robotics”, BYTE/McGraw Hill, Peterborough, 
NH, 1981 
[68] Fodor J: “The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way”; MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 
2000. 
[69] Searle J: ”The Rediscovery of the Mind”, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1992  
[70] Pylyshyn, Z: “The Robot’s Dilemma: The Frame Problem in Artificial 
Intelligence”; Ablex, Norwood, N.J., 1987. 
[71]  Kamel S. Saidi, Robert Bunch, Alan M. Lytle, Fredrick Proctor,:  “Development 
of a Real Time Control System Architecture for Automated Steel Construction”, 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, ISARC, 2006. 
[72] Volpe, Nesnas, Estlin, Mutz, Petras, Das: “The CLARAty Architecture for 
Robotic Autonomy”, 2001 also “CLARAty: Coupled Layer Architecture for Robotic 
Autonomy”, 2000; Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, CA. 
[73] Muller J.P., Pischel M.: “The Agent Architecture InteRRaP: Concept and 
  Page No - 275 - 
 
                                                                                                                                
Application”; German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI), Saarbrucken 
11, 1993. 
[74] “JACK™ Intelligent Agents: Agent Manual, Release 5.2”, dated 10-June-05, 
Agent Oriented Software Pty. Ltd., Victoria, Australia 
[75] Rao.A and Georgeff.M: “BDI Agents: From Theory to Practice”; Technical Note 
56, Australian Artificial Intelligence Institute, April 1995. 
[76] DARPA: “J-UCAS – Commonly Asked Questions”; 2005. Available at 
www.darpa.mil/j-ucas 
[77] Pitarys M, Deputy Director J-UCAS: A presentation entitled ”J-UCAS: Common 
Systems & Technologies”, Industry Day for Common Operating System Development”, 
June 2004. Available at www.darpa.mil/j-ucas 
[78] Ministry of Defence WebSite, http://192.5.30.131/issues/simulation/seba.htm, 
20 September 2005 
[79]  Michelle Bevan, Sean Price: “Simulation Based Acquisition: A US/UK 
Perspective”, Presented at the European Simulation Interoperability Workshop in June 
2003;  
[80] Crosstalk: The Journal of Defence Engineering, August 2002 Issue. Article re-
produced at: http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2002/08/easd.html 
[81] United States Air Force: “Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan, 2009-2047”,  
Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington DC, 18 May, 2009 
